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ABSTRACT 
This thesis employs the historical method to illustrate that the central aim of U.S. 
basic national security policy and strategy is and has been to achieve and maintain the 
core national interests — ensure the physical security of the nation, the nation’s values, 
and the nation’s economic prosperity — and core desired end state — provide for the 
enduring security for the American people — by exerting the full spectrum and reach of 
its instruments of national power in peace and in war. To accomplish this, U.S. national 
security policy and strategy must dispose of the artificial walls currently separating its 
foundations and realign and resynchronize the capabilities resident in its instruments of 
national power. Doing so will enable the U.S. to achieve the strategic advantage.  In sum, 
this thesis illustrates that national security encompasses homeland defense and security 
and that the current architecture is counterproductive because destabilizes and retards the 
capabilities, including the "reach," of the instruments of national by creating  unnecessary 
friction and competition for resources between them and their proponents and denigrating 
their capabilities to achieve the strategic advantage. Absent a secure homeland, there is 
no national security and no strategic advantage. 
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I. PURPOSE 
Defining national security is complicated. George F. Kennan (1904-2005; U.S. 
foreign service officer, diplomat, and historian) offered perhaps the least complicated 
definition: “the continued ability of this country to pursue its internal life without serious 
interference.”1 Although the specific modern English term “national security” itself came 
into common parlance in the post-Second World War years, national security refers to, 
and has referred to, the requirement of governments and their civilian and military leaders 
to maintain and ensure the sovereignty and survival of the (their) nation-state through the 
use of economic, military and political power and the exercise of diplomacy. 
Methodologies to achieve and maintain the highest possible desired state of national 
security have been constantly and consistently developed and refined to establish, ensure, 
and maintain political, diplomatic, military, financial, and economic sovereignty and 
security.  
At the end of the Second World War, the term “national security” came into full 
usage in U.S. political discourse. Edward Mead Earle, in the seminal work on modern 
strategic studies Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought From Machiavelli to 
Hitler, pointed out as early as 1943 that “national security strategy has of necessity 
required increasing consideration of nonmilitary factors: economic, psychological, moral, 
political, and technological. Strategy, therefore, is not merely a concept of wartime, but is 
an inherent element of statecraft at all times.”2  
In general, “national security” is a collective term encompassing both national 
defense and foreign relations of the United States. It is the foundation for the 
development of valid national objectives that define U.S. goals or purposes. National 
security interests include, and have included, preserving U.S. political identity, 
                                                 
1 Peter Bergen and Laurie Garrett, Report of the Working Group on State Security and Transnational 
Threats (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
2 Edward Mead Earle, Gordon Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from 
Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), viii. 
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framework, and institutions; fostering economic well-being; and bolstering international 
order supporting the vital interests of the United States and its allies. 
At its simplest, U.S. national security is the use of national power — all of the 
means that are available for employment in the pursuit of national objectives — in peace 
and war to further a strategic vision of America’s role in the world that will best achieve 
the nation’s three core interests: physical security, promotion of values, and economic 
prosperity. The instruments of national power are all the means that are available for 
employment in the pursuit of national objectives.3  
It is this author’s  intention to argue in this thesis that basic U.S. national security 
policy in the post-Cold War era, and in fact throughout it history as an independent 
nation, encompasses not only the fundamental instruments of national power, but that the 
disciplines of homeland defense, homeland security, and comprehensive all-hazard 
(national) emergency preparedness are not separate and distinct disciplines, but rather 
components of U.S. national security that are, or should be, vertically and horizontally 
integrated and operationalized through the nation’s instruments of national power.4 
Secondly, the author intends to illustrate that the national security — physical security, 
promotion of values, and economic prosperity — of the U.S. is best served by a basic 
national security policy and strategy emphasizing a forward-deployed presence 
possessing a concomitant ability to project power globally, but selectively, through the 
nation’s instruments of national power in theaters of operations distant from the U.S. 
homeland. 
Given the transformation of the threat facing the U.S. in the second decade 
following the Cold War, from a symmetric bi-polar nation-state peer competitor 
environment to an asymmetric multi-faceted transnational non-state environment, it is 
critical that U.S. national security policy continues to be able to detect, deter and prevent, 
deny and disrupt, contain, and defeat current and emerging threats to the nation’s 
                                                 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-0: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), x, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed August 15, 2008). 
4 Hereafter referred to as the instruments of national power. 
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survival, and vital, and important interests. These activities must be executed overseas in 
theaters of operations distant from the U.S. homeland. The U.S. must simultaneously 
maintaining the highest state of preparedness possible at home and abroad in order to 
protect against, prevent if possible, respond to, and recover from the effects and 
consequences of attacks and disruptive incidents that do occur. 
 4
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II. RESEARCH ARGUMENT 
It is this author’s contention that the U.S. national security establishment — 
government, private sector, and academia — may have, since the end of the Cold War 
and especially since the attacks of September 11, 2001, unintentionally created an 
unnecessary and counterproductive compartmentalization of U.S. national security.  
This artificial compartmentalization of U.S. national security has unintentionally 
obfuscated the natural alignment and synchronization of the nation’s instruments of 
national power.5 This in turn has hampered the national leadership in optimally 
identifying core national security objectives and expectations (desired end state); 
selecting the appropriate instrument or elements of national power (resources or means) 
to achieve the desired end state; and employing the most effective and efficient course of 
action to conduct operations in pursuit of the desired end state. Above all, artificially 
compartmentalizing these disciplines has hampered the U.S. ability to achieve and sustain 
the strategic advantage and its ability to plan and decisively execute joint and combined 
operations because it has inhibited the alignment and synchronization of the capabilities 
resident in the instruments of national power. 
This thesis will contend and argue, using classical historical method outlined in A 
Guide To Historical Method by Gilbert J. Garraghan, S.J.,6 that the U.S., in order to 
remain responsive to the constantly evolving spectrum of transnational threats facing the 
nation and its survival, vital, and important interests as it closes out the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, should eliminate the artificial separation of homeland defense,7 
                                                 
5 Geographic, natural resources, population/demographics, military, informational, diplomatic, legal 
and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, economic, and the national will. 
6 Gilbert J. Garraghan, A Guide to Historical Method, ed. Jean Delanglez (New York, NY: Fordham 
University Press, 1946). 
7 Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical 
defense infrastructure against external threats, aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. The 
Department of Defense is responsible for homeland defense. 
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homeland security,8 and comprehensive all-hazard emergency preparedness9 and adopt a 
more holistic and integrated definition and organization of U.S. national security.10  
Secondly, this thesis will contend and argue that the U.S. should adopt a 
nominally unilateral and realistic national security posture that emphasizes a forward-
deployed presence possessing a concomitant ability to project power globally, but 
selectively, through the nation’s instruments of national power in theaters of operations 
distant from the U.S. homeland. This national security posture should be operationalized 
through the presence of the full spectrum of U.S. instruments of national power that have 
been appropriately forward-deployed to ensure presence and possess the ability to project 
U.S. power and influence to achieve and maintain the strategic advantage. It must be able 
to detect, deter and prevent, disrupt and deny, contain, and decisively defeat, through 
joint and combined operations, current and emerging threats to the nation’s survival, 
vital, and important interests in at least two major theaters of operations distant from the 
U.S. homeland. It must also simultaneously maintain the highest state of readiness in 
preparation to protect against, prevent if possible, respond to, and recover from any 
disruptive event that could affect the homeland and the core national survival interests. 
                                                 
8 Homeland security is the concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United 
States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that 
do occur. The Department of Homeland Security is the lead federal agency for homeland security. In 
addition, its responsibilities extend beyond terrorism to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and 
recovering from a wide range of major domestic disasters and other emergencies.  
9 It is the policy of the United States government to enhance the preparedness of the nation by 
developing and maintaining a standardized risk-based approach to national planning to integrate and affect 
policy and operational objectives to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all hazards and 
comprises. All-hazard emergency preparedness and incident management strengthen and ensure the 
preparedness of the United States to protect against and mitigate the effects of prevent, respond to, and 
recover from threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. 
10 On May 17, 2007, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13434 (National Security 
Professional Development) that directed the Federal Executive Branch to establish and maintain a cadre of 
senior officers capable of leading operations across organizational boundaries and disciplines during 
periods of national crisis. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
In researching and preparing this thesis, the author predominantly employed the 
classical historical method outlined in A Guide to Historical Method11 by Gilbert J. 
Garraghan, S.J. and the author’s undergraduate training as an historian at the University 
of Oklahoma (1977-1981). Garraghan predominantly employed secondary research 
techniques that involved the summary, collation, and/or synthesis of existing research 
rather than primary research. 
The historical method comprises the techniques and guidelines by which 
historians and historiographers use historical sources and other evidence to research and 
then to write history. There are various history guidelines commonly used by historians in 
their work, under the headings of external criticism, internal criticism, and synthesis. This 
includes higher criticism and textual criticism. 
Though items may vary depending on the subject matter and researcher, the 
following concepts are usually part of most formal historical research: 
 Identification of origin date 
 Evidence of localization 
 Recognition of authorship 
 Analysis of data 
 Identification of integrity 
 Attribution of credibility 
Given that the art and science of formulating and implementing a nation’s basic 
national security policy (BNSP) and strategy and achieving and maintaining a nation’s 
national security occurs within the framework of the international environment and 
because any discussion of basic national security policy and strategy must be entered into  
with an understanding of the international environment and international relations theory, 
this thesis opens the thesis with an introductory overview of international relations theory 
in Chapter IV.  
                                                 
11 Garraghan, A Guide to the Historical Method. 
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Chapter IV recognizes that the strategic environment — past, present, and future 
— is always defined by the character of politics and the interactions among political 
entities. This environment is complex and subject to the interplay of dynamic and often 
contradictory factors. Some elements of politics and policy are rational, that is, the 
product of conscious thought and intent. Other aspects are governed by forces, like 
emotion and chance that defy any purely rational explanation. The effective strategist 
must master the meaning and the peculiarities of this environment 
Then follows a discussion in Chapter V a discussion of the current and 
contemporary threat environment in which U.S. basic national security policy and 
strategy must operate in. The international environment is fraught with threats, both 
foreign and domestic, to the national security of the United States. The current threat 
environment is highly ambiguous and characterized by volatility, uncertainty, 
complexity, and ambiguity. It is precisely because of these threats that the U.S. must 
formulate, adopt, and implement a BNSP and strategy that can detect, deter and contain, 
deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat these threats if it is to 
achieve and sustain its core national security end state and defend its core national 
security goals, objectives, expectations, and interests. Chapter V acknowledges that there 
are enduring challenges for the current and future U.S. national security establishment, at 
home and abroad, and will include familiar military activities, such as defending against 
attacks on U.S. territory, conflict with other nation-state powers, and terrorist networks 
and criminal organizations. These enduring challenges also include dealing with the 
collapse of functioning states and the use of military forces in combination with the non-
military instruments of national power to deter and prevent conflict around the world. 
In Chapter VI, the author introduces the art and science of strategy and the nexus 
it has with both the complex international environment and the threats to U.S. national 
security that are resident within the international environment. Chapter VI advances the 
formulary that basic national security policy (BNSP) and strategy is formulated and 
implemented to (a) defend against threats to the core national end state and the core 
national interests, goals, and objectives associated with it, and (b) to advance, achieve, 
and sustain those core national interests, goals, and objectives. Distilled to its essence, 
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grand strategy is about determining a state’s vital interests — those important enough to 
fight over — and its role in the world. “The crux of grand policy lies,” Paul Kennedy 
observed, “in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of 
the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancements of 
the nation’s long-term (that is wartime and peacetime) best interests.”12 
Chapter VII introduces the position that the defense of the homeland is, and 
always has been, the core national interest and central to U.S. BNSP and strategy. 
Chapter VII discusses and analyzes the differential strategic approaches and how U.S. 
BNSP and strategy must make use, individually and in combination, of its instruments of 
national power to: detect; prepare for and protect against; deter, contain, and prevent; 
respond to, recover from if necessary; and decisively defeat these threats.  Chapter VII 
also introduces the calculus that although American power and influence is pervasive and 
multidimensional when all of its instruments of national power are deployed, the 
challenge of strategic integration, of bringing the instruments into coherent effectiveness 
in the pursuit of national interests, remains. 
Chapter VIII focuses on the criticality and essentiality of the leadership 
identifying clearly defined national interests and subsequently pursuing clearly defined 
and attainable goals, consistent with national values, whose achievement best furthers the 
national interest(s). Chapter VIII concurrently expands on the fundamental purpose of the 
U.S.’s BNSP and its corresponding course of action is to provide a comprehensive 
strategy that balances the ends, ways, and means of the instruments of national power to: 
(1) achieve national security, and to (2) protect, preserve, and promote the American 
political, economic, and ideological way of life. The chapter articulates how U.S. BNSP 
shapes the global environment and how it provides enduring security for the American 
people by exerting the full spectrum and reach of its instruments of national power — 
military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and 
economic — on the international system at the international, state, group/organization, 
                                                 
12 J.A. Bassani, Jr., Saving the World for Democracy - An Historical Analysis of America's Grand 
Strategy in the 21st Century (2005) Storming Media, http://www.stormingmedia.us/85/8566/A856634.html 
(accessed August 15, 2008).  
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and individual levels in order to shape and control its external environment by detecting, 
deterring and preventing, and defeating current and emerging threats to the nation’s 
survival, vital, and important interests. Although departments and agencies have, alone 
and in combination, substantial capabilities (i.e., means and resources or the instruments 
of national power) at their disposal and have developed standard ways of applying those 
means, the absence on clear ends, which are derived from and justified by interests, 
renders the strategic equation insolvable. 
The instruments or elements of national power – geography, natural resources, 
population and demographics, military, informational (ideological), diplomatic, legal and 
law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic and the national will — are 
introduced and defined in Chapter IX. The instruments of national power are the means, 
or resources, which a nation through its government, possesses to operationalize its 
power through its BNSP and strategy in order to achieve its desired end state. Achieving 
and maintaining a satisfactory national security posture involves every instrument of 
element of national power. Given that national security strategists operate across 
organizations and disciplines and subject each potential objective, as well as the ways to 
achieve it, to rigorous mission analyses to assess the costs, risks, and likelihood of 
success, Chapter IX argues that only after completing such analyses can the strategist 
recommend an objective(s) to the policymakers that best furthers the national interest and 
employs, alone or in combination, the strengths and capabilities resident in and 
represented by the instruments of national power. Finally, Chapter IX expands on the 
concept and definition of grand strategy, which is seeks the seamless integration of all 
aspects of national power to achieve a desired policy goal, and introduces the 
“Instrument-Element Model” because it focuses on the essential elements which underlie 
the instruments of power by which competitors, rivals, and belligerents contend and 
interact with each other. 
Chapter X closes the body of thesis by introducing and discussing the 
operationalization of a U.S. BNSP and strategy based on forward presence and power 
projection that is capable of detecting, deterring and containing, denying and disrupting, 
discrediting and delegitimizing, and decisively defeating threats to its core national 
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security end state and supporting interests. Chapter X closes by discussing a layered, 
defense-in-depth BNSP and strategy focused primarily on the U.S. homeland and the 
approaches to U.S. territory. 
The thesis concludes by restating the premise that the principal nexus of the 
definitions of national security, homeland security, and national defense is defending and 
securing the homeland and ensuring the enduring sovereignty of the government and 
people of the United States. The secondary nexus is that only by exerting the full 
spectrum and reach of its instruments of national power can the United States achieve and 
maintain its core interests by framing and shaping the international environment in ways 
favorable to the nation’s desired end state. The third and final nexus is the ever-changing 
international environment.  
Secondly, the author reemphasizes: 
1. U.S. BNSP is the sum (∑) of history; prior decisions; actors; laws, rules, 
regulations, and authorities; and actions and reactions over time. The 
executive branch’s national security establishment, in partnership with the 
legislative branch, determines and defines the survival, vital, and 
important national interests; determines and defines the domestic and 
foreign threats to those interests; and develops and implements actions 
(i.e., courses of action or ways) using the resources (i.e., means or 
capabilities) resident in the instruments of national power to deter and 
contain, deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat 
these threats; and  
2. National power is the capacity to influence the decisions and actions of 
other actors favorable to the U.S. National power is exerted through the 
instruments of elements of national power. Although national power has 
both domestic and foreign components and domestic and foreign 
applications, the core purpose of the application of national power is to 
create and maintain conditions favorable to the nation’s core interests and 
end state. In the practice of national security, there is a constant need to 
balance ends, ways, and means. Achieving this can be likened to a three-
legged stool with the stool itself representing the strategy. A strategy is 
balanced and entails little risk if the selected way (course of action) is 
capable and has sufficient means (resources) to obtain the desired end 
(objective). 
In closing, any future U.S. BNSP and strategy must be (1) a strategy of intent, (2) 
iterative, (3) offensive, but not necessarily preemptive, aggressive, and antagonistic, (4) 
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one of annihilation, and (5) asymmetric.  Any future U.S. BNSP and strategy must focus 
on its ability to deter and contain, deny and disrupt, and discredit and delegitimize 
enemy/adversary actions through the measured and commensurate application of swift, 
precisely targeted, and devastating retaliatory reprisals — through any one of, any 
combination of, or all of the instruments of national power — without warning. The 
retaliatory action must demonstrate that costs and risks of future action far outweigh the 
benefits and gains and that the objective of the U.S. is to eliminate the 
enemy’s/adversary’s ability to defend himself, in other words, to disarm him, thus 
leaving him helpless to oppose the imposition of U.S. will. 
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IV. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
The art and science of formulating and implementing a nation’s basic national 
security policy and strategy and achieving and maintaining a nation’s national security 
occurs within the framework of the international environment. Consequently, any 
discussion of basic national security policy and strategy must be entered into with an 
understanding of the international environment and international relations theory. 
International Relations Theory (IRT) entails the development of conceptual 
frameworks and theories to facilitate the understanding and explanation of events and 
phenomena in world politics, as well as the analysis and informing of associated policies 
and practices.  
Although its origins can be traced back to the 1648 Peace Treaty of Westphalia 
and the establishment of the European concept of the nation-state, the discipline of IRT 
was “officially” established within the social sciences’ community as an inter- and multi-
disciplinary field of study following the First World War with a view to avoiding future 
mass conflicts and ensuring peaceful change.  
This remains a worthy goal, but today the scope and complexities of world 
politics, especially the introduction of an escalating transnational asymmetric and 
unconventional threat, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and 
advanced high explosives (CBRN-E) and other weapons of mass destruction and effect 
(WMD/E) posed by state and non-state actors (NSAs), demand an understanding of a 
much wider range of issues. Moreover, new normative and empirical conceptual 
frameworks and theories are required to improve understanding and assist in the 
development of better policies and practices. 
IRT is a branch of political science and incorporates and represents the study of 
foreign affairs, national security and defense, and global issues actors within the 
international system, including the roles of states, non-state actors, international (inter-
governmental) organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
multi-national corporations (MNCs). IRT is both an academic and public policy field, and 
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can be either positive (i.e., quantitative/empirical) or normative (i.e., qualitative) as it 
both seeks to analyze as well as formulate the national security (defense and foreign 
policy) of particular states. Because of the increased threat posed by radicals and 
extremists who employ terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures, the study of IRT, and 
its companion discipline of comparative politics and government, is increasingly 
incorporating the study of homeland defense and security. As this thesis will argue, the 
core, central raison d’être of any nation’s basic national security policy and strategy is to 
ensure national sovereignty and territorial integrity or as Kennan said, “the continued 
ability of this country to pursue its internal life without serious interference.”13 
Apart from political science, IRT is a multi- and interdisciplinary field of study 
that operates across organizations and disciplines. It draws upon such diverse fields as 
finance and economics, diplomacy, history, law and juridical science, philosophy, 
geography, sociology, anthropology, psychology, linguistics, military art and science, 
intelligence tradecraft, and cultural studies and involves a diverse range of issues, such as 
globalization and its impacts on societies and state sovereignty to ecological 
sustainability, nuclear proliferation, nationalism, economic development, terrorism, 
organized crime, human security, and human rights. Foreign affairs is also a synonym for 
international relations, that is, the activities of a government concerned with basic 
national security and defense policy; foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy; 
international economics and finances; intelligence operations; international 
representation; and the academic study of these activities. 
Many modern political scientists, especially international relations theorists, 
conceptualize and treat political entities as “unitary rational actors,” the social equivalents 
of Newton’s solid bodies hurtling through space. Real political units, however, are not 
unitary nor are they always rational. Rather, they are collections of intertwined, but 
fundamentally distinct actors and systems. Their behavior derives from the internal 
interplay of both rational and irrational forces, as well as from the peculiarities of their 
own histories and of sheer chance. Strategists who accept the unitary rational actor model 
                                                 
13 Bergen and Garrett, Report of the Working. 
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as a description of entities at war will never understand either side’s motivations or actual 
behavior. Such strategists ignore their own side’s greatest potential vulnerabilities and 
deny themselves potential levers and targets — the fault-lines that exist within any 
human political construct. In fact, treating an enemy entity as a unitary actor tends to be a 
self-fulfilling and counterproductive prophecy, reinforcing a sense of unity among 
disparate elements which might otherwise be pried apart. 
Given this, modern political scientists postulate that in order to survive over time, 
the various participants in any system must adapt not only to the “external” environment 
but to each other. These agents (or actors) compete or cooperate, consume and are 
consumed, join and divide, and so on. In fact, from the standpoint of any individual 
agent, the behavior of the other agents is itself a major element of the environment. The 
collective behavior of the various agents can even change the nature of the “external” 
environment. Such changes in the environment will, in turn, necessitate and reward 
adaptive changes elsewhere in the system. And, of course, the environment can also be 
changed by the intrusion of external factors, setting off yet another round of adaptations. 
A system created by such a multiplicity of internal feedback loops is called a 
complex adaptive system (CAS). Such systems nestle one inside the other, constructing, 
interpenetrating, and disrupting one another across illusory “system boundaries.” Such 
systems are inherently dynamic.  
Although they may sometimes appear stable for lengthy periods, the complex 
network of interconnected feedback loops demands that its subcomponents constantly 
adapt or fail. Slight changes are sometimes absorbed unnoticed by the system. Other 
slight changes — an alteration in the external environment or a local mutation — can 
send the system into convulsions of growth or collapse; sometimes both 
simultaneously.14  
One of the most interesting things about complex adaptive systems is that they are 
inherently unpredictable. It is impossible, for example, to know in advance which slight 
                                                 
14 Christopher Bellavita, “Introduction to Homeland Security” (classroom lecture, Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security, Shepherdstown, WV, 2007). 
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perturbations in a system will settle out unnoticed and which will spark catastrophic 
change. This is so, not because of any flaw in our understanding of such systems, but 
because the system’s behavior is generated according to rules the system itself develops 
and is able to alter. In other words, a system’s behavior may be constrained by external 
factors or laws, but is not determined by them. Every system evolves according not only 
to general laws but to local rules established by evolution, accident, and happenstance — 
or, if an intelligent agent is involved, through conscious innovation or intervention.  
Another characteristic of complex adaptive systems is that the system itself 
exhibits behaviors and creates structures which are utterly different from those of the 
individual agents which create it. Systems starting from a similar base will come to have 
unique individual characteristics based on their specific histories.  
Quantitative methods and science can describe, and often explain the evolution 
and behavior of a complex adaptive system, but cannot predict it. Oftentimes, however, 
the chain of events is so subtle and convoluted, and the evidence so fragmentary, that the 
sequence of events and the web of causation can never be satisfactorily understood, even 
in retrospect and behavior cannot be predicted based on an understanding, however 
detailed, of the individual agents they comprise: One must always consider the system as 
a whole rather than as a collection of independent parts.  
The reason social scientists dwell on the complex adaptive system is that it 
provides so much insight into human history and political constructs. Any group of 
humans who interact will, over time, form a unique system broadly similar to the ones 
previously described. Humans build all sorts of social structures and engage in complex 
behavior. Human structures include families, tribes, clans, social classes and castes, 
secret societies, street gangs, armies, feudal hierarchies, commercial corporations, church 
congregations, political parties, bureaucracies, criminal mafias, states of various kinds, 
alliances, confederations, and empires. These structures participate in distinct but 
thoroughly intertwined networks one calls social, economic, and political systems. Those 
networks produce, and sustain, markets, elections, and wars.  
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Such networks and structures create their own rules and are thus fundamentally 
unpredictable. Economic and political events can be subjected to rigorous analysis before 
and while they occur, and can be described and often plausibly explained afterwards. 
Nonetheless, as any regular watcher of the evening news has long since discovered, they 
cannot reliably be predicted.  
Indeed, both evolutionary scientists and historians of human events find steady 
employment in seeking better ways to “postdict” the past, which can be just as puzzling 
as the present or future. One can certainly see “patterns” in human history, yet history 
does not repeat itself. “Victory” goes, not only to those participants who learn the 
existing rules, but also to those who succeed in making new ones.  
When it is said that politics and war are unpredictable, it does not mean that they 
are sheer confusion, without any semblance of order. Intelligent, experienced military and 
political actors are generally able to foresee the probable near-term results, or at least a 
range of possible results, of any particular action they may take. Broad causes, such as a 
massive superiority in manpower, technology, economic resources, and military skill will 
definitely influence the probabilities of certain outcomes.  
Conscious actions, however, like evolutionary adaptations, seldom have only their 
intended effects. As many political scientists and historians have wryly observed, there is 
an unremitting “law of unintended consequences.” As the ripples from any one action 
spread out, their effects unpredictably magnify or nullify the ripples from other actions. 
Thus, actions that seemed at the time to have great importance may prove to lead 
nowhere, while actions so minor as to escape notice may have tremendous consequences.  
Further, human systems are “open” systems, without any clear boundaries. Events 
wholly outside the range of political and military leaders’ vision can have an unforeseen 
impact on the situation. New economic and social concepts, new religious ideas or the 
revival of old ones, technological innovations with no obvious military applications, 
changes in climatic conditions, demographic shifts, all can lead to dramatic political and 
military changes.  
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The cumulative effect of all these factors is to make the strategic environment 
fundamentally uncertain and unpredictable. The onset of competition, conflict, and war 
merely intensifies this effect. Friction, misunderstandings and misinterpretations, 
imperfect knowledge, low-order probabilities, and sheer random chance introduce new 
variables into any evolving situation allowing events begin to spin out of control. History 
is too full of examples of great states defeated by seemingly inferior powers, of 
experienced leaders and armies overthrown by inexperienced newcomers, to believe that 
politics and war are predictable, controllable phenomena. 
All of the social structures described above have engaged in warfare. Nonetheless, 
practitioners of international relations theory and the community of strategists, policy 
makers, decision makers, academics, and politicians tend to associate war with the 
nation-state and to blame it on the essentially anarchic nature of the international state 
system. It is certainly true that the state form of organization has been effective in all 
forms of politics, including war. It has been so effective, in fact, that virtually all of the 
world’s land surface and its people are now recognized as belonging to some more or less 
effective territorial state. 
Given the current international environment and the threat posed by non-state 
actors who employ terrorist tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to change 
in the status quo in which the disenfranchised are empowered by gaining and exercising 
political power, one must remember that it is incorrect, qualitatively and quantitatively, to 
think that war is something that occurs exclusively between states, or that it is a product 
of the state or of the state system. While it has correctly been said that “War made the 
state, and the state made war,”15 even that formula acknowledges that warfare was a pre-
existing condition. The anthropological evidence for large-scale human-on-human 
violence in non-state societies is overwhelming.16 Therefore, it would be equally accurate 
to say that “War made the state, and the state made peace.”17  
                                                 
15 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press 1976).   
16 Lawrence H. Keeley, War before Civilization (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996), 33. 
17 Bruce Porter, War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics (New 
York, NY: Free Press, 1994), 78. 
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The modern European state system originated in an effort (the Peace of 
Westphalia) to put an end to one of the bloodiest fratricidal conflicts in Western history, 
the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648). Although warfare between states continued, 
successful states were able to control the ultimately more costly endemic local warfare 
typical of non-state societies. 
Although the state is a stabilizing force, the state has not been able invariably to 
maintain its desired monopoly on the legitimate — socially sanctioned — use of 
violence. Entities including organized criminals, narcotraffickers, human smugglers, 
terrorists, insurgents, guerillas, radicals, extremists, anarchists, and revolutionaries, other 
than the state make war, most often on each other, but sometimes on the state itself.  
In either case, the state will become involved, either in self-defense or to assert its 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The monopoly on violence cannot be 
preserved by an entity unwilling to use violence effectively. Should it fail to involve itself 
in the struggle, the state will lose a major justification for its existence and will likely find 
that existence challenged. If the state fails to meet this challenge, it will likely be 
destroyed, or taken over by some new entity willing and able to take on this fundamental 
function. This new entity may be another state, or possibly a supranational entity like the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the United Nations (U.N.). Or it may be a 
new revolutionary government evolving out of what formerly was a non-state entity.  
Thus one sees that states exist within a rather precarious zone between order and 
chaos. They are created and maintained by the interaction of various others, hopelessly 
intertwined but essentially autonomous systems. Leaders and governments have various 
levers to influence events, but they do not truly “control” their political entities so much 
as they more or less skillfully “ride the wave.” If they impose too much order the system 
will stagnate and die, like the former Soviet Union. If they cease to provide enough 
coherence, the system will fly apart.  
The salient point is that, despite the persistence of some political forces and 
entities, the political movements and individual states and governments that wage wars 
are remarkably changeable and often fleeting things. In other words, there is nothing 
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permanent about any particular political entity. A state or political movement exists only 
so long as it serves some powerful set of human needs. Ultimately, its creation, existence, 
and disappearance depend entirely on its population’s willingness to sustain belief. 
Radical changes in the distribution of power can occur in remarkably short periods.  
Strategists, policy makers, decision makers, academics, and politicians, all 
practitioners, of the art and science of strategy and international relations theory, stress 
the fragility of political entities for two reasons.  
 First, it is helpful to remind ourselves of our own, U.S., vulnerability. 
Powerful and inspiring as it is, the existence of the grand democratic 
experiment we call the United States of America is not inevitable. It 
continues only through the strenuous efforts of its government and of 
other elements in society which perceive it as a benefit. It can be, and 
occasionally has been, stressed to the breaking point.  
 Second, it is necessary to remember that every enemy, no matter how 
seamless and monolithic it may appear, has political fault-lines that may 
be vulnerable to exploitation. 
From its inception (ca. 1648-1918), IRT has been a policy-oriented discipline. 
There is no agreed-upon methodology for it (other than taking a normative perspective), 
but the field seeks to not only analyze foreign policy but to help formulate it. This has 
led, as one might imagine, to various debates (called theoretical debates) about ways of 
thinking in international relations. The content and character of those debates have 
shaped the field into what might be called the following “Schools of Thought” which 
roughly followed one another chronologically, despite overlap: (1) realism; (2) 
behavioralism; (3) neorealism; (4) neoliberalism; (5) world systems theory; (6) critical 
theory; and (7) postmodernism. The two dominant perspectives today are neorealism and 
neoliberalism, or perhaps realism and neoliberalism, as Gaddis (2003) points out, 
Kissinger (2001), being the most prominent American “realist” and Nye (1999) being the 
founder of “neoliberalism.”18 
Theories of international relations (IR) are attempts to capture, categorize, and 
explain the behavior of international actors. Foreign policy and strategy is crafted by 
                                                 
18 Thomas O’Connor, “An Overview of the Field of International Relations,” Austin Peay State 
University, http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort/3040/3040lect02a.htm (accessed 28 December 2007). 
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drawing on theory to achieve long-term goals. The strategic theorist Colin Gray has 
commented extensively on the nexus between theory and the application of strategy. He 
correctly observed, “Strategic ideas and theory must define, organize, and explain for the 
practical world wherein threats or deeds have strategic consequences.”19  
Most national leaders work within this context. They subscribe to a particular IR 
worldview (theory) which they then transform into policy (practice) in the international 
arena. Simple put, theories of international relations (IR) are broadly used by 
policymakers as the conceptual framework to determine conduct between nations. 
Decisions as heady as whether or not to go to war, or as mundane as whether or not to 
raise a tariff, are generally governed by an administration’s degree of adherence to a 
particular IR theory-in-practice (TIP). Bernard Brodie noted that strategy is “nothing if 
not pragmatic…Above all, strategic theory is a theory for action.”20 
Excellent overviews of the field of international relations include James E. 
Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International 
Relations,21 and Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: 
Realism, Pluralism, Globalism.22  These are two of the most comprehensive and 
inclusive surveys and syntheses available on the subject. They have been thoroughly 
revised and updated to reflect the various paradigmatic and theoretical debates that have 
emerged since the end of the Cold War and now incorporate the most significant current 
writings on all areas of theory from neo-realism, neo-liberal theory, postmodernism, 
constructivism to globalization, ethnic conflict, international terrorism, and new 
approaches to deterrence amidst proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and effect 
(WMD/E) technologies. 
                                                 
19 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), 124 and 354-355. 
20 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: MacMillan and Sons, 1973), 452.  
21 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, 
5th ed. (New York: J.B. Lippencott Company, Harper and Row Publishers, 2001). 
22 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, 
2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1993). 
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In “classical” international relations theory, the international system operates at 
“levels.”23 Simplified, the levels of analysis are international, nation-state, and 
individual.24The first level, or international system level, suggests that nation-states 
behave the way they do because of certain fundamental characteristics of the system; a 
system partially self-imposed by the actors themselves (i.e., dispositional) and partially 
by characteristics of the operational environment (i.e., situational) of which they are all a 
part. The idea is simply that the system itself exerts a kind of force on the states, and 
increasingly the non-state actors, that compels them to behave and react in certain 
predictable ways.  
For strategic leaders of the twenty-first century primarily concerned with the 
issues of foreign policy and national security, the international system with which they 
will be dealing is likely to only partially reflect the traditional international system. While 
the nation-state, first codified by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, remains the dominant 
political body in international politics, its ability to influence events and people is being 
challenged by an assortment of non-state actors, failed or failing states, and ungoverned 
regions. This is occurring in combination with the transnational threats posed by terror, 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), crime, drugs, pandemics, and 
environmental degradation, as well as by elements of the system that also have 
potentially positive impacts such as globalization and the information revolution.25 
The international system refers to the structure of relationships that exist at the 
international level. These include the roles and interactions of both state and non-state 
actors, along with international organizations (IO), multinational corporations (MNC), 
and non-governmental organizations (NGO). States make foreign and national security 
policy against this external environment.  
                                                 
23 U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 
2nd ed. Ed. by Bartholomees, J. Boone, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006), 81-82. 
24 Ibid., 81-82. 
25 Jeffrey D. McCausland, Developing Strategic Leaders for the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA: U.S. 
Army War College, 2008), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=839 
(accessed September 19 2008). 
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The international system frames the forces and trends in the global environment; 
it also frames the workspace of national security policy and strategy makers. As they 
work through the formulation process, with an understanding for the interests and 
objectives of any actors in a given situation, those involved in the business of policy and 
strategy making must be able to account for the associated state and non-state actors 
present in the international system. 
The national security establishment must be able to understand the threats to order 
in the international system represented by both conventional and transnational entities. If 
the policymaker or strategist can accurately assess all these factors, he might be able to 
determine friends and enemies, threats and opportunities, and capabilities and constraints 
inherent in the contemporary world (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
challenges/threats analysis or SWOC/SWOT).26 However, it must always be remembered 
that strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges are not constant; strengths can 
be weaknesses, challenges can be opportunities, weaknesses can be strengths, and 
opportunities can be challenges. Equally important is the idea that threats must have both 
intent and capability to constitute an actionable threat. 
Threats, challenges, and opportunities can come in many shapes and sizes. A 
traditional threat might take the shape of a nation-state in possession of WMD/E and a 
hostile attitude (i.e., capability and intent). This is also true for a non-state actor, 
potentially going down to the individual level if he is willing to fly an airplane into a 
building. Less direct, but also significant in the twenty-first century world are the threats 
that can be made to the successful execution of a nation-state’s policies, if other nation-
states are unwilling to provide support in a given situation. Threats, challenges, and 
opportunities will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IX. 
Theories such as the balance of power are based on this kind of analysis; for 
example, that if a single nation-state seeks to dominate the system (a hegemon), other 
states will join together to counter the power of that single state (balancing). Who 
                                                 
26 John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Non-Profit Organizations: A Guide to 
Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement (San Francisco, CA: John Wiley and Sons, 
2006). 
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possesses how much and what kinds of power (political, economic, military, etc.) at any 
given time are the critical variables. This leads to a basic focus on the distribution of 
power in the international system as a key explanation for system and hence nation-state 
behavior.  
The reasons for this are found in the characteristics of the international system. 
The system is largely anarchic and possibly increasingly archaic because it is largely 
state-centric, in that the emergent dominant power, or “tipping point leader,” in this 
complex adaptive system is increasingly the non-state actor. In other words, there is no 
collective decision-making body or supreme authority to manage conflict, and enforce 
conflict resolution, among the competing states, and increasingly the proliferating 
population of non-state actors, in the system.  
States, and increasingly non-state actors, a population that ranges from terrorists 
to multi-national corporations, compete with each other and manage their conflicts 
through their own use of organic power. This means that the system basically relies on 
self-help by the individual states, so the states must be concerned about developing their 
power relative to other states in the system. The more power one has, the more that state 
is able to achieve its goals and objectives; the less power one has, the more that state may 
be subject to the whims of other states. These two characteristics mean that each state has 
a basic goal of survival and must be the guardian of its own security and independence. 
The second level of analysis is commonly referred to as the nation-state level. 
This second level of analysis argues that because states are the primary actors, it is the 
internal character of those states that matters most in determining overall patterns of 
behavior. Because states are sovereign entities, they act relatively independently; because 
they are all part of the same system, the interaction of those independent decisions is 
what leads to war or peace or conflict or cooperation. One of the most common state-
level approaches emphasizes the nature of the political system as a major determinant of 
state behavior. 
Actors: 
 State: The 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 
considered the classic legal definition for states, indicates that states 
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possess the following characteristics: permanent population, defined 
territory, and a government capable of maintaining effective control over 
its territory and conducting international relations with other states. In 
addition, the government must possess a monopoly on the legitimate use 
of force in the state, and other states in the international system must 
recognize the sovereignty of that government. In contemporary 
international law, sovereign states are treated as equals; every recognized 
state can participate in the international system on the same plane. This 
sovereign equality possesses the following elements:  
 States are legally equal. 
 Every state enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty. 
 Every state is obligated to respect the fact of the legal entity of other 
states. 
 The territorial integrity and political independence of a state are 
inviolable. 
 Each state has the right to freely choose and develop its own political, 
social, economic, and cultural systems. 
 Each state is obligated to carry out its international obligations fully and 
conscientiously and to live in peace with other states 
Since the seventeenth century, the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the nation-state has 
been the dominant entity in the international system, in part because of the power the 
concept of sovereignty gave the recognized states—both in terms of absolute domestic 
control and independence on the international level. 
 Non-State: The term non-state actor (NSA) typically refers to any 
participant in the international system that is not a government. It is an 
entity or group that may have an impact on the internationally related 
decisions or policies of one or more states. Examples of non-state actors 
would be international bi- and multi-lateral organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and multi-national corporations, the 
international media, and armed elements attempting to free their territory 
from external rule, or terrorist groups. An individual may also be a non-
state actor. 27 
The third level of analysis emphasizes the role played by individual leaders — 
“the Great Man Theory” versus the philosophical analyses of human nature theory. 
Recently this level has been referred to as the decision-making level, which tends to point 
                                                 
27 Yale University, “Convention on Rights.” 
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to factors more general than the idiosyncrasies of individuals, and to the fact that 
decisions about war and peace, conflict and cooperation are made by individuals, 
organizations, and institutions within a society. But the primary emphasis remains the 
same: real people make decisions that determine the pattern of behavior among states in 
the international system. 
International Relations (IR) theories can be roughly divided into one of two 
epistemological camps: “positivist” and “post-positivist”.28Positivist theories aim to 
replicate the methods of the natural sciences by analyzing the impact of material forces. 
They typically focus on features of international relations such as state interactions, size 
of military forces, balance of powers, etc. 
Post-positivist epistemology rejects the idea that the social world can be studied in 
an objective and value-free way. It rejects the central ideas of neo-realism/liberalism, 
such as rational choice theory, on the grounds that the scientific method cannot be 
applied to the social world and that an empirical and quantitative (i.e., replicable) science 
of IR is impossible. 
A key difference between the two positions is that while positivist theories, such 
as neo-realism, offer causal explanations (such as why and how power is exercised) post-
positivist theories focus instead on constitutive questions, for instance what is meant by 
‘power’; what makes it up, how it is experienced and how it is reproduced. Often, post-
positivist theories explicitly promote a normative approach to IR, by considering ethics. 
This is something which has often been ignored under traditional IR as positivist theories 
make a distinction between facts and normative judgments, or values.29 
                                                 
28 William M.K. Trochim, “Positivism and post-Positivism,” Research Methods Knowledge Base, 
Social Research Methods (2006) http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/positvsm.php (accessed 
December, 28, 2007). 
29 Robert Jackson and George Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and 
Approaches (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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Realism:30 Sometimes called the power-politics school, realism focuses on 
(nation) state security and power above all else. Realism was the dominant theoretical 
tradition throughout the Cold War. It depicts international affairs as a struggle for power 
among self-interested states and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for 
eliminating conflict and war.31 Realism stresses that the international system is naturally 
in conflict. “Classical” realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr believed 
that states, like human beings, had an innate desire to dominate others, which led them to 
fight wars.32 Realism dominated in the Cold War years because it provided simple but 
powerful explanations for war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, and other 
international phenomena, and because its emphasis on competition was consistent with 
the central features of the American-Soviet rivalry.  
Early realists such as E.H. Carr, Daniel Bernhard, Bernard Brodie, and Hans 
Morgenthau, argued that nation-states are self-interested, power-seeking rational actors, 
who seek to maximize their security and chances of survival. Any cooperation between 
states is explained as functional in order to maximize each individual state’s security (as 
opposed to more idealistic reasons).  
Many realists saw the Second World War as the vindication of their theory. 
Realism is defined by the following assumptions: the international realm is anarchic and 
consists of independent political units called states; states are the primary actors and 
inherently possess some offensive military capability or power which makes them 
potentially dangerous to each other; states can never be sure about the intentions of other 
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states; the basic motive driving states is survival or the maintenance of sovereignty; states 
are instrumentally rational and think strategically about how to survive.33  
Neo-Realism:34 Neo-realism, or what is sometimes called structural realism, is 
largely based on the work of Kenneth Waltz (who first coined the term “structural 
realism” in his book Man, the State, and War).35 While retaining the empirical 
observations of realism, that international relations are characterized by antagonistic 
interstate relations, neo-realists point to the anarchic structure of the international system 
as the cause and rejected explanations that take account of states’ domestic 
characteristics, viewing all states as black boxes whose intentions cannot be gauged with 
100 percent certainty. Neorealist theory ignores human nature and focuses on the effects 
of the international system.36 States are compelled by relative gains and balance against 
concentration of power.37 
Unlike classical realism, neo-realism seeks to be scientific and more positivist. 
What also distinguishes neo-realism from realism is that the former does not accept the 
latter’s emphasis on the behavioral (i.e., dispensational) explanation of international 
relations. In a neo-realist environment, states seek to survive within an anarchical system. 
Although states may seek survival through power balancing, balancing is not the aim of 
that behavior; balancing is a product of the aim to survive.  
Given that the international system is regarded as anarchic in the neo-realist 
paradigm and based on self-help, the most powerful units set the scene of action for 
others as well as themselves. These major powers are referred to as poles; hence the 
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international system (or a regional subsystem), at a particular point in time, may be 
characterized as 38uni-polar, bipolar or multi-polar.  
An important refinement to realism was the addition of offense-defense theory; 
laid out by Robert Jervis, George Quester, and Stephen Van Evera, who argued that war 
was more likely when states could conquer each other easily. When defense was easier 
than offense, however, security was more plentiful, incentives to expand declined, and 
cooperation could blossom. If the defense had the advantage, and states could distinguish 
between offensive and defensive weapons, then states could acquire the means to defend 
themselves without threatening others, thereby dampening the effects of anarchy.39  
For these defensive realists, states merely sought to survive, and great powers 
could guarantee their security by forming balancing alliances and choosing defensive 
military postures (such as retaliatory nuclear forces). Not surprisingly, Waltz and most 
other neorealists believed that the United States was extremely secure for most of the 
Cold War. Their principle fear was that it might squander its favorable position by 
adopting an overly aggressive (hegemonistic by default or by choice) foreign policy. By 
the end of the Cold War, realism had moved away from Morgenthau’s dark brooding 
about human nature and taken on a slightly more optimistic tone.40 
Liberalism — Idealism — Liberal Internationalism: Liberalism et al., is 
occasionally referred to as institutional liberalism precisely because of the focus on 
spreading democratic institutions. Liberalism is a Lockean dispensational political theory 
founded on the natural goodness of humans and the autonomy of the individual. It favors 
civil and political liberties, government by law with the consent of the governed, and 
protection from arbitrary authority.  
In IR, liberalism covers a fairly broad perspective ranging from Wilsonian 
Idealism through to contemporary neo-liberal theories and the democratic peace thesis. In 
general, liberalists stress that the international system is naturally cooperative. One strand 
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of liberal thought argues that economic interdependence discourages states from using 
force against each other because warfare threatens each side’s prosperity. A second 
strand, often associated with President Woodrow Wilson, envisions the spread of 
democracy as the key to world peace, claiming that democratic states are inherently more 
peaceful than authoritarian states. A third, more recent theory argues that international 
institutions such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) could help overcome selfish state behavior, mainly by encouraging 
states to forego immediate gains for the greater benefits of enduring cooperation.41  
In a liberal IR paradigm, states are but one actor in world politics, and even states 
can cooperate together through institutional mechanisms and bargaining that undermine 
the propensity of basing interests simply in military terms. States are interdependent and 
other actors, such as trans- and multi-national corporations, the International Monetary 
Fund/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or the World 
Bank), and the United Nations play important roles in framing and shaping the behavior 
of states.  
Adherents of liberalist international relations posit that states mutually gain from 
cooperation and that war is so destructive to be essentially futile and thus 
counterproductive if not self-destructive. Liberal internationalism states that, through bi- 
and multi-lateral non-governmental international organizations such as the United 
Nations, it is possible to avoid the worst excesses of “power politics” in relations between 
nations.  
Liberal internationalism argues that liberal states should intervene, including 
military intervention and humanitarian aid, in other sovereign states in order to pursue 
liberal objectives. The goal of liberal internationalism is to achieve global structures 
within the international system that are inclined towards promoting a liberal world order. 
To that extent, global free trade, liberal economics, and liberal political systems are all 
encouraged. In addition, liberal internationalists are dedicated towards encouraging 
democracy to emerge globally. A new version of “idealism,” centered on human and civil 
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rights, liberties, and freedoms as basis of the legitimacy of international law, has been 
advanced. Examples of liberal internationalists include Woodrow Wilson, Paul Berman, 
and Oliver Kamm.42 
Neo-Liberalism: Neo-liberalism is institutional liberalism that distinguishes itself 
by contrast and/or selective inclusion with the ideas of “commercial” liberalism (the 
linking of free trade with peace), “republican” liberalism (the linking of democracy and 
peace), and “sociological” liberalism (theories of international integration). The more 
inclusive theories, according to Baldwin (1993),43 tend to be the best challengers to 
realist/neorealist orthodoxy, and neo-liberalism is best understood as opposed to 
realism/neo-realism orthodoxy (its war-mongering and militaristic thrusts).  
Neo-liberalism defines “security” in broad terms, often arguing that factors such 
as health, welfare, and environmental issues need to be included in institution-building 
efforts, whether passive (non-interventionist) or active (interventionist).44 Neo-liberalism 
seeks to update liberalism by accepting the neorealist presumption that states are the key 
actors in international relations, but still maintains that non-state actors (NSAs) and inter- 
and non-governmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs) matter.  
Proponents of neo-liberalism as such argue that states will cooperate irrespective 
of relative gains, and are thus concerned with absolute gains. This also means that nations 
are; in essence, free to make their own choices as to how they will go about conducting 
policy without any international organizations blocking a nation’s right to sovereignty.45 
Neoliberalism also contains an economic theory that is based on the use of open and free 
markets with little, if any, government intervention to prevent monopolies and other 
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conglomerates from forming. The growing interdependence throughout and after the 
Cold War through international institutions led to neo-liberalism being defined as 
international institutionalism.46 
Classical realism and classical liberalism have a long and respected tradition in 
American political culture as well as in many other countries. However, the literature 
researched suggested that it must be acknowledged that neither classical realism nor 
classical liberalism are fully equipped to assist in meeting the strategic challenges of the 
twenty-first century. 
International Society Theory (the English school): The “English School”47 
focuses on the shared norms and values of states and how they regulate international 
relations. Examples of such norms include diplomacy, order, and international law. 
Unlike neo-realism, it is not necessarily positivist.  
The “opposite” of International Society Theory is Behavioralism, or the 
“American School.” Behavioralism “peaked” in the 1960s and is the term commonly 
used when interdisciplinary borrowing takes place (of ideas, concepts, models, theories, 
or methods) from one of the other fields in social science.  
Behavioralist theories tend to be eclectic, cross-level, and some are cutting-edge 
while most are at least an attempt to expand the boundaries of the discipline. They are 
distinguishable by either a heavy empirical research thrust and/or a heavy discursive 
critique of the “classical” tradition in IR.48 
Social Constructivism: Constructivist approaches emphasize the impact of ideas. 
Instead of taking the state for granted and assuming that it simply seeks to survive, 
constructivists regard the interests and identities of states as a highly malleable product of 
specific historical processes. They pay close attention to the prevailing discourse(s) in 
society because discourse reflects and shapes beliefs and interests, and establishes 
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accepted norms of behavior. Consequently, constructivism is especially attentive to the 
sources of change. This approach has largely replaced Marxism as the preeminent radical 
perspective on international affairs.49  
The end of the Cold War played an important role in legitimating constructivist 
theories because realism and liberalism both failed to anticipate this event and had some 
trouble explaining it. Therefore, social constructivism is a post-Cold War situationalist 
theory that encompasses a broad range of theories that aim to address questions of 
structure and the relative role of material forces (i.e., situational/environmental) versus 
ideas (i.e., dispensational).50 
Constructivism is not a theory of IR in the manner of neo-realism, but is instead a 
social psychological theory which is used to better explain the actions taken by states and 
other major actors.51 Constructivist theory rejects the basic assumption of neo-realist 
theory that the state of anarchy (lack of a higher authority or government) is a structural 
condition inherent in the system of states. Rather, it argues, in Alexander Wendt’s words, 
that “Anarchy is what states make of it.”52 That is, anarchy is a condition of the system of 
states because states, in some sense, “choose” to make it so. Anarchy is the result of a 
process that constructs the rules or norms that govern the interaction of states. The 
condition of the system of states today as self-helpers in the midst of anarchy is a result 
of the process by which states and the system of states were constructed. It is not an 
inherent fact of state-to-state relations. Thus, constructivist theory holds that it is possible 
to change the anarchic nature of the system of states.53 
Critical Theory: Critical Theory is the application of critical social theory or 
social psychology. It is an approach or methodology which seeks to take a critical stance 
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towards itself by recognizing its own presuppositions and role in the world; and secondly, 
towards the social reality that it investigates by providing grounds for the justification 
and criticism of the institutions, practices and mentalities that make up that reality and 
therefore attempts to bridge the divides in social thought between explanation and 
justification, philosophical and substantive concerns, pure and applied theory, and 
contemporary and earlier thinking — to international relations.54  
Proponents focus on the need for human emancipation from the nation-states. 
Hence, it is critical of mainstream theories that tend to be state-centric. Almost all 
“critical theorists” hold to the belief that all theories are for someone and for some 
purpose. Critical theorists, therefore, try to merge or connect knowledge and practice 
(called praxis), fact and value, and the knower and the known.55 
In international relations and diplomacy, the three most common approaches are 
unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism. While most scholars and practitioners 
would agree that unilateralism constitutes actions taken by a power without seeking the 
consultation and the agreement of other states with interest in the given issue area, and 
bilateralism constitutes interaction between two states, the meaning of what 
multilateralism entails is rather elusive. 
Bilateralism is a term referring to political and cultural relations between two 
states. Most international diplomacy is done bilaterally. Examples of this include treaties 
between two states, exchanges of ambassadors and other accredited diplomatic personnel, 
and state visits. The alternatives to bilateral relations are multilateral relations, which 
involve multiple states, and unilateralism, when one state acts on its own. 
Realism and realists generally explain state behavior in international relations 
through looking at their relative level of material power and the role of self-interested 
considerations. Such a framework would argue that states are more unilateral if they have 
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more material (i.e., military, informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, 
finance, and/or economic or any combination thereof) power invested in the issue at 
hand.  
Realists tend to see and emphasize manifestations of material power (i.e., 
military, informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and/or 
economic or any combination thereof) that states have in different areas and then suggest 
that states with more relative power within an area are more inclined to unilateral action. 
A state will adopt a unilateral position if it has, relatively speaking, greater actionable 
power within an area; but will adopt a multilateral stance if it is relatively weak in this 
same arena or if such a choice will allow them to advance their national interest while 
sharing the costs with other states. 
Liberalism and liberalists investigate and weigh the interests of important players 
in domestic politics as the major determinant of state behavior in international relations. 
They generally do not look at states as unitary actors and emphasize the influence of 
domestic lobby groups and other power centers within society, such as legislative and 
executive branches, on the foreign policy decision making process.  
Liberal theorists are concerned with finding an explanation as to why certain 
domestic groups prevail over others in influencing foreign policy. In general, states will 
adopt a unilateral or multilateral position due to pressures applied to them by powerful 
domestic interest groups. Furthermore, if a state is more vulnerable to the impacts of 
other states and the international environment, it is more likely to embrace a multilateral 
approach. 
Constructivists generally focus on what would be the appropriate norms of action 
for the actors based on their identities. This investigative and analytical framework 
investigates what norms of behavior (i.e., experiential, situational, dispensational) are 
more appropriate for the particular state and argue that the resulting uni-, bi-, or multi- 
lateral action in certain issue areas is guided by norms of appropriateness.  
The focus of the inquiry of the constructivist approach is on the perceived rules of 
appropriate conduct at the time of engagement. Since the norms of appropriateness can 
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change over time, it is possible that different actors have taken different approaches on 
the same issue due to changes in their identity and respective change in the norms of 
appropriateness. Therefore, states selection of a unilateral or multilateral position within 
an issue area will depend on the understanding and interpretation of norms of 
appropriateness for the states with certain identities. 
Unilateralism:56 Unilateralists tend to believe that the international environment 
is, and has been, unpredictable, unstable, and dangerous. They believe nation-states must 
use their power to protect, and in many cases propagate, its interests and values.  
Unilateralists contend that an assertive approach to national security policy is 
justified on both pragmatic and ideological grounds. Adherents of this perspective posit 
that the essence of unilateralism is that a nation-state does not allow others, no matter 
how well-meaning, to deter it from pursuing its fundamental security interests or, in 
practice, nor should it compromise when pursuing its national security interests.  
Unilateralists believe that a nation-state should not squander its position and 
capabilities by compromising and diluting its objectives and lessening its expectations in 
order to attract allies and partners. If the cause is justifiable, the nation-state should 
pursue it without compromise or caution and other nation-states, regardless of their 
position, can either accept the arguments and follow or be left behind as the other nation-
state does what it should and must to advance its interests and values and maintain its 
national security. Adherents of unilateralism argue and defend the position that one of the 
main advantages of unilateral approaches to problems is that they provide maximum 
freedom of action. 
Multilateralism:57 Multilateralism can be defined as relations among three or 
more states according to a (common) set of rules or principles. Multilateralism refers to 
multiple states and/or international governmental and non-governmental organizations 
working together in concert on a given issue.  
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Multilateralists acknowledge that there are circumstances in which a nation-state 
should not rule out acting unilaterally, particularly when “vital survival interests” are at 
stake. However, multilateralists argue that most important issues facing the modern 
nation-state, including the U.S., in the twenty-first century are not amenable to or 
solvable through unilateral solutions. This concern is best represented by the emergence 
of a number of transnational threats posed by state and non-state actors. 
Throughout U.S. history that has meant observing a shifting national security 
strategy, based on the relative influence of one of the broad traditional IR theories: 
classical realism, classical liberalism, isolationism, and idealism (also known as 
utopianism or internationalism). 
The term “idealism” was coined by historian and international relations theorist 
Edward Hallett Carr as an epithet to describe the foreign policy orientation of President 
Woodrow Wilson, as well as several other international leaders after World War I.58 Carr 
made the case for “realist” policy approaches by demonstrating, as he saw them, the 
weaknesses and fallacies of idealism. Broadly defined, idealism is “an approach to 
international relations that stresses the importance of moral values, legal norms, 
internationalism and harmony of interests as guides to foreign policy-making...a focus on 
institution building…(and) favoring a mixed-actor model which includes international 
organizations, transnational organizations, NGOs (non-governmental organizations), 
MNCs (multi-national corporations), and other non-state players” as central to modern 
interactions between nations.59 
Isolationism — like idealism, a term that carries much negative baggage — 
implies little involvement with the community of nations. Isolationism in this sense is 
more of a conceptual and hypothetical construct as opposed to an IR TIP. Neo-
isolationism, the more practicable off-shoot of isolationist thinking which has at times 
dominated U.S. national security strategy, is defined more broadly as “a broad spectrum 
of aspirations, assumptions and attitudes” which “suggest that permanence is a vice and 
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flexibility a virtue” and that “America’s engagement with the world outside its own 
hemisphere should be selective and dictated by national priorities above all else”.60 
Likewise, classical realism and classical liberalism require definition within the 
context of this paper. Classical realism, broadly defined, is the belief that a state or 
nation-state is the principal self-interested actor in international politics and “its central 
proposition is that since the purpose of statecraft is national survival in a hostile 
environment the acquisition of power is the proper, rational and inevitable goal of foreign 
policy. International politics, indeed, all politics, is thus defined as a “struggle for 
power.”61 
Power, in this sense, is conceptualized as both a means and an end in itself. 
Rooted in the Hobbesian (pessimistic) view of human nature, the state is a necessary 
creation to protect individuals from an inherently anarchic world and the worst impulses 
manifested by human beings.62 Classical liberalism is similarly broadly defined as “an 
ideology, or current of political thought, which strives to maximize liberty, i.e., freedom 
of thought for individuals, limitations on the powers of government and religion, the rule 
of law…and fundamental human rights…to include the right to life, liberty, and 
property.”63 In this construct, the state is held as the medium through which “natural 
rights” of an individual are attained, the most fundamental of which are personal liberty 
and equality. All IRT schools see the excessive concentration of power achieved by the 
United States after the Cold War as problematic or at least potentially so.  
Realists, with their assertion of the centrality of power, whether as a means or an 
end, for understanding the dynamics of international politics, view American hegemony 
with apprehension because the kind of excessive crusading that comes when a nation 
abandons the pursuit of “interest defined in terms of power” for absolutist goal.  
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While realist views tend to suggest a certain inevitability to the emergence of an 
anti-American coalition, liberal institutionalists and constructivists are not so fatalistic in 
their assessment. Whether from the perspective of power transition theory or other views 
of peace settlements, liberal scholars see the United States as able to shape the response 
of other states to the status quo.  
Finally, because the constructivists locate the source of national interests in a 
nation’s identity, the way the United States views itself may well determine its ability to 
pursue the kind of institutional strategy recommended by those emphasizing “imperial” 
hegemonic cooperation and coexistence. There is some evidence that the United States is 
moving increasingly in the direction of an imperial definition of its identity.  
In the end, all three schools of theory converge on conclusions concerning 
hegemony. American leaders would do well to heed the observation of Edmund Burke in 
1793 when Great Britain stood at, simultaneously, the height and brink of its power:  
…Among precautions against ambition, it may not be amiss to take one 
precaution against our own. I must fairly say, I dread our own power and 
our own ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded . . . we may say 
that we shall not abuse this astonishing and hitherto unheard-of power. But 
every other nation will think we shall abuse it. It is impossible but that, 
sooner or later, this state of things must produce a combination against us 
which may end in our ruin...64 
An additional aspect to IRT is the concept of polarity. Polarity in international 
relations is a description of the distribution of power within the international system. It 
describes the nature of the international system at any given period of time. There are 
three types of systems, uni-polarity, bipolarity, and multi-polarity. The type of system is 
completely dependent on the distribution of power and influence of states in a region or 
internationally. 
Uni-polarity in both historical and contemporary international relations, theory 
and practice, describes a distribution of power in which there is one state with most of the 
executable instruments of national power — military, informational (i.e., cultural and 
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ideological), diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic. This is 
also called a hegemony in which the state is a hegemon or hyperpower.  
Simply put, hegemony or hegemonism65 can be defined as the predominant 
influence, as of a state, region, or group, over another or others; leadership or dominance, 
especially by one country or social group over others; or preponderant influence or 
authority over others or domination. A hyperpower is a state that is militarily, 
economically, and technologically dominant on the world stage. Hegemons often see 
their strengths transformed into weaknesses and their opportunities consumed by 
challenges. The U.S., as the dominant global power of the post-Cold War twenty-first 
century, has been experiencing this since 2003-2004 due to current campaigns against 
radical extremists and the changing demographics of the global economy and the 
changing supply and demand for energy resources. 
Fortunately or unfortunately, the United States, with the fall of the Soviet Union 
in 1991-1993, has become the dominant military force in the world, along with 
considerable economic, cultural, and political influence. As a result, the U.S. is often 
identified as the last superpower (i.e., a powerful and influential nation, especially a 
nuclear power that dominates its allies or client states in an international power bloc) or 
the last great power (i.e., a nation having great political, social, and economic influence 
in international affairs).  
The superpower or hegemon in a uni-polar system, lacking any major powers 
challenging it, is normally able to maintain its dominance over lesser (i.e., middle or 
regional powers) powers and minor states for a long time until it is weakened by internal 
decay or by forces from outside the system. Although it is early in the current financial 
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and economic crisis, the U.S. may be at the precipice in terms of maintaining global 
hegemony due to its overextension militarily and overexposure in the financial and 
economic sectors due to its large national debt and trade imbalance and changing 
domestic demographics. 
Bipolarity in both historical and contemporary international relations, theory and 
practice, describes a distribution of power — or balance of power66 — in which two 
states, superpowers or great powers, have the majority of military, informational (i.e., 
cultural and ideological), diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and 
economic influence internationally or regionally. In the majority of instances, spheres of 
influence and political-military alliance coalesce around these states. For example, during 
the Cold War, 1947-1993, most Western and democratic states identified with and 
aligned themselves with the U.S. under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and other regional collective defense and security alliances, the 
Global Agreement on Taxes and Tariffs (GATT), and the European Union, while most 
Communist states, voluntarily or involuntarily, identified with and aligned with the 
Soviet Union and became members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). 
Multi-polarity in both historical and contemporary international relations, in both 
theory and practice, describes a distribution of power describes a distribution of power in 
which more than two nation-states have nearly equal amounts of military, cultural, and 
economic influence. It is therefore a variant of bipolarity. Most scholars and practitioners 
believe this system to be the least stable of all of the systems in international relations. 
This is because the multi-polar system tends to create many shifting alliances until one of 
two resolving actions occur and temporarily stabilize — either a balance of power is 
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achieved because neither alliance see value in attacking the other or one alliance will 
initiate military operations and attack the other because it either fears the potential of the 
new alliance, or it feels that it can defeat the other side. In addition, one of the major 
implications, and drawbacks, of an international system with any number of poles, 
including a multi-polar system, is that decisions and decision making will be situational 
and experiential vice dispensational and will often be made for strategic reasons to 
maintain a balance of power rather than out of ideological or historical reasons. 
In all three systems, there is a plethora of countries that are neither powerful nor 
powerless. These countries are called middle powers. The term is employed in the field of 
international relations theory to describe states that are neither superpowers nor great 
powers, but still have and wield legitimate political and diplomatic, financial and 
economic, scientific and technical, cultural and ideological, and military influence 
internationally. There is no single specific definition of which countries are middle 
powers and there is no standard agreed method to decide which states are middle powers.  
Under the original sense of the term, a middle power was one that had some 
degree of influence globally, but not dominance over any one area. However, this usage 
is not universal, and some define middle power to include nations that can be regarded as 
regional powers. The term regional power is also used to describe a nation that exercises 
influence and power within a region. 
Finally, the issue of hegemony or hegemonism must be introduced and discussed. 
As stated earlier in this section, hegemony or hegemonism can be defined as the 
predominant influence, as of a state, region, or group, over another or others; leadership 
or dominance, especially by one country or social group over others; or preponderant 
influence or authority over others or domination. As previously defined, a hegemon or 
hyperpower is a state that is militarily, economically, and technologically dominant on 
the world stage and may be defined as a power that can dictate the policies of all other 
powers in its vicinity, or that is able to defeat any other power or combination of powers 
that it might be at war with. 
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First, hegemony is about raw, hard power. Militarily, a hegemon’s capabilities are 
such that “no other state has the wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it.”67 A 
hegemon also enjoys “economic supremacy” in the international system and has a 
“preponderance of material resources.”68 Second, hegemony is about the dominant 
power’s ambitions. A hegemon acts self-interestedly to safeguard its security, economic, 
and ideological interests.69 Third, hegemony is about polarity. Because of its 
overwhelming advantages in relative military and economic power over other states in 
the international system, a hegemon is the only great power in the system, which is 
therefore, by definition, uni-polar.70 Fourth, hegemony is about will. A hegemon 
purposefully exercises its overwhelming power to impose order on the international 
system.71 Finally, hegemony is fundamentally about structural change, because “if one 
state achieves hegemony, the system ceases to be anarchic and becomes hierarchic.”72 
Based on these issues, questions naturally arise. 
 Is the United States a global hegemon? Probably.  
 An extra regional hegemon? Yes.  
 Is the U.S. a hyperpower? Probably.  
 Is the world now uni-polar? No. 
According to Samuel P. Huntington, in a March–April 1999 article in Foreign 
Affairs:  
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...there is now only one superpower. But that does not mean that the world 
is uni-polar. A uni-polar system would have one superpower, no 
significant major powers, and many minor powers. As a result, the 
superpower could effectively resolve important international issues alone, 
and no combination of other states would have the power to prevent it 
from doing so... A bipolar system like the Cold War has two superpowers, 
and the relations between them are central to international politics. Each 
superpower dominates a coalition of allied states and competes with the 
other superpower for influence among nonaligned countries. A multi-polar 
system has several major powers of comparable strength that cooperate 
and compete with each other in shifting patterns. A coalition of major 
states is necessary to resolve important international issues...73 
Huntington continues by stating that  
Contemporary international politics does not fit any of these three models. It is 
instead a strange hybrid, a uni-multi-polar system with one superpower and 
several major powers. The settlement of key international issues requires action 
by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states; 
the single superpower can, however, veto action on key issues by combinations of 
other states. The United States, of course, is the sole state with preeminence in 
every domain of power — economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, 
technological, and cultural — with the reach and capabilities to promote its 
interests in virtually every part of the world. At a second level are major regional 
powers that are preeminent in areas of the world without being able to extend 
their interests and capabilities as globally as the United States. They include the 
German-French condominium in Europe, Russia in Eurasia, China and potentially 
Japan in East Asia, India in South Asia, Iran in Southwest Asia, Brazil in Latin 
America, and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa. At a third level are secondary 
regional powers whose interests often conflict with the more powerful regional 
states. These include Britain in relation to the German-French combination, 
Ukraine in relation to Russia, Japan in relation to China, South Korea in relation 
to Japan, Pakistan in relation to India, Saudi Arabia in relation to Iran, and 
Argentina in relation to Brazil...74 
Consequently, although U.S. officials often act as if the world was uni-polar and 
they would clearly prefer a uni-polar system in which the U.S. would be the hegemon; in 
essence, U.S. officials expected x, they got y. They boast of American power and 
American virtue, hailing the United States as a benevolent hegemon. However, that 
moment has passed. In the uni-polar moment at the end of the Cold War and the collapse 
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of the Soviet Union, the United States was often able to impose its will on other 
countries.75 Given the current situation, the U.S., although still able to qualitatively and 
quantitatively eclipse its individual peer competitors in most, if not all, of the measures of 
national power, may not be able to impose its will as effectively as it has over the past 
decade. 
According to Huntington, the superpower’s efforts to create a uni-polar system 
stimulate greater effort by the major powers to move toward a multi-polar one. Virtually 
all major regional powers are increasingly asserting themselves to promote their own 
distinct interests, which often conflict with those of the United States. Global politics has 
thus moved from the bipolar system of the Cold War through a uni-polar moment—
highlighted by the Gulf War – and is now passing through one or two alternating uni-
/multi-polar decades before it enters a truly multi-polar twenty-first century.76 The United 
States, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has said, will be the first, last, and only global 
superpower.77 Brzezinski is probably correct in that the U.S. will remain the only global 
superpower. However, the U.S. will have to work harder and smarter to dominate an 
increasingly globalized and integrated world that is inherently more flexible, malleable, 
and transitory in terms of alliances and interests. 
The major powers (i.e., middle or regional powers) prefer a multi-polar system in 
which they could pursue their interests, unilaterally and collectively, without being 
subject to constraints, coercion, and pressure by the stronger superpower. These powers, 
which currently include Russia, China, and India, currently feel threatened by what they 
see as the American pursuit of political and diplomatic, financial and economic, scientific 
and technical, cultural and ideological, and military global hegemony. American officials 
feel frustrated by their failure to achieve that hegemony because, according to former 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott:  
... in a fashion and to an extent that is unique in the history of Great 
Powers, the United States defines its strength—indeed, its very 
                                                 




greatness—not in terms of its ability to achieve or maintain dominance 
over others, but in terms of its ability to work with others in the interests 
of the international community as a whole...78  
None of the principal power-wielders in world affairs is happy with the status 
quo. For the US, rather than focusing on establishing unchallenged dominance in all 
places at all time, the status quo must focus on creatively combining and employing the 
instruments of national power to ensure its freedom of action in pursuing, achieving, and 
maintaining its core interests and its core end state. 
In closing, Huntington argues that  
...In the multi-polar world of the twenty-first century, the major powers 
will inevitably compete, clash, and coalesce with each other in various 
permutations and combinations. Such a world, however, will lack the 
tension and conflict between the superpower and the major regional 
powers that are the defining characteristic of a transitional uni-multi-polar 
world. For that reason, the United States could find life as a major power 
in a multi-polar world less demanding, less contentious, and more 
rewarding than it was as the world’s only superpower.79 
Christopher Layne in The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 
to the Present,80 and his The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United 
States’ Unipolar Moment81 argued that since the early 1990s, U.S. policymakers have 
embraced primacy and adopted an ambitious grand strategy of expanding the United 
States’ preponderant power, notwithstanding the seemingly ironclad rule of modern 
international history that hegemons always provoke, and are defeated by, the counter-
hegemonic balancing of other great powers. Advocates claim that U.S. hard-power 
capabilities are so overwhelming that other states cannot realistically hope to balance 
against the United States, nor do they have reason to because U.S. hegemony is 
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benevolent, and because they believe that hegemony advances U.S. interest and that the 
United States can maintain its preeminence deep into the century.  
However, Layne counters and challenges the United States’ hegemonic grand 
strategy by using a balance of power paradigm that suggests the period of U.S. primacy is 
numbered and that other states have good reason to fear unbalanced U.S. power. 
Although Layne, like Huntington, does not condemn U.S. primacy, he acknowledges that 
unless the United States wields its preponderant power with restraint, it could fall victim 
to a counter-hegemonic backlash not withstanding its relative invulnerability to 
conventional military threats.82 Layne’s argument illustrates the transformation of 
strengths into weaknesses and opportunities into challenges. 
Nevertheless, Layne makes it eminently clear that the United States’ hegemonic 
power is not illusory. First, the United States enjoys a commanding preeminence in both 
military and economic power. Second, since the Soviet Union’s disappearance, no other 
great power has emerged to challenge U.S. preponderance. In this sense, U.S. hegemony 
is the result of objective material conditions.83 The material conditions, especially the 
financial and economic conditions, are being challenged and being placed under stress. 
According Layne, U.S. hegemony marks the fulfillment of long-standing grand 
strategic objectives. Since the early 1940s, the United States has striven to create a uni-
polar distribution of power in the international system. And in the three regions that 
matter the most to it — Western Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf — it has 
maintained a permanent military presence both to prevent the emergence of new poles of 
power and to establish the kind of regional stability necessary to uphold a U.S.-
dominated international order by more or less replacing anarchy with hierarchy in those 
regions.84  
Layne calls this a form of “Open Door” expansionism, drawing on a long tradition 
of revisionist work in U.S. diplomatic history. According to the author, Open Door 
                                                 




ambitions dictate that the U.S. promotes an international system characterized by 
ideologically and economically friendly governments. In the terminology of international 
relations theory, such ambitions are a unit-level factor. The explanation for America’s 
extraordinarily advanced global role over the past 60 years therefore lies in the specific 
intersection of international and domestic factors: American power acts as a permissive 
cause, while open door ambitions act as motivation. Given the U.S. dependence on 
foreign trade and commence and the need for reciprocal transparency in trade and 
commerce, the “Open Door” policy, coupled with an ingrained sense of idealism and 
exceptionalism, has been at the core of the U.S.’ national security policy since the 
nation’s earliest beginnings. 
In essence, the U.S. exists in a duality: The United States is a status quo power in 
that it aims to preserve the existing distribution of power. Yet, the United States is also an 
expansionist state that seeks to increase its power advantages and to extend its 
geopolitical and ideological reach. As Layne says, to preserve the status quo that favors 
them, real and perceived hegemons, including the U.S., must keep knocking down actual 
and potential rivals; that is, they must continue to expand. However, expansion in an 
increasingly globalized and integrated global environment may no longer be measurable 
in tangible metrics, but rather in terms of a actor’s ability to establish and maintain 
transactional and relational communications through which dominance is achieved 
through consultation, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration; in essence, the ability 
to favorably frame and shape the situation in ways favorable to the actor will become the 
measure of successful expansionism and dominance. 
As Kenneth Waltz noted, power does not mean that a state possesses the ability to 
get its way all of the time.85 According to Layne, material resources never translate fully 
into desired outcomes (military strategists acknowledge this when they observe that “the 
enemy has a vote” in determining the degree to which a state can realize its strategic 
goals). Although a hegemon does not get its way all of the time, its vast power will help it 
get its way with other states far more often than they will get their way with it.  
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Precisely because the United States is a hegemon, there is a marked asymmetry of 
influence in its favor. In international politics, the United States does not get all that it 
wants all of the time. But it gets most of what it wants an awful lot of the time, and it 
affects other states far more than other states affect it.86 
Layne suggests that the optimal and expected realist strategy would, in fact, be a 
generally noninterventionist approach in relation to European and Asian security matters, 
but that at least since the 1940s, the U.S. has instead followed an extremely ambitious 
and dysfunctional strategy of global or “extra-regional hegemony.”  
According to Layne, and to some degree Huntington, the most robust argument 
for long-lasting U.S. hegemony is that uni-polarity transforms the nature of international 
politics and negates the balancing dynamic because the United States’ hard power has 
surpassed this threshold and that the sheer magnitude of its military, technological, and 
economic power discourages would-be peer competitors from even attempting to 
compete geopolitically against it, and most states have no reason to balance against the 
United States because they do not feel militarily threatened by it. Although the United 
States can employ its many military, economic, and diplomatic instruments as 
inducements to ward off potential challenges to its preeminence, the fact that the United 
States is a democratic hegemon not only alleviates others’ fears of its hegemonic power, 
but the liberal democratic nature of the United States’ domestic political system 
legitimates U.S. hegemony and simultaneously reassures others of its benevolence.87  
Layne and Huntington would likely agree that although the U.S. is a hegemonic 
power, it has not necessarily sought hegemonic power. Instead, the U.S. has used its 
strengths to convert temporary vacuums of power into exploitable opportunities. By 
filling the vacuum of power, the U.S. has expanded and maintained its “reach” and its 
ability to control, direct, and dominate world affairs. 
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Although many U.S. policymakers believe that the United States is a benevolent 
hegemon, other states must worry primarily about the hegemon’s, in this case the U.S., 
capabilities rather than its intentions; the ability of the United States to reassure others is 
limited by its formidable, and unchecked, capabilities, which always are at least a latent 
threat to other states. Even in a uni-polar world, not all of the other major powers (super 
and great powers, middle, and regional powers) will believe themselves to be threatened 
(or to be equally threatened) by the hegemon.  
However, according to Layne’s argument, some are bound to regard the 
hegemon’s power as menacing.88 For example, although primacists assert that U.S. 
hegemony is non-threatening because U.S. power is “offshore,” this manifestly is not the 
case according to Layne and Stephen M. Walt.89  
On the contrary, in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East, American power is 
both onshore (or lurking just over the horizon in the case of East Asia) and in the faces of 
Russia, China, and the Islamic world. Far from being an offshore balancer that is 
“stopped by water” from dominating regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, the United 
States has acquired the means to selectively project massive military power and non-
military power into, and around, Eurasia, and thereby to establish extra-regional 
hegemony in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. 
Given that the U.S. currently exists in a duality, it has only five postures available 
to it as it enters the second decade of the twenty first century. 
 Isolationism: Isolationism has appealed to the populace in the past, 
especially during the early twentieth century. Its supporters assert that the 
United States is “not responsible for, and cannot afford the costs of, 
maintaining world order.”90 In adopting a global posture emphasizing 
isolationism, the size and capabilities of the military force structure would 
thus be modest and centered on a reactive, defensive posture.  
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 Critics of isolationism argue that by only directly addressing the vital 
interest of protection of “security, liberty, and property” can the United 
States disengage throughout the world. Now, more than ever, the United 
States has an interest in the global environment. The immediate risks of 
isolationism would include a decreased economic prosperity, since U.S. 
corporations would find it more difficult to engage in trade with other 
nations and multi-national corporations. The U.S. economy is 
interdependent on the economies of other trading partners through treaties 
and international organizations. Longer-term risks include the global 
deterioration of basic human rights and prospects of more conflict as some 
failing countries are unable to secure basic human rights of their citizens 
and transition to democratic governments due to a withdrawal of United 
States support. Likewise, global terrorists and transnational criminal 
organizations will find an environment ripe for exploitation. While it is not 
likely that the United States would no longer enjoy a free representative 
government, it is very possible that individual security and prosperity 
would suffer if the United States retreated to a strategy of isolationism.91 
“American leadership and engagement in the world are vital for our 
security, and the world is a safer place as a result.”92 The U.S. cannot 
abdicate its current position. Consequently, isolationism is not a viable 
BNSP approach. 
 Collective Engagement/Offshore Balancer: A second possibility, 
collective engagement, is a strategic acknowledgement that the United 
States, acting as the offshore balancer — multilateral and realistic, cannot 
turn inward and that “no nation can build a safer, better world alone.”93 
Through active cooperation with international organizations and alliances 
such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, and African Union, the United States can protect a 
wider range of national interests without a global military presence. 
Effective organizations and alliances foster norms of conduct by deterring 
would-be challengers through the certainty of collective retaliation.94  
 However, skeptics argue that “international organizations have 
little if any power and therefore can do little to maintain or, 
particularly, restore peace;”95 in part because it is difficult to reach 
a political consensus on the application of national or coalition 
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power. Furthermore, collective engagement requires a “sacrifice of 
[national] power and control over the intervention”96 in exchange 
for a decrease in “human and economic resources” required to 
sustain national powers – especially military power. Although 
helpful in the face of direct threats to national security, collective 
engagement could make it harder to protect human rights and 
economic national interests when it lacks international 
consensus.97 
 Deterrence and Containment (Extra Regional Hegemon): A containment 
strategy, strategic internationalism and extra regional, loosely associated 
with collective engagement, supports international organizations and 
alliances for a narrowly defined role; it seemed to be successful in 
countering the expansion of the Soviet Union for the latter half of the 
twentieth century. While there is some dispute whether or not containment 
actually caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is clear, following the 
Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001 and attempts by terrorist groups 
to employ weapons of mass destruction, that containment will not always 
work against non-state actors or rogue and failed states, which can operate 
across borders and are not easily deterred. Similar to the strategy of 
isolationism, containment does not portend the loss of a free representative 
U.S. government.  
 However, continued human rights abuses, the rise of totalitarian regimes, 
and direct threats to personal security pose a variety of risks. Although 
free trade under containment would result in greater prosperity under than 
isolationism and collective engagement, failure to restore failed states 
would pose a threat to continued globalization. Relying on the reactive 




interests. Indeed, the new global environment calls for a preemptive 
national strategy buttressed with positive incentives for all nations to join 
the global community.98 
 Selective Engagement: The selective engagement strategy is the U.S. 
acting as the offshore balancer — multilateral and realistic — and utilizes 
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“carrots” and “sticks” to engage state and non-state actors. It has been the 
prevalent strategy, supported by administrations since the end of the Cold 
War, to create a favorable world order and was first promoted by the 1991 
National Security Strategy and modified by the 2002 National Security 
Strategy’s advocacy of a balance of power favoring human freedom. 
Selective engagement recognizes that the United States “has developed an 
extraordinarily wide range of international commitments, and . . . [has] 
important interests at stake in every world region.”99 This strategy 
recognizes that U.S. economic prosperity relies heavily on globalization, 
and “inside the global market all interests have transnational 
implications.”100  
 Critics argue that while the United States supports human rights, the 
United States is not consistent in applying the range of national power to 
protect human rights. These critics point out that the United States uses 
military power in some countries and uses only diplomatic power in other 
countries to further human rights.101 But the United States uses national 
power only after thorough analysis to determine the level of threat to a 
national interest and the appropriateness of using the wide range of 
national power to counter a given threat – “the most important strategic 
question is the opportunity cost.”102 A tailored strategy, designed to 
support national interests, has become the norm for states, regions, and 
non-state actors. The military force required for this strategy must be 
scalable and provide diverse capabilities. Selective engagement will have 
succeeded if a favorable world order and U.S. economic prosperity are 
sustained over the long run. 
 Primacy (Global Hegemon): Primacy, global hegemony, the antithesis of 
isolationism, assumes “only a preponderance of U.S. power ensures 
peace.”103 As a grand strategy, primacy requires the uncontested 
supremacy of all forms of national power. Although the United States is 
the only remaining superpower with no near military competitor for the 
next few decades, economic power is bi-polar at best and steadily moving 
towards multi-polarity due to globalization. The United States recognizes 
the difficulty of seeking primacy and supports local and regional near-
competitors by sharing economic, diplomatic, information and financial 
power in an effort to create a balance of power that is favorable to U.S. 
BNSP core interests and those of U.S. allies. Furthermore, while the 
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United States has no near singular military competitor, coalitions and non-
state actors such as terrorist groups, guerillas, insurgents, and criminals 
could challenge the U.S. military primacy and bring great chaos and 
suffering to the U.S. homeland. Given that the United States has finite 
economic, diplomatic, and military resources and thus must continue to 
work with allies and governmental organizations to achieve its national 
interests and it is unreasonable to postulate that the United States can 
instantly achieve all of its national interests in view of the limited 
capability and resources available to wield the various forms of national 
power. 
Isolationism is neither practical nor achievable. An engaged option is preferred. 
The present Bush Administration’s U.S. BNSP and strategy can be characterized 
as primacy-based selective engagement.  Its predecessor’s, the Clinton Administration, 
BNSP and strategy was a primacy-based collective engagement/offshore balancer 
strategy. Prior to 1993, the majority of the administrations adopted BNSPs and strategies 
that were largely characterized as being based on extra-regional hegemonistic deterrence 
and containment. Of note, the George W. Bush Administration (2000-2008) was the first 
administration since the James K. Polk Administration (1844-1848) to advocate, 
formulate, and execute a preemptive BNSP and strategy. 
One of the most useful and traditional in the post-Westphaliam era (1648-
present), approaches to understanding the behavior of political entities is the concept of a 
balance of power. This concept is a tricky one, however, for the term is used to mean a 
number of quite different things. In fact, it has no widely agreed-upon meaning. It is 
nonetheless useful to examine some of the different, often contradictory, ways in which 
the phrase “balance of power” is used. These contradictions themselves reveal a lot about 
the nature of politics and the role of war. According to George Liska in Sheehan’s The 
Balance of Power: History and Theory, the balance of power is “at once the dominant 
myth and the fundamental law of interstate relations.”104  
The term balance of power is usually used in reference to states, but it is 
applicable to any system involving more than one political power center. The phrase can 
mean any of the following:  
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 The actual distribution of power, however unequal that may be.  
 A situation in which two or more entities or groups of entities possess 
effectively equal power.  
 A system in which entities shift alliances in order to ensure that no one 
entity or group of entities becomes preponderant.  
For the purposes of this paper, the most useful meaning of the term is the last 
given. Balance of power systems have appeared frequently in world history. Normally, 
such a system is created when several entities vie for supremacy (“hegemony”), yet none 
individually has the power to achieve it alone. All are suspicious of any potentially 
hegemonic power, for fear of being swallowed up. Historically, most societies have 
viewed this as an abnormal situation; the traditional Chinese ideal of uniting “all under 
heaven” is typical, as was the medieval European ideal of a universal church and empire. 
After all, there can be only one “best” solution philosophically, and that solution logically 
should apply to all of mankind. Most civilizations have ultimately achieved such unity; 
and paid for it with stagnation.  
Only in the modern (post-Westphalian, ca. 1648) European world did the concept 
of a balance of power gain widespread recognition as a desirable state of affairs. This 
occurred when it became apparent that no one government or ideology had the power to 
unite Western civilization by force. Attempts to do so had become so costly and 
disruptive that they threatened social stability and the dominance of ruling classes 
everywhere.  
Gradually, the ideal of a stable system of independent states took hold. After the 
Peace of Westphalia (1648), most European wars were fought either to maintain the 
rough equality of the “great powers” or to contain or destroy the occasional “shark” who 
sought to overthrow the system and impose its hegemony. The object of the system was 
not peace, but rather the security, freedom, and independence of the participating states.  
One of the great debates over the nature of the state system is over whether all 
states are by nature are sharks who would consume their neighbors given the opportunity 
or if instead most states are content to coexist peacefully, and sharks are the exception to 
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the rule. That debate is essentially irresolvable. It is clear, however, that the periodic 
arrival of an undeniable “shark” led to a steady decrease in the number of independent 
states even in Europe. Even non-aggressive states were forced to annex their smaller 
neighbors as a means of increasing their own powers of self-defense.  
“Sharks” seek to overthrow the balance of power system. Their strategy is to 
eliminate all competitors (within a state, a region, or world-wide). In the West as a whole, 
this goal has frequently been attempted but never achieved. Such an effort tends to be 
disastrous, since it means taking on multiple enemies.105 “Sharks” (e.g., Napoleonic 
France, Imperial and Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union) represent an obvious class of 
threats to a balance of power system. Ambitious powers must always be wary of what 
Clausewitz called the “culminating point of victory.”106 This is the point at which one 
competitor’s success prompts its allies and other potential players to withdraw their 
support or even throw their weight against it.  
Even if successful, the hegemonic solution has its limits. A political entity with no 
peer competition will most likely stagnate, a case of “nothing fails like success.” Because 
of the internal dynamics of any human system, inherently a complex adaptive system of 
systems, it is difficult for such a winner to maintain its military edge for long. For 
example, the reservoir of military experience inevitably ages (with all of the changes in 
attitude and values that this implies) and eventually dies off. Almost equally inevitably, a 
new enemy will arise, either from within via civil war or revolution or from off-stage. 
World historians have suggested that it was the success of hegemonic states in the Middle 
East, India, and China that left them so vulnerable to the emerging West, in which there 
remained the stimulus of furious internal political, economic, and military competition.107  
The conservative, fundamentally practical, doable, achievable, and realistic, 
strategic solution is to know when and where to stop, i.e., to understand the meaning of 
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the culminating point of victory and to live within the balance of power system. Entities 
pursuing this strategy are not necessarily altruistic or unambitious. They simply recognize 
the nature of the system and use it to enhance their own positions. They draw strength 
from the other members of the system and benefit from the errors committed by 
sharks.108  
Knowing where to stop, in both their internal and external political struggles, has 
been a major factor in the consistent strategic success of powers like Great Britain and 
the United States. The greatest individual practitioner of this strategy, the art and science 
of realpolitik, was probably the Prussian/German chancellor Otto von Bismarck. In three 
short wars (1864, 1866, and 1870-71), Bismarck disrupted the European balance of 
power by unifying most of the small German states into a single, powerful German 
Empire.109 Rather than use this power in a dangerous attempt to unify all of Europe; 
however, he used it to make Germany the new balancing power, working tirelessly to 
maintain peace among the great powers. His successors, by overplaying their hand, 
destroyed both Germany and Europe.  
Less well understood, however, is another kind of threat, the “power vacuum.” A 
power vacuum occurs when there is no authority capable of maintaining order in some 
geographic area.110 As stated earlier in this chapter, the U.S. has, because of the great 
strengths resident in its instruments of national power, has taken advantage of the 
opportunity to fill these “power vacuums” and subsequently, in most case, exploit them 
to its benefit. 
Power vacuums are disruptive to the balance of power in two distinct ways. First, 
the disorder in the vacuum tends to spread as violent elements launch raids into 
surrounding areas or as fanatics and criminal organizations commit other provocative 
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acts. The disintegration of Soviet power in the early 1990s has provided many examples of 
this sort. Another example is the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which drew a reluctant NATO 
intervention force into Bosnia. Second, the power vacuum may attract annexation by an 
external power. 
If this act threatens to add substantially to the annexing entity’s power, other states 
will become concerned and may interfere. Many Russians saw NATO’s intervention in 
Bosnia in this light. NATO’s agreement to Russian participation in that mission represented 
an attempt to mitigate such concerns. Russia’s recent actions (August 2008) in Georgia are 
highly illustrative of this effect. There have been examples of surrounding states peacefully 
cooperating to ensure that a power vacuum is eliminated in a manner that leaves the balance 
of power unchanged. For example, Prussia, Austria, and Russia had fought a series of 
exhausting balance-of-power wars in the 18th century. A new problem arose when Poland, 
bordered by these three states, became a power vacuum due to its own internal political 
failures. Eager to evade a new struggle, the three states avoided war by cooperating in three 
successive partitions of the Polish state.111 Sometimes, neighboring entities are unwilling to 
take responsibility for maintaining order in a disrupted area. In that case, they will normally 
assist some local element to achieve sufficient power to reestablish order.  
Another example of the problem of power vacuums also helps demonstrate the 
usefulness of the state form of organization. As a result of the Palestinian Intifada in the 
Israeli-occupied territories, a de facto power, but not de jure, vacuum developed. Israel could 
prevent the Palestinians from developing their own government, but it could not impose 
order. Israel had already discovered the difficulties of dealing with a disembodied, non-state 
terrorist organization, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO or Fatah).  
Neither problem had proved soluble through military means. Israel has attempted to 
solve both problems by creating what is, in effect, a Palestinian state. This state can claim 
legitimacy in the occupied territories and can, in theory at least, be relied upon to put a stop 
to the turmoil there.  
The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan following the exit of the Soviet forces in 
1989 and the Taliban’s fellow travelers in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal 
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Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan are also excellent examples of power vacuums 
being filled by de facto, but non-de jure, authorities. Al-Qa’ída, on the other hand, does 
not represent a de facto authority filling a real or perceived power vacuum. Instead, al-
Qai’da is filling perceived philosophical vacuum. 
Strategists must be keenly aware of the dynamics of the various balance of power 
systems that are involved in any given strategic problem112  
First, one’s own strategy (i.e., the U.S.) will be affected to some significant extent 
by the internal balancing and fractious jockeying for power that takes place between 
political parties, factions, and branches of government, and between various agencies, 
departments, and services responsible for maintaining the resources (i.e., means) resident 
in the instruments of national power. It takes strong leadership and willpower to prevent 
the bureaucratic balancing instinct from dominating the strategy-making process. The 
United States is not immune to the culminating point of victory.113 
In addition, many participants in the coalitions that the United States has 
assembled since the end of the Second World War — specifically those formed to 
prosecute the 1990-1991 Gulf War and liberate Kuwait, the decade (1990-2001) long 
NATO-led peace-making, peace-enforcement and peace-keeping effort in the Balkans, 
and the on-going wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — are only temporary comrades in arms, 
with long-term goals that may diverge widely from the U.S. 
Even some of the U.S.’ customary allies, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Canada, Australia, and Japan for example, have long traditions as “great powers” 
and have not necessarily forgotten their own ambitions or, most recently and most 
importantly, their domestic political demographics and demands and their domestic 
economic requirements. Consequently, allies’ and partners’ attitudes toward American 
power, presence, and operations involving the U.S.’ unilateral application of the U.S.’ 
instruments of national power are complex. One need to only look at the reaction of, and 
divisions between, U.S. allies and partners to the crisis in Georgia to see that there are 
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great differences driven by domestic political demographics and domestic economic 
requirements. Consequently, a particular victory or setback may either weaken or 
strengthen U.S. alliances, dependent on the specific circumstances of the conflict.  
Third, the balance of power mechanism is operational within the adversary’s 
camp as well. During the early stages of the Second World War, for example, much of 
Italy’s behavior was driven by concerns about her German ally’s successes — and their 
failures. The resultant Italian actions caused great problems not only for the Western 
allies, but for Germany as well.114  
During the current Iraq War, American policy and the community of strategists, 
policy makers, decision makers, academics, and politicians, all practitioners of the art and 
science of national security were very concerned about the internal balance of power 
within a defeated Iraq. The United States desired the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, but 
not if the result was the ascendancy of a radical new Shiite regime.  
Like the “invisible hand” of market economics—supply and demand—the 
balance of power mechanism, itself a derivative of the supply and demand theory in 
which there is a supply of and demand for power, is always at work, regardless of 
whether the system’s participants actively believe that it is a good thing. It will always 
influence events, but does not predetermine them.115  
Balancing tendencies can often be overcome by strong leadership, by common 
interests, by a powerful threat from outside the system. They occasionally break down 
completely, and a single dominant power emerges. Consequently, the concept of a 
balance of power is a useful basis for strategic analysis, and the balancing mechanism is 
often a useful strategic tool.116  
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Despite the recurrence of various underlying strategic patterns, the strategic 
environment can take dramatically different forms depending on what Clausewitz called 
“the spirit of the age.” The First World War occurred in a multi-polar world dominated 
by powerful, militarized nation-states vying for national glory. In its aftermath, four 
empires ceased to exist—the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman 
Empires.117 Into the power vacuums stepped the National Socialists in Germany, the 
Bolsheviks and Communists in Russia, and Kemalists and Young Turks in Turkey. The 
Austro-Hungarian Empire simply devolved into its distinct ethno-national entities before 
being consumed and absorbed into the Third Reich in the Second World War. 
The Cold War, utterly different in character and duration, took place between vast 
coalitions in a bipolar world sundered by the ideological competition of communism and 
liberal democracy. The superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and their respective 
blocs of allies, associates, and partners, strove to repress or contain “local” conflicts 
everywhere (i.e., Berlin, Korea, Hungary, Vietnam and southeast Asia, the Cuban Missile 
Crisis and the Bay of Pigs, Malaysia and Kenya, Algeria, the Arab-Israeli Wars, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Indo-Pakistani and Indo-Chinese Wars, etc.) for fear they 
might lead to global war — and the fear of initiating and consummating (losing by 
winning or winning by losing) thermonuclear war.118   
In the post-Cold War world, the community of strategists, policy makers, decision 
makers, academics, and politicians, all practitioners of the art and science of national 
security see, perhaps perceive is a better word, a global balance of power that is uni-polar 
and dominated by the United States and its Western or Westernized allies and largely free 
of fundamental ideological disputes, save in some cases religion.  
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The conventional wisdom among U.S. grand strategists is that U.S. hegemony is 
exceptional — that the United States need not worry about other states engaging in 
counter-hegemonic balancing against it. The case for U.S. hegemonic exceptionalism, 
however, is weak. 
Contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists, no new great 
powers have emerged since the end of the Cold War to restore equilibrium to the balance 
of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States — that is, at least, not 
yet. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the 
United States. Here, however, they conflate the absence of a new distribution of power in 
the international political system with the absence of balancing behavior by the major 
second-tier powers. Moreover, the primacists’ focus on the failure of new great powers to 
emerge, and the absence of traditional “hard” (i.e., military) counterbalancing, distracts 
attention from other forms of counter balancing — notably “leash-slipping” — by major 
second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the same result: the end of uni-polarity. 
Because uni-polarity is the foundation of U.S. hegemony, if it ends, so too will U.S. 
primacy.119 However, the U.S. will remain the “primus inter pares” because no other 
nation-state, nor any combination of nation-states, currently possesses, in their 
instruments of national power, the depth and breadth of capabilities required to establish 
and maintain genuine global dominance. 
While a uni-polar global balance of power seems simple in theory, politics and the 
jockeying for political power did not stop with America’s victory in the Cold War. The 
current situation in Georgia, and potentially east and central Europe with respect to the 
deployment of a new anti-ballistic missile defense system, are excellent examples. In 
Moscow’s view, the missile defense sites are inexorably linked to U.S. relationships with 
Eastern Europe, including on-going NATO and EU expansion. Given this, the historic 
Russian fear of encirclement is very much alive at the moment. 
However, many analysts in Europe and the U.S. widely believe Russia is using 
controversy over the agreement within Europe and NATO to further divide the U.S. and 
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its allies; and there may be some fact to this theory. There is a growing fear in countries 
such as Poland, Ukraine, and Estonia that they could be attacked, militarily, economically 
and financially, and diplomatically, by Russia as it attempts to reemerge as an 
international power. In addition, some U.S. European allies have been extremely reticent 
to support the missile shield agreement for fear it could amp up nuclear proliferation and 
cause nuclear ripples across the globe, where other countries such as India, China, or 
even Pakistan must reassess their own nuclear capabilities. The complexity of the 
situation is only beginning to emerge. 
For example, there has been the recent emergence and promulgation of the 
Medvedev Doctrine.120 The “doctrine” states that the Russian Federation has finally 
asserted itself and has proclaimed to the Russian people and the world that it will not 
allow itself to be encircled by the United States. The Russian Federation’s Presidential 
web site has the July 12, 2008 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation on-line 
in its entirety.121 The Medvedev Doctrine, to say the least, is polarizing and it is not 
surprising that the Russians used the situation in Georgia to launch the doctrine.  
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Another region of concern is in East Asia involving China and Taiwan122 China 
and Taiwan, while in practice maintaining a fragile “status quo” relationship, periodically 
grow impatient with the diplomatic patchwork that has kept the island separate from the 
Communist mainland since 1949. After losing the civil war to Communist Chinese and 
fleeing to Taiwan in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) leaders of the Republic of 
China regarded the Communist Chinese government as illegitimate, claiming the 
mainland as rightfully their own. Beijing, in turn, regards Taiwan as a renegade province 
and has tried repeatedly to persuade the island to negotiate a return to the fold under 
terms similar to those governing the former British colony in Hong Kong.  
While the threat of open war appears low and economic ties have grown steadily 
since the two began serious bilateral exchanges in the 1980s, periodic spasms of anti-
Taiwan feeling in Beijing and of pro-independence sentiment on the island severely test 
the peace that has reigned in recent years across the Taiwan Strait. Experts say KMT’s 
return to power may bring better relations with the mainland. Fortunately, neither Russia 
nor China, nor a condominium of Russia and China, possess the requisite strengths to 
operationalize the current window of opportunity and challenge the U.S. for global 
dominance. 
Additionally, potential “flash points” exist on the Indian subcontinent between an 
increasingly modern and industrializing India that is emerging on to the world stage 
along with China as a major force and an unstable and increasingly Islamic Pakistan that 
has ties to the global Islamic jihad. Similarly, Latin America’s resurgent leftist 
nationalism and xenophobic anti-Americanism for example are also emerging national 
security “flash points.” Additionally, a lucrative worldwide drug trade flourishes, 
financing criminal organizations that undermine or even seek to destroy legitimate 
governments. Burgeoning populations, especially in the littoral regions, threaten to 
overwhelm the abilities of corrupt or incompetent governments to provide justice and 
other vital services. Environmental disasters and disputes over resources as basic as water 
raise regional tensions.  
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Consequently, the U.S. is dominant within an evolving international environment 
that is characterized by a host of new conflicts and new kinds of conflicts; the foremost 
among them are radical extremists who employ terrorist tools, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures in order to change the status quo in which the disenfranchised are empowered 
by gaining and exercising political power. This is new, that is, to a world grown used to 
the “long peace” imposed by the long stalemate of the Cold War. Bear in mind that the 
periods between 1815 (the end of the Napoleonic Wars) and 1860 (the beginnings of the 
Italian Wars of Unification and the Franco-Prussian War) and again between 1871 (the 
end of the Italian Wars of Unification and the Franco-Prussian War) and 1914 (the 
beginning of the First World War) were also characterized by the term “long peace.”123 
Long-suppressed ethnic, religious, regional, and even personal hatreds can trigger, 
and are triggering, large-scale violence. The result is often terrorism, civil war, secession, 
and sometimes the total breakdown of order. In Somalia, for example, the state 
completely disappeared, swamped by warfare between local clans and gangs.  
No longer guided by the Cold War’s overarching strategic concept of 
“containment,” American strategists appear to be puzzled by this new strategic pattern or 
lack thereof. The United States finds itself drawn into local, regional, and transnational 
conflicts by a mixture of internal pressures, economic self-interest, humanitarian 
impulses, and balance-of-power concerns.124  
Like any complex system, the international environment is constantly subject to 
change, experiencing periods of both stability and instability. Instability tends to increase 
as the degree of interaction rises, particularly if one or more actors seek to impose change 
on the strategic environment. Periods exhibiting lower degrees of interaction are 
generally more stable. Periods characterized by stability tend to favor linear approaches 
to problems or challenges, while periods exhibiting greater instability tend to require 
nonlinear perspectives and problem-solving.  
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As the level or complexity of interaction rises, the strategic environment 
potentially moves into a state of self-organizing criticality, at which time it lies on the 
border of order and disorder, and then is highly susceptible to a radical new rebalancing. 
Therefore, the strategic equilibrium is adjusted continuously, but on these occasions the 
strategic environment experiences dramatic change. Such major changes really reflect 
upheavals in the key continuities of the strategic environment’s different communities — 
business, government, academic, military, religion, etc. 
What this body of literature shares is an appreciation that the strategic 
environment is in the midst of a major reshaping as a result of changes generally 
attributed to the convergence of a number of events or trends: the end of the Cold War, 
massive changes in economic relationships, the rise of globalization, and seminal 
advances in technology. At the heart of these changes are the establishment of 
information and knowledge — their production, dissemination, storage, and use — as the 
fundamental social and economic activity, rather than the cultivation of agriculture or the 
production of manufactured goods.125  
It is a transformation of social and economic life on a global scale. Such a 
widespread change in multiple subsystems has dramatic implications for the strategic 
environment and the states and actors that compose the international system. Moreover, it 
will impose further change both at the international and domestic levels of most, if not 
all, actors. 
Strategists in the first quarter of the twenty-first century must recognize that the 
emerging strategic environment is the product of such an upheaval. In terms of chaos or 
complexity theory, the strategic environment is in the process of bifurcation. The order or 
relative balance of the bipolar Cold War becomes part of the past as a new order is 
formed. While not all the rules must change, because of the heightening the sense of 
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uncertainty and instability, many will need to be changed or reinterpreted as states and 
actors seek a new equilibrium. 
The current period of great and rapid change presents both threats and 
opportunities. The period has already displayed its characteristics in broad terms. It 
favors service economies over industrial manufacturing economies; it is global and local 
in scope at the same time, global in its reach and local in its focus; it allows and 
encourages decentralized production while it democratizes decision making; it challenges 
and replaces authorities who cannot compete; and it appears to be ushering in a period of 
hyper-competition among businesses, cultures, and nation-states, non-state actors, and/or 
other new state-like actors.126  
In essence, it will be a period of revolutionary change until a new equilibrium is 
achieved, with the strategic environment now teetering on the edge of chaos. It is a period 
of great opportunity and risk for the strategist in any system. In retrospect, the latter Cold 
War period appears to have been relatively stable, with established rules for the 
international strategic environment that orchestrated the relationships and interaction 
among the states and actors — in short, a stable, but uneasy and volatile equilibrium of 
sorts.127 
Efforts to adjust to this an uneasy and volatile equilibrium in which smaller-scale 
warfare will be highlighted, however, must be tempered by concerns about the possible 
emergence of a new peer competitor (i.e., Russia or China or potentially a resurgent 
European Union) or some other strategic surprise (i.e., a pandemic, a catastrophic natural 
disaster, or climate change). However clear the general pattern of conflict may be in any 
era, there are always exceptions. The pattern can always change, with little or no 
warning. As demonstrated earlier, radical changes in the distribution of power can occur 
in remarkably short periods.  
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However, given the current financial-economic contagion and the keen 
competition for scarce military-industrial resources, it is highly unlikely that a genuine 
peer competitor to the U.S. will arise in the near term with the requisite strengths to 
operationalize the current window of opportunity and challenge the U.S. for global 
dominance. However, as unlikely as this scenario is, the U.S., in formulating and 
executing its BNSP, must constantly be on guard against such developments and 
maintain its freedom action so that it can (1) detect, deter and contain, deny and disrupt, 
discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat threats to its core interests and end state; 
and (2) ensure the highest level of preparedness necessary in order to effectively protect 
its population and critical infrastructures, including its instruments of national power, 
from the effects and consequences of potential threats; proactively and preemptively 
prevent, when possible and prudent, these threats from materializing and manifesting 
themselves against the U.S.; responding to, when necessary, to these threats; and 
recovering from the effects and consequences of threats that have impacted the U.S.  
In any particular strategic situation, one can discern certain consistent patterns — 
like the balance of power mechanism — and use them as a framework to help understand 
what is occurring. At the same time, the U.S. must realize that each strategic situation is 
unique: In order to grasp its true nature, the U.S. must comprehend how the characters 
and motivations of the antagonists will interact under specific, often new, circumstances.  
Summarizing the environment within which war and strategy are made, 
Clausewitz described it as being dominated by a “remarkable trinity,” composed of (1) 
primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; 
(2) of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; 
and (3) of (war’s) element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it 
subject to reason. The first of these three aspects more concerns the people; the second 
more the commander and his army; the third more the government.  
These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their 
subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one 
of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality 
to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless. The task of today’s 
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strategists, policy makers, decision makers, academics, and politicians, all practitioners of 
the art and science, therefore, is to develop a theory that maintains a balance among these 
three tendencies, like an object floating among three sources of attraction.128  
In other words, Clausewitz concluded that the strategic environment is shaped by 
the disparate forces of emotion, chance, and rational thought. At any given moment, one 
of these forces may dominate, but the other two are always at work. The actual course of 
events is determined by the dynamic interplay among them.129  
Thus the strategic environment, past, present, and future, is always defined by the 
character of politics and the interactions among political entities. This environment is 
complex and subject to the interplay of dynamic and often contradictory factors. Some 
elements of politics and policy are rational, that is, the product of conscious thought and 
intent. Other aspects are governed by forces, like emotion and chance which defy any 
purely rational explanation. The effective strategist must master the meaning and the 
peculiarities of this environment.130 
The art and science of formulating and implementing a nation’s basic national 
security policy (BNSP) and strategy and achieving and maintaining a nation’s national 
security occurs within the framework of the international environment. Any discussion of 
basic national security policy and strategy must begin with and be entered into with an 
understanding of the international environment and international relations theory. The 
strategic environment — past, present, and future, is always defined by the character of 
politics and the interactions among political entities, foreign and domestic. This 
environment is complex and subject to the interplay of dynamic and often contradictory 
factors. Some elements of politics and policy are rational, that is, the product of 
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conscious thought and intent. Other aspects are governed by forces, like emotion and 
chance that defy any purely rational explanation. The effective strategist must master the 
meaning and the peculiarities of this environment 
The international environment, in which U.S. basic national security policy and 
strategy must operate in, is fraught with threats, foreign and domestic, to the national 
security of the United States. It is precisely because of these threats that the U.S. must 
formulate, adopt, and implement a BNSP and strategy that can detect, deter and contain, 
deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat these threats if it is to 
achieve and sustain its core national security end state and defend its core national 
security goals, objectives, expectations, and interests.  
The current threat environment is highly ambiguous and characterized by 
volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. It is precisely because of these threats 
that the U.S. must formulate, adopt, and implement a BNSP and strategy that can detect, 
deter and contain, deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat 
these threats if it is to achieve and sustain its core national security end state and defend 
its core national security goals, objectives, expectations, and interests. Based on the 
recently completed National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025: A Transformed 
World and the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Threat 
Assessment: Evaluating Threats 2008–2013, the future threat environment is projected to 
be equally ambiguous and similarly characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, 
and ambiguity. 
Chapter V will acknowledge that there are enduring challenges resident within the 
international environment for the current and future U.S. national security establishment, 
at home and abroad and will include familiar military activities, such as defending against 
attacks on U.S. territory, conflict with other nation-state powers, and terrorist networks 
and criminal organizations. These enduring challenges also include dealing with the 
collapse of functioning states and the use of military forces in combination with the non-
military instruments of national power to deter and prevent conflict around the world. 
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V. THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES131 
The international environment is fraught with threats, both foreign and domestic, 
to the national security of the United States. The current threat environment is highly 
ambiguous and characterized by the acronym “VUCA;” volatility, uncertainty, 
complexity, and ambiguity. It is precisely because of these threats that the U.S. must 
formulate, adopt, and implement a BNSP and strategy that can detect, deter and contain, 
deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat these threats if it is to 
achieve and sustain it core national security end state and defend its core national security 
goals, objectives, expectations, and interests. 
It has been seven years since 9/11. It has been more than seven years since the 
attack on the USS Cole, ten years since the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania, 15 years since the first attack on the World Trade Center, and 25 years since 
the bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut. Over that quarter-century, the 
threat the U.S. faces from radicalism, extremism, and terrorism has constantly mutated, 
sometimes in tragically unexpected ways.132 
No one state, and no one particular threat or actor, state or non-state, threatens the 
United States directly. The Cold War threat has been replaced by a diverse, but 
interconnected set of threats and risks, which affect the United States directly and 
concurrently, have the potential to undermine wider international stability. They include 
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international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed states, 
pandemics, and transnational crime. These and other threats and risks are driven by a 
diverse and interconnected set of underlying factors, including climate change, 
competition for energy, poverty and poor governance, demographic changes and 
globalization. 
According to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the dominant 
contemporary threat facing the U.S. is no longer emanating from a peer nation-state 
competitor (i.e., the former Soviet Union) as it was between 1945 and 1993.  Instead, the 
dominant contemporary threat facing the U.S. is the transnational threat; specifically the 
extremist non-state-based Islamist threat.133 
According to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), J. Michael McConnell, 
General Michael Hayden, Director of CIA, General Michael Maples, Director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Mr. Robert Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI), and Mr. Randall Fort, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence 
and Research (INR), the current and projected threat to the U.S. is dominated by the 
transnational terrorist threat.134 
In his February 2008 Unclassified Intelligence Community Annual Threat 
Assessment Statement for the Record to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the DNI 
characterized the threat as broad and increasingly non-traditional. The threat to U.S. 
national security and core interests was highlighted by the continuing global terrorist 
threat; the continuing challenges in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, where many of the U.S.’ 
most important interests intersect; the persistent threat of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD)-related proliferation in North Korea and Iran; the threats to vulnerabilities in the 
U.S. information infrastructure to increasing cyber attacks by foreign governments, non-
state actors and criminal elements; the growing foreign interest in counter-space 
programs that could threaten critical U.S. command, control, communications, and 
computer (C4), military, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; 
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issues of political stability and of national and regional conflicts in Europe, the Horn of 
Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia; growing humanitarian concerns stemming from the 
rise in food and energy prices for poorer states; and concerns about the financial 
capabilities of Russia, China, and OPEC countries and the potential use of their market 
access to exert financial leverage to achieve political ends.135 
Earlier, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, there was a widespread sense 
of optimism about peace, but that was all shattered on September 11, 2001 by the terrorist 
attacks on the United States and the long war against state and non-state actors who 
employ terrorist tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Today, the United States is 
challenged by many different and evolving threats, including enemies with many faces 
and no borders — terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, infectious 
diseases, cyber attacks, natural and man-made technological disasters, and illegal 
trafficking.136 
Over the past 25 years, it has become increasingly difficult for the U.S. to detect, 
deter and contain, deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and defeat these 
escalating and evolving threats; especially those characterized as being inherently 
asymmetric and unconventional. Although the U.S. maintains overwhelming dominance 
in terms of symmetric, conventional military, informational/ideological, 
diplomatic/political, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic 
instruments (elements) of national power, the transnational, non-state-based extremist 
Islamist threat has become increasingly resilient and resistant to being contained by the 
aggregation of U.S. national power. These multifaceted threats, especially the terrorist 
threats to the homeland and to allies, remain the pre-eminent challenge to U.S. national 
security137 and represent the next war the U.S. must prepare for, respond to, and win. 
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Since the demise of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, the transnational, 
and increasingly non-state-based, threat, primarily the Islamist terrorist threat, has rapidly 
and dramatically expanded in size, scope, and complexity and escalated in operational 
tempo. The introduction of an escalating transnational asymmetric and unconventional 
threat, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and advanced high 
explosives (CBRN-E) and other weapons of mass effect (WME) or destruction (WMD) 
posed by state and non-state actors must be considered as permanent for at least the 
foreseeable future.  The Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) 
National Intelligence Council (NIC) judged, in its unclassified July 2007 National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE), The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland, that the U.S. 
homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years.138 
Although many of the current threats to U.S. national security and core interests 
are indeed generated by rational state and non-state actors, there many threats generated 
by irrational (or ill-informed) state and non-state actors. Consequently, they may be 
willing to accept destruction or disproportionate loss and thus may not be deterrable from 
striking out against the U.S. and its core interests. Consequently, the U.S. national 
security establishment must ensure that the nation is prepared to protect and mitigate 
against the effects and consequences of these threats and contain them; prevent these 
threats from occurring when and where possible; respond to and contain the against the 
effects and consequences of these threats; recover from them by detecting them as early 
as possible; denying and disrupting the threats distant from the U.S. homeland; and 
decisively defeating these threats. 
For the foreseeable future, this threat environment, and, therefore, the threat to 
U.S. and its core interests (survival, vital, and important), will best be defined by a global 
struggle against a violent extremist ideology — and those who employ terrorist tools, 
tactics, techniques, and procedures — that seeks to overturn the international state 
system. Beyond this transnational struggle, the U.S. faces other threats: including a 
variety of irregular (i.e., asymmetric and unconventional) challenges; the quest by rogue 
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states for nuclear weapons; the anarchic instability and chaos caused by fragile, failing, 
and failed states; and the rising military power of other states. These are long-term 
challenges. Success in dealing with them will require the orchestration of national and 
international power through the instruments of national power, over years or decades to 
come. 
Violent extremist movements such as al-Qa’ida, its associates, and fellow 
travelers comprise a complex and urgent challenge. Like communism and fascism before 
it, today’s violent extremist ideology rejects the rules and structures of the international 
system. Its adherents reject state sovereignty, ignore borders, and attempt to deny self-
determination and human dignity wherever they gain power.  
Fragile, failing, and failed states constitute another threat axis. The inability of 
many states, best characterized as failing or failed states, to police themselves effectively 
or to work with their neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to the 
international system. Armed sub-national groups, including but not limited to those 
inspired by violent extremism, threaten the stability and legitimacy of key states. If left 
unchecked, instability can spread and threaten regions of interest to the United States, its 
allies, and friends and perhaps even the homeland itself. 
Rogue states such as Iran and North Korea similarly continue to threaten the 
international order. The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism and is attempting to disrupt the 
fledgling democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology and 
enrichment capabilities poses a serious challenge to security in an already volatile region. 
The North Korean regime also poses a serious nuclear and missile proliferation concern 
for the U.S. and other responsible international stakeholders. 
The U.S. must also consider the possibility of challenges by more powerful 
states– Russia and China, for example, and now increasingly India. Some of these states, 
such as Russia and China, may actively seek to counter the United States in some or all 
domains of traditional warfare or to gain an advantage by developing capabilities that 
offset those of the U.S. Others may choose niche areas of military capability and 
competition in which they believe they can develop a strategic or operational advantage. 
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That some of these potential competitors also are partners in any number of diplomatic, 
commercial, and security efforts will only make these relationships more difficult to 
manage. 
China is one ascendant state with the potential for competing with the United 
States. It is likely that China will continue to expand its conventional military capabilities 
including developing a full range of long-range strike, space, and information warfare 
capabilities. The U.S.’ interaction with China will likely be long-term and multi-
dimensional and will involve peacetime engagement between defense establishments as 
much as fielded combat capabilities. The objective of this effort is to mitigate near term 
challenges while preserving and enhancing U.S. national advantages over time. 
Russia is another ascendant state. Russia’s first on-schedule change in leadership 
since communism and the first voluntary transfer of power from one healthy Kremlin 
leader to another was been clouded, however, by former President Putin’s service as 
prime minister under his hand-picked successor, Dmitry Medvedev; a move that raises 
questions about who will ultimately be in charge of Russia. Coming at a time of 
uncertainty about Russia’s direction, the Medvedev-Putin “cohabitation” raises questions 
about the country’s future and the implications for Western interests.139  
As projected, Russia’s retreat from openness and democracy, most recently 
exhibited in its actions recently with the Republic of Georgia, could have significant 
security implications for the United States, its European allies, and the U.S.’ allies and 
partners in other regions.  Russia has leveraged the revenue from, and access to, its 
energy sources; asserted claims in the Arctic; and has continued to bully its neighbors; all 
of which are causes for concern.  
Russia could become a more inward-looking and difficult interlocutor for the 
United States over the next several years. High profits from exports of oil and gas and 
perceived policy successes at home and abroad have bolstered Moscow’s confidence. 
Although Russia probably will work with the United States on shared interests such as 
counterterrorism, counter narcotics, and counter proliferation, growing suspicions about 
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Western intentions and Moscow’s desire to demonstrate its independence and defend its 
own interests may make it harder to cooperate with Russia on areas of concern to the 
United States.   
Other elements of Russian national power — from trade and energy, to diplomatic 
instruments and military and intelligence capabilities — are on a path to grow over the 
next four years. For example, Russia is positioning to control an energy supply and 
transportation network spanning from Europe to East Asia. Aggressive Russian efforts to 
control, restrict, or block the transit of hydrocarbons from the Caspian to the West — and 
to ensure that East-West energy corridors remain subject to Russian control — 
underscore the potential power and influence of Russia’s energy policy. The Russian 
military has begun to reverse a long, deep deterioration in its capabilities that started 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union.140 
Russia also has begun to take a more active military stance, such as the renewal of 
long-range bomber flights and naval deployments, and has withdrawn from arms control 
and force reduction treaties, and even threatened to target countries hosting potential U.S. 
anti-missile bases. Furthermore, Moscow has signaled an increasing reliance on nuclear 
weapons as a foundation of its security. All of these actions suggest a Russia exploring 
renewed influence, and seeking a greater international role. 
China, as discussed previously in this paper, sees itself as a regional power with 
global interests. Its strategic priorities focus on sustaining economic growth and political 
stability, partly as means to reinforce China’s status as a great power and to uphold its 
territorial integrity. Beijing sees a peaceful external environment as vital to achieving 
these goals. As a result, China’s global engagement is not driven by Communist ideology 
or military expansionism, but instead by a need for access to markets, resources, 
technology and expertise, and a desire to assert its role in the international community. 
China’s efforts there have largely focused on gaining greater access to natural 
resources — especially oil; but China’s involvement in these regions also helps promote 
its regional and global influence by burnishing China’s image as a leader of the 
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developing world. Public statements by Chinese leaders indicate that Beijing perceives 
itself as being in the midst of a twenty-year “window of opportunity” favorable to 
China’s growth, development, and rise in influence.141  
As a result, Beijing is seeking a constructive relationship with the U.S. and the 
rest of the world, which will allow China to fully capitalize on a favorable strategic 
environment. Indeed, Chinese officials consistently emphasize the need to seek 
cooperative relations with Washington, because conflict with the United States would 
risk derailing China’s economic development. They also seek to alleviate international 
concerns about China’s strategic intentions. As China’s influence grows, however, 
Beijing probably will increasingly expect its interests to be respected by other countries. 
This will be especially true within East Asia, as Beijing tries to leverage its growing 
influence into a greater leadership role in the region.142 Notwithstanding China’s external 
goals, the leadership is focused on threats to domestic stability. President Hu Jintao’s 
domestic policy agenda is an attempt to strengthen the Communist Party’s hold on power 
and maintaining China’s impressive economic growth.143 
China’s impressive economic growth, it is the world’s second largest economy 
and one of the largest investors in and owners of U.S. debts, masks significant distortions 
and risks, including a rigidly controlled currency that contributes to excess liquidity and 
wasteful investment; government policies that favor exports over domestic consumption; 
and a state-run banking system slowly recovering from a series of credit problems. 
China’s demographic problem of an aging population, high incidence of chronic and 
infectious disease, environmental degradation, and an increasing energy dilemma are 
likely to slow economic growth over the long term.144  
A sudden and sharp slowdown in China’s economy could exacerbate 
vulnerabilities in the global economy; hardest hit would be its neighbors who sell about 
50 percent of their goods to China and commodity producers who have enjoyed high 
                                                 





prices and expanding export volumes because of China’s rising demand for raw material, 
metals, and food. A sudden and sharp slowdown would also injure China’s military 
modernization. 
The U.S.’ southern borders and neighbors also pose additional national security 
challenges beyond the contemporary concern over the porosity of this border. Although 
the gradual consolidation of democracy remained the dominant trend over the last year in 
Latin America, a small, but expanding, group of radical populist governments continues 
to project competing vision that appeals to many of the region’s poor.  
Indeed, the persistence of high levels of poverty and striking income inequalities 
will continue to create a potentially receptive audience for radical populism’s message, 
especially in the less developed areas of Latin America. Inspired and supported by 
Venezuela and Cuba, leaders in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and, more tentatively, in Ecuador and 
Uruguay, are pursuing agendas that undercut checks and balances on presidential power, 
seek lengthy presidential terms, weaken media and civil liberties, and emphasize 
economic nationalism at the expense of market-based approaches. Moreover, each of 
these governments, to varying degrees, has engaged in sharply anti-U.S. rhetoric, aligned 
with Venezuela and Cuba, and increasingly Iran, on international issues, and advocated 
measures that directly clash with U.S. initiatives.   
Policy missteps or the mishandling of a crisis, including natural, man-made, and 
technological crises, by the (Cuban) leadership could lead to political instability in Cuba, 
raising the risk of mass migration. Illegal migration, drug smuggling and associated 
violence, and human trafficking continue to threaten to Mexico’s internal security and the 
security of the U.S. southern border. The government also faces a rejuvenated threat from 
domestic insurgents and the narcotraffickers and their cartels and by a return to violence 
by the radical leftist Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR).145 
In Africa, where the Department of Defense just “stood up” a new geographic 
combatant command, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), persistent insecurity in 
Nigeria’s oil producing region, the Niger Delta, poses a direct threat to U.S. strategic 
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interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Ongoing instability and conflict in other parts of Africa 
pose less direct though still significant threats to U.S. interests because of their high 
humanitarian and peacekeeping costs, drag on democratic and economic development, 
and potential to get worse.146 
Southeast Asia, now recovered from the late twentieth century’s economic 
“bubble burst,” includes vibrant, diverse, and emerging democracies looking to the 
United States as a source of stability, wealth, and leadership. However, the region is also 
home to terrorism, separatist aspirations, crushing poverty, ethnic violence, and religious 
divisions. Burma remains a dictatorship, and Cambodia is retreating from progress on 
democracy and human rights made in the 1990s. The region is particularly at risk from 
avian flu, which will be addressed later at greater length. Al-Qa’ida-affiliated and other 
extremist groups are present in many countries, although effective government policies 
have limited their growth and impact. 
Now more than ever, access to stable and affordably priced energy supplies is, 
and has long been, a critical element of national security. Sustained increases in global 
demand and the interactive effects of energy with other issues, such as the emergence of  
China and India as major oil consumers and users due to rapid industrialization, have 
both magnified and broadened the significance of developments in the global energy 
system.  
Geopolitical uncertainties and tensions heighten the risk of a major oil supply 
disruption and the attendant negative repercussions for the global economy. Threats to 
Iraqi and Nigerian oil output remain a concern despite some positive developments last 
year. Terrorist attacks against Persian Gulf oil facilities and the potential fallout from 
mounting tension with Iran over its nuclear program are significant additional risks.   
In Iraq, completion of a new pipeline and security improvements have helped 
Baghdad boost production and exports in recent months by several hundred thousand 
barrels per day, but output remains vulnerable to episodic violence. Ethnic and political 
violence and criminal activity threaten a large portion of Nigeria’s 2.2 million barrels per 
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day (b/d) of oil output. Public statements by al-Qa’ida leaders indicate that terrorists are 
interested in striking Persian Gulf oil facilities. Iran could withhold some or all of its 2.4-
million b/day oil exports or even try to impede the flow of 18 million barrels per day of 
oil through the Strait of Hormuz if its pursuit of the nuclear fuel cycle sparks a major 
crisis; however, the U.S. assesses Tehran is likely to take these provocative steps only if 
it perceived it had little to lose. Venezuela’s President Chavez has pledged solidarity with 
Iran and might also curtail some or all of his country’s exports of about 2 million b/d in 
such a scenario.  
High energy prices and escalating demand for oil and natural gas, also has 
resulted in windfall profits for producers. OPEC countries earned an estimated $690 
billion from oil exports last year, nearly three times the revenues earned in 2003. The 
increased revenues also have enabled producers like Iran, Venezuela, Sudan, and Russia 
to garner enhanced political, economic and even military advantages and complicated 
multilateral efforts to address problems such as the tragedy in Darfur and Iran’s nuclear 
program. 
With about 70 percent of global oil reserves inaccessible or of limited 
accessibility to outside oil companies, competition between international oil companies to 
secure stakes in the few countries open to foreign investment is likely to intensify. 
Determined to secure the energy inputs necessary to fuel continued robust economic 
growth, Chinese and Indian state-owned and private energy companies are pursuing 
strategic investments in energy assets worldwide. There is also a sharp rise in Russia’s 
investment abroad, much of it driven by Russian energy companies. Moscow is using the 
power of its energy monopoly to ensure that East-West energy corridors remain subject 
to Russian influence.147 
Global food prices also have been rising steadily over the past two years driven by 
higher energy prices, weak harvests, historically low stocks, and robust demand. There is 
little near term relief in sight because production increases in several countries, including 
Australia, are hampered by water shortages and land constraints. High food prices in 
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several countries, including Russia, China, India, and Vietnam, are forcing governments 
to engage in market distorting practices such as banning food exports, increasing 
subsidies, or fixing prices: The double impact of high energy and food prices is 
increasing the risk of social and political instability in vulnerable countries.148  
The international spread of infectious diseases and the increasing emergence of 
new ones remain challenges to U.S. national security. The spread of infectious disease is 
exacerbated by poverty, an insufficient global health infrastructure, increasing 
globalization, urbanization (especially in the developing world), migration, complex 
humanitarian emergencies with resultant refugee flows, and environmental degradation. 
Additionally, misuse of antibiotics has led to an increase in resistant bacteria strains. 
Disease also indirectly threatens us with its potential impacts upon the 
international economy, civil society and critical infrastructures. Even if an outbreak does 
not threaten the U.S. directly, the resulting instability or humanitarian emergency can 
place additional demands on U.S. resources. 
The most pressing infectious disease challenge for the United States is still the 
potential emergence of a severe influenza pandemic. Although the avian H5N1 virus 
(“bird flu”) has remained primarily a threat to poultry, it continues to expand its 
geographic coverage and to evolve — indeed it retains the potential to evolve into a 
human pandemic strain. A virulent virus from such an emerging pandemic also has, albeit 
small, the potential to be used as a weapon by a terrorist group or a technically 
experienced lone actor; such an attack would likely be devastating, both economically 
and socially (i.e., the October 2001 anthrax attacks).  
While the Intelligence Community (IC) does not currently see this level of 
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possibility cannot be ruled out; therefore, the IC will continue to use its intelligence 
resources to try to help detect any such preparations to use a virus as a terrorist 
weapon.149 
Therefore, population, resource, energy, climatic and environmental crises are 
likely to combine with rapid social, cultural, technological and geopolitical change to 
create greater uncertainty. This uncertainty is exacerbated by both the unprecedented 
speed and scale of change, as well as by the unpredictable and complex interaction 
among the trends themselves. Globalization and growing economic interdependence, 
while creating new levels of wealth and opportunity, also create a web of interrelated 
vulnerabilities and spread risks even further, increasing sensitivity to crises and shocks 
around the globe and generating more uncertainty regarding their speed and effect.   
As already illustrated, there are many drivers and trends shaping the future global 
environment in which the U.S. national security establishment must operate: 
demographic and social change; increased economic integration and competition; rapid 
technological innovation and diffusion; environmental pressures and growing energy 
demand; broad geo-political changes; and new forms of governance. Each driver and 
trend independently produces unique changes and challenges; those points where factors  
intersect often reinforce and amplify the effects of change and create a series of complex 
and often unpredictable threats and risks that transcend geographic borders and 
organizational boundaries.  
None of these trends and drivers is more visible than globalization. Global 
networks of information, finance, commerce, transportation, and people shape and 
empower these threats. This infrastructure increasingly is being targeted for exploitation, 
and potentially for disruption or destruction, by a growing array of state and non-state 
adversaries. 
It is therefore quite evident that the international strategic landscape of the 
twenty-first century will be shaped by complex and contradictory forces. This world will 
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be characterized by turmoil, changing patterns of state-to-state relationships, as well as 
conflicts within states caused by ethnic, religious, and nationalistic differences have 
become commonplace. International terrorism, drug cartels, and threats created by net-
centric information-age technology will add to the turmoil and uncertainty.  
The world of the twenty-first century will be a dynamic world in which the pace, 
scope, and complexity of change are increasing. The continued march of globalization, 
the growing number of independent nation-state and non-state actors, in combination 
with advancing technologies, have increased global connectivity, interdependence, and 
complexity, creating greater uncertainties, systemic risk and a less predictable future. 
These changes have led to reduced warning times and compressed decision cycles.  
Although this interconnected world offers many opportunities for technological 
innovation and economic growth, it also presents unique challenges and threats. In this 
environment, the key to achieving lasting strategic advantage is the ability to rapidly and 
accurately anticipate and adapt to complex challenges. Future trends portend and describe 
a world in which rich and prosperous states represent a smaller and smaller portion of 
humanity, while the poorest and least economically dynamic societies on earth grapple 
with rapid population growth, explosive mega-cities, and cultural and environmental 
change that stresses already-fragile social and political structures. 
Globalization has the potential to lift millions from abject poverty, but its uneven 
impact will produce social dislocation, and because of raised expectations may produce 
dissonance and disorder if societies cannot translate gains in global trade into local 
prosperity. As more people around the world have access to markets, trade and travel, 
these flows become more vulnerable to disruption. Finally, greater complexity in the 
operating environment and rapid rates of technological change and surprise are changing 
security paradigms, placing greater emphasis on prevention, and blurring enemies, 
adversaries, competitors, and friends. 
As articulated by the DNI, the threat environment of the twenty-first century will 
encompass a broad spectrum of threats to U.S. national security and U.S. core 
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interests.150 The spectrum includes foreign and domestic terrorism, state-based threats 
and non-terror-related threats, including weather, earthquakes, and man-made and 
technological disasters. 
Other “national security shocks”151 are possible. Should they come to pass, they 
would have dramatic effects on U.S. national security and the wider global security 
environment. These “national security shocks” include significant disruptions to energy 
security or, conversely, the development of alternatives to oil.152 Other “national security 
shocks” include technological surprise, loss of access to the global commons, or the 
emergence of man-made or natural pandemic that kills and sickens a significant portion 
of the world’s population. Finally, nuclear attack on one or more of America’s cities, or a 
global depression that disrupts the U.S. economy would overturn the international system 
and result in wide-ranging and dramatic changes to the U.S. security posture. 
These emerging or evolving threats are likely to pose serious problems several 
years out for the nation and capture the national security community’s current 
understanding of strategic threats — both deliberate and naturally occurring — that have 
the potential to harm and have high consequences for the nation and its citizens in terms 
of loss of life, economic damage, and psychological impact. 
The FBI divides the terrorist threat facing the United States into two broad 
categories, international and domestic. International terrorism involves violent acts or 
acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States 
or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of 
the United States or any state. Acts of international terrorism are intended to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government, or affect the conduct 
of a government. These acts transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by 
which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate, or the 
locale in which perpetrators operate.  
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During the past decade, the FBI has witnessed dramatic changes in the nature of 
the terrorist threat. In the 1990s, right-wing extremism overtook left-wing terrorism as the 
most dangerous domestic terrorist threat to the country. During the past several years, 
special interest extremism, as characterized by the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and 
the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), has emerged as a serious terrorist threat. Generally, 
extremist groups engage in much activity that is protected by constitutional guarantees of 
free speech and assembly. The FBI estimates that the ALF and ELF have committed 
more than 600 criminal acts in the United States since 1996, resulting in damages in 
excess of 43 million dollars. Animal rights extremism and eco-terrorism continue to pose 
a threat. Extremists within these movements generally operate in small, autonomous cells 
and employ strict operational security tactics making detection and infiltration difficult. 
These extremists utilize a variety of tactics, including arson, vandalism, animal theft, and 
the use of explosive devices.  
Special interest terrorism differs from traditional right-wing and left-wing 
terrorism in that extremist special interest groups seek to resolve specific issues, rather 
than effect widespread political change. Special interest extremists continue to conduct 
acts of politically motivated violence to force segments of society, including the general 
public, to change attitudes about issues considered important to their causes. These 
groups occupy the extreme fringes of animal rights, pro-life, environmental, anti-nuclear, 
and other movements. Some special interest extremists—most notably within the animal 
rights and environmental movements — have turned increasingly toward vandalism and 
terrorist activity in attempts to further their causes. 
While much of the national attention is focused on the substantial threat posed by 
international terrorists to the homeland, the U.S. must also contend with an ongoing 
threat posed by domestic terrorists based and operating strictly within the United States. 
Domestic terrorists, motivated by a number of political or social issues, continue to use 
violence and criminal activity to further their agendas. 
Despite the fragmentation of white supremacist groups resulting from the deaths 
or the arrests of prominent leaders, violence from this element remains an ongoing threat 
to government targets, Jewish individuals and establishments, and non-white ethnic 
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groups. The militia/sovereign citizen movement similarly continues to present a threat to 
law enforcement and members of the judiciary. Members of these groups will continue to 
intimidate and sometimes threaten judges, prosecutors, and other officers of the court. 
Sporadic incidents resulting in direct clashes with law enforcement are possible and will 
most likely involve state and local law enforcement personnel, such as highway patrol 
officers and sheriff’s deputies.  
Some U.S.-based black separatist groups follow radical variants of Islam and, in 
some cases, express solidarity with international terrorist groups. These groups could 
utilize black separatists to collect intelligence on U.S. targets or to identify radical 
elements within the African-American community who could act as surrogates on their 
behalf.  
Domestically, a variety of homegrown extremists groups organized around anti-
globalization, environmental, political, and religious issues will continue to operate in the 
United States. They often adopt extremely violent rhetoric, although their activities 
generally fall within the purview of state and local law enforcement. Activities range 
from simple harassment and assault to arson, murder, small scale explosives, and 
vandalism. Yet, the openness of the U.S. environment, easy access to weapons and  
knowledge about how to use them, and the ability to train out of sight in remote parts of 
the country could set the stage for more consequential extremist violence, given the right 
stimulus.  
Most prominent domestic extremist groups are well-known. However, splinter 
cells and “lone wolves” who split-off from the larger organizations are of concern 
because they are difficult to identify, track, and disrupt. Homegrown domestic Islamic 
extremists will pose the greatest potential domestic extremist threat. Recent plots 
uncovered at the Fort Dix, New Jersey military installation and John F. Kennedy 
International Airport, New York illustrates continued intent from these groups to carry 




increasingly of concern as prison environments are permissive to the proliferation of 
radical ideologies and are easily exploited by charismatic recruiters who are looking for a 
new generation of jihadists.  
Non-Muslim terrorist, guerilla, and insurgent groups, especially environmentally 
focused and often referred to as “single-issue” groups by the FBI, probably will conduct 
attacks over the next three years given their violent histories, but this violence is likely to 
be on a small scale. Other domestic extremist groups, particularly those espousing 
vehement anti-government views, maintain substantial supplies of arms and explosives. 
Many of these groups are reactive, and certain government actions could precipitate an 
increase in the level and severity of activity. White supremacists and militias are more 
likely to opt for violence on the scale of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, but animal 
rights and environmental extremists are the most active and cause the greatest economic 
damage.153 
Enduring challenges for the current and future U.S. national security 
establishment, at home and abroad, will include familiar military activities, such as 
defending against attacks on U.S. territory, conflict with other nation-state powers, and 
terrorist networks and criminal organizations. These enduring challenges also include 
dealing with the collapse of functioning states and the use of military forces in 
combination with the non-military instruments of national power to deter and prevent 
conflict around the world. 
A global multi-polar system is emerging with the rise of China, India, and others. 
The relative power of non-state actors — businesses, tribes, religious organizations, and 
even criminal networks — also will increase. By 2025 a single “international 
community” composed of nation-states may no longer exist as power (i.e.; influence, 
leverage, prestige, etc.) will be more dispersed with the newer players bringing new rules 
of the game, while risks will increase that the traditional Western alliances will weaken. 
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Furthermore, the unprecedented shift in relative wealth and economic power roughly 
from West to East now under way will likely continue. As some countries become more 
invested in their economic well-being, incentives toward geopolitical stability could 
increase. Although the United States will remain the single most powerful country, it will 
likely be less dominant and shrinking economic and military capabilities may force the 
U.S. into a difficult set of tradeoffs between domestic versus foreign policy priorities. 
Given these transformative forces, Chapter VI introduces the art and science of 
strategy and the nexus it has with both the complex international environment and the 
threats to U.S. national security that are resident within the international environment. 
Chapter VI advances the formulary that basic national security policy (BNSP) and 
strategy is formulated and implemented to (1) defend against threats to the core national 
end state and the core national interests, goals, and objectives associated with it; and (2) 
to advance, achieve, and sustain those core national interests, goals, and objectives. 
Distilled to its essence, grand strategy is about determining a state’s vital interests — 
those important enough to fight over — and its role in the world. “The crux of grand 
policy lies,” Paul Kennedy observed, “in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s 
leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the 
preservation and enhancements of the nation’s long-term (that is wartime and peacetime) 
best interests.154 
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VI. THE ART AND SCIENCE OF STRATEGY 
Basic national security policy (BNSP) and strategy is formulated and 
implemented to (1) defend against threats to the core national end state and the core 
national interests, goals, and objectives associated with it and (2) to advance, achieve, 
and sustain those core national interests, goals, and objectives. Grand or national strategy 
is associated with actions at the state/national level.  
Grand strategy — what Edward Meade Earle called “the highest type of strategy” 
— is the most critical task of statecraft.155 As Geoffrey Parker observed, grand strategy 
encompasses the decision of a state about its overall security — the threats it perceives, 
the way in which it confronts them, and the steps it takes to match ends and means.156 
Distilled to its essence, grand strategy is about determining a state’s vital interests — 
those important enough to fight over — and its role in the world. “The crux of grand 
policy lies,” Paul Kennedy observed, “in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s 
leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the 
preservation and enhancements of the nation’s long-term (that is wartime and peacetime) 
best interests.”157 Like politics, strategy is the art of the possible; but few can discern 
what is possible.158 
Strategy, broadly defined, is the process of interrelating ends and means. The 
strategic process is all about how (concept or way) leadership will use the power 
(resources or means) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances 
and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) in accordance with state policy.159 
When applied to a particular set of ends and means, the product, that is strategy, is a 
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specific way of using specified means to achieve distinct ends. Strategy, then, provides 
direction for the state, seeking to maximize positive outcomes and minimize negative 
outcomes, as the state moves through a complex and rapidly changing environment into 
the future.160 
Strategy is thus both a process and a product and an art and a science. At the 
highest levels, ends are expressed as national interests. Interests are a nation’s wants, 
needs (or requirements), and concerns. Specifically, national interests normally involve 
four main areas: survival and security, political and territorial integrity (and sovereignty), 
economic stability and well-being, and stability. Conflict can arise as a result of a threat 
(or perceived threat) to any one of these four areas. Interests are central to a discussion of 
strategy because interests signal a nation’s desires and intentions to other nations.161 
Certain interests that a nation sees as essential are referred to as vital interests. 
Vital interests are distinguished from other interests by the fact that nations are usually 
unwilling to compromise on them and are often prepared to resort to conflict in support 
of them.162 Thus, when examining a strategic situation, a strategist must identify not only 
what interests are at stake but also which interests one or more of the participants view as 
vital.  
National interests are often vague or consist of highly generalized abstractions 
rooted in the ideological and socio-cultural history of the nation and its people. While 
national interests underpin national strategy, the specifics of the strategy must focus on 
more concrete ends. The specific goals and aims of national strategy are often referred to 
as objectives. Objectives are the ends a nation must achieve to promote, protect, or attain 
its interests. Objectives tend to be more tangible than interests because they normally  
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describe specific activities or conditions which must be attained. Objectives provide the 
departure point for national strategy in that they describe what a state is actually trying to 
do.163 
The strategic environment is overwhelmingly political and psychological in 
nature, because warfare is nothing but a violent expression of the political process. 
Therefore, one is accustomed to thinking of “strategy” as the preserve of the highest 
levels of political and military leadership, and of the most dangerous levels of warfare.  
In addition, the strategic environment, encapsulated by the U.S. Army War 
College in the acronym VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity), is 
marked by a world order where the threats are both diffuse and uncertain, where conflict 
is inherent yet unpredictable, and where U.S. capability to defend and promote its 
national interests may be restricted by materiel and personnel resource constraints. In 
short, an environment marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity 
(VUCA).164 The current operational environment can aptly and accurately be described 
as one fraught with “VUCA.” 
Characterized by the four earmarks, the strategic environment is always in a 
greater or lesser state of dynamic instability or “chaos.” The role of the strategist is to 
exercise influence over the volatility, manage the uncertainty, simplify the complexity, 
and resolve the ambiguity, all in terms favorable to the interests of the state and in 
compliance with policy guidance. 
In addition, the strategic environment is often referred to as a system of systems 
in order to emphasize its complexity and its characterization as a complex adaptive or 
complex evolving system; the strategic environment is a composite of complex systems, 
linked vertically and horizontally. As such, the strategic environment exhibits complex, 
self-organizing behavior, it continuously seeks to find an acceptable order or relative  
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balance (i.e., the balance of power) in which it can exist. Thus the world is more a place 
of instability, discontinuity, synergies, and unpredictability and “tipping points” than 
strategists and planners prefer. 
Strategy provides a coherent blueprint to bridge the gap between the realities of 
today and a desired future. It is the disciplined calculation of overarching objectives, 
concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable future 
outcomes than might otherwise exist if left to chance or the hands of others. It is the 
consideration of the relation of how to apply resources to achieve desired results in a 
specific strategic environment over time. In the context of the state, strategy is the 
employment of specific instruments of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military, 
and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or in 
competition with other actors pursuing their own, possibly conflicting and incoherent, 
objectives.165  
In other words, strategy is the application of the power inherent in the natural (i.e., 
dispositional) and societal (i.e., situational, contextual, and environmental) resources of 
the state toward policy ends in an emerging, dynamic, and competitive strategic 
environment. Both strategy and planning (to include mission analysis) are subordinate to 
the nature of the environment. Strategy has distinct attributes and differs from planning in 
its scope, assumptions, and premises, but it provides the structure and parameters for 
more detailed long-range and short-term planning. Both strategy and planning use ends, 
ways, and means, and are bounded by the criteria of suitability, feasibility, and 
acceptability. Strategy has its own inherent logic that can be understood and applied. 
Any discussion of ends and means in conflict, including conflict in its penultimate 
expression, war, must begin with two basic points. First, as strategists throughout the 
ages have observed, conflict, war, is an expression of politics. The ends or goals of any 
party in a conflict or waging war, even though those goals may be social, economic, 
religious, or ideological in nature, are by definition political goals. Second, conflicts and 
wars are fought by political entities that have unique characteristics and often very 
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dissimilar goals and resources. In order to understand any conflict, strategists must 
appreciate the ways in which the means and ends of the participants may vary. 
An underlying assumption of strategy from a national perspective is that all 
nation-states and non-state actors have interests they will pursue to the best of their 
abilities. Interests are desired end states categorized in terms such as survival, economic 
well-being, favorable world order, and enduring national or group values. Interests are 
derived from these broad categories as reflected in the strategic environment and can be 
stated more specifically in the context of issues. The elements of power are the resources 
used to promote or advance national or group interests.  
Resources are applied through the use of instruments of power. The role of 
strategy is to ensure that the pursuit, protection, or advancement of these interests — 
which are achieved through the application of the instruments of power to specific 
objectives to create strategic effects in favor of the interest based on policy guidance — is 
accomplished in a coherent and optimal manner.166 
Thus good strategy seeks to influence and shape the future environment as 
opposed to merely reacting to it. This is the first premise. Strategy is not crisis 
management. It is to a large degree its, crisis management, antithesis. Crisis management 
occurs when there is no strategy or the strategy fails to properly anticipate. Thus, the first 
premise of a theory of strategy is that strategy is proactive and anticipatory, but not 
predictive. A second premise is that political purpose dominates all strategy; this idea has 
been perhaps best set forth in Clausewitz’ famous dictum, “War is merely the 
continuation of policy by other means.”167 
Political purpose is stated in policy. Policy is the expression of the desired end 
state sought by the government. In its finest form, policy is the clear articulation of 
guidance for the employment of the instruments of power towards the attainment of one 
or more objectives or end states. In practice, it tends to be much vaguer. Nonetheless, 
policy dominates strategy by its articulation of the end state and its guidance regarding 
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resources, limitations on actions, or similar considerations. The analysis of the end state 
and guidance yields strategic objectives. Objectives provide purpose, focus, and 
justification for the actions embodied in a strategy.168  
Achievement of the objectives creates strategic effects contributing to the desired 
end state. National strategy is concerned with a hierarchy of objectives determined by the 
political purpose. The development of strategy informs policy; policy must adapt itself to 
the realities of the strategic environment and the limits of power. Thus, policy ensures 
that strategy pursues appropriate aims, while strategy informs policy of the art of the 
possible.169 
Strategy is subordinate to the nature of the strategic environment. Strategy is 
developed from a thorough consideration of the strategic situation and knowledge of the 
nature of the strategic environment. In today’s parlance, this is called situational 
awareness of the common operating picture. 
The strategic environment possesses both physical (i.e., tangible) and 
metaphysical (i.e., intangible) attributes. It has both domestic and external components. 
The international environment is the external component, consisting of the physical 
geographic environment, the international system, and other external actors — and their 
cultures, beliefs, and actions. The domestic environment consists of internal physical 
realities and the internal actors, constituencies, institutions, and organizational roles at 
play within the United States. Indeed, within the United States, there are groups that have 
worldviews significantly different from those of the national leadership, which makes the 
domestic element of strategy formulation even more complex.  
Nascent contradictions always exist to challenge the status quo and initiate a 
search for a new equilibrium. Stability within the environment resists change; instability 
within the environment urges adoption of a new strategy. 
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The nature of the strategic environment can be described as an interactive, 
chaotic, complex system of systems.  The strategist must recognize that, to be successful, 
a strategy must account for both the external and internal components of the strategic 
environment. For the political state, these can be identified as the domestic and 
international environments on a grand scale, but external elements can be further divided 
into adversaries, allies, and other actors. 
Strategy must be consistent with the nature of the strategic environment in its 
formulation and execution. Therefore, strategy is holistic in outlook. It demands 
comprehensive consideration. That is to say, while the strategist may be devising a 
strategy from a particular perspective, he must consider the whole of the strategic 
environment in his analysis in order to arrive at a proper strategy to serve his intended 
purpose at his level. He, the strategist, is concerned with external and internal factors at 
all levels and the horizontal and vertical integration of his strategy.  
In formulating a strategy, the strategist must also be cognizant that each aspect, 
objective, concept, and resource has effects on the environment around him. Thus, the 
strategist must have a comprehensive knowledge of what else is happening within the 
strategic environment and the potential first-, second-, third-, etc., order effects of his 
own choices on the efforts of those above, below, and on the same level with him, 
whether they be friendly, adversary, or indifferent actors.  
The strategist’s efforts must be integrated fully with the strategies or efforts of 
senior, coordinate, and subordinate elements. Strategists must think holistically, that is, 
comprehensively. They must be cognizant of the “big picture,” their own organization’s 
capabilities and resources, and the impact of their actions on the whole of the 
environment. Good strategy is never developed piecemeal or in isolation.  
Any strategy creates a security dilemma for the strategist and other actors. Any 
strategy, once known or implemented, introduces change into the strategic environment, 
even when it seeks to maintain the status quo.170 Change can occur on multi-ordered 
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levels and may be nonlinear. Change threatens the existing equilibrium or status quo in 
the strategic environment, raising the question of whether the results of doing nothing are 
better or worse than the consequences of doing something. Strategy can anticipate the 
future though the pursuit of proper objectives, but strategy cannot predict the future with 
absolute certainty, neither the achievement of its objectives nor the precise consequences 
of achievement or failure. The strategist must determine whether the attainment of the 
specified end justifies the risks of initiating action, and the strategist must also consider 
how other actors may react.  
Strategy is grounded in what is to be accomplished and why it is to be 
accomplished; strategy cannot be formulated in a policy or intellectual vacuum. The 
strategist must know the end state he is trying to achieve. Strategy rightfully focuses on a 
desired or preferred end state among an array of possible end states in a dynamic 
environment. Strategy provides direction for the persuasive or coercive use of the 
instruments of power to achieve specified objectives to create strategic effects leading to 
the desired end state. 
Strategy is an inherently human enterprise and is central to all human endeavors. 
Not solely a consideration of objective factors, “strategy involves human passions, 
values, and beliefs, few of which are quantifiable.”171 The role of belief systems, 
worldviews, and cultural perceptions of all the players is important in the formulation of 
strategy. Strategists must be careful to eliminate counterproductive bias while ensuring 
the strategy meets criteria of acceptability at home and abroad while compensating for 
differences as appropriate.  
Friction is an inherent part of strategy. Friction is the difference between the ideal 
strategy and the applied strategy; how it is suppose to work versus how it actually unfolds 
in execution. Friction is a natural consequence of the chaotic and complex nature of the 
strategic environment, chance, and human frailty. Friction cannot be eliminated, but it  
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can be understood and accounted for by the strategist to a greater or lesser extent in the 
formulation of the strategy.172 In practical terms, friction can be best defined within the 
VUCA acronym. 
Strategy focuses on root causes and purposes and is inherently adaptable and 
flexible by emphasizing strategic purpose and empowering subordinate levels. Strategy 
incorporates learning from experience and is sufficiently broad in its construction to 
adapt to unfolding events and an adversary’s countermoves. 
Strategy addresses linear and nonlinear phenomena. Unlike planning, which is 
largely cause and effect and usually linear, strategy is a process interacting with the 
strategic environment: Strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions 
and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate. 
Process is facilitated by constructing strategy with flexibility and adaptability in its 
component parts. Strategy’s focus on root causes and purposes ensures that the direction 
provided to subordinate levels is sufficiently broad to allow adaptability and flexibility 
while not deviating from strategic purpose.173 
Strategy is hierarchical. The political leadership ensures and maintains its control 
and influence over the instruments of power through the hierarchical nature of state 
strategy. Strategy cascades from the national level down to the lower levels.  
Generally strategy originates at the top as a consequence of a grand strategy 
(often undocumented), national security strategy, or other stated national-level strategies 
and policy statements in regard to specific issues. Grand and national security strategies 
lay out broad objectives and direction for the use of all the instruments of power. 
National policy provides broad strategic guidance from political leaders, generally 
articulating the national interests as they relate to specific strategic circumstances. From 
these strategies and policies the major activities and departments develop subordinate 
strategies. 
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The U.S. Army War College (in consonance with Joint Pub 1-02) defines the 
levels of strategy as they pertain to the military element of power within the state as:174 
 Grand Strategy [italics added]. An overarching strategy summarizing the 
national vision for developing, applying, and coordinating all the 
instruments of national power in order to accomplish the grand strategic 
objectives, viz., preserve national security; bolster national economic 
prosperity; and promote national values. Grand Strategy may be stated or 
implied. 
 National Security Strategy [italics added] (also sometimes referred to as 
Grand Strategy and National Strategy). The art and science of developing, 
applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, 
economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that 
contributes to national security. 
Strategy has a symbiotic relationship with time. A key component of strategic 
competency is thinking in time — the ability to foresee continuity of strategic choices 
with the past and the consequences of their intended and unintended effects in the future. 
A strategic choice must have continuity with the past as it bridges to the future. Strategy 
must account for the past in its formulation, acknowledging preceding interaction and 
history within the strategic environment. A strategic action that has characteristics 
contrary to the past experience or culture of the society it affects is less likely to be 
successful. Strategists extrapolate the possible futures from the present strategic 
circumstances with a clear sense of the long past from which these possible futures flow; 
then constructs a paradigm of change from which planning seeks to shape a more 
favorable future.175  
Strategy is cumulative. Effects in the strategic environment are cumulative; once 
enacted, they become a part of the play of continuity and change. Strategy is cumulative 
from several different perspectives. It is cumulative from the perspective that once 
implemented, a strategy becomes part of the continuities of the strategic environment.  
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Regardless of whether it is successful or not, it becomes a part of the fabric of change and 
interaction in the strategic environment and its consequences must be considered in any 
future strategy.  
Strategy is cumulative from a stratified perspective also. The effect of a policy is 
the summation of the strategy and subordinate planning at all levels and the interaction 
related to them; the cumulative effect often exceeds the sum of the parts. It is also 
possible that the value of one level of strategic efforts might be negated by the effects of 
another level. Strategies at different levels interact, with the cumulative effects 
influencing the success of higher and lower strategy and planning over time.176  
Efficiency is subordinate to effectiveness in strategy. This is not to say that 
efficiency is not desired. Good strategy is both effective and efficient, but the purpose of 
strategy is to create strategic effect. Strategic objectives, if accomplished, create or 
contribute to the creation of strategic effects that favor the achievement of the desired end 
state at the level of strategy being analyzed and, ultimately, serve national interests. 
Strategy must emphasize effectiveness because failure, whatever the cause, creates much 
greater risk of undesirable and unanticipated multi-ordered consequences. Concepts and 
resources serve objectives without undue risk of failure or unintended effects; efficiency 
is necessarily subordinate to effectiveness in strategy.177 
Strategy provides a proper relationship or balance among the objectives sought, 
the methods used to pursue the objectives, and the resources available for the effects 
sought at its level in the hierarchy. In formulating a strategy, the ends, ways, and means 
are part of an integral whole and work synergistically to achieve strategic effect at that 
level of the strategy, as well as contribute to cumulative effects at higher levels.  
Ends, ways, and means must be in concert qualitatively and quantitatively, 
internally and externally. Strategic objectives and concepts have a proper relationship  
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within a strategy, but must also relate properly within the hierarchy. The quantitative 
relationship suggests that the concept employs and is resourced with the appropriate types 
and quantity of resources.  
From the synergistic balance of ends, ways, and means, the strategy achieves 
suitability and acceptability — the attainment of the objectives using the instruments of 
power in the manner envisioned accomplishes the strategic effects desired at acceptable 
costs. The synergistic balance also achieves feasibility — the strategic concept is 
executable with the resources made available.178 
Risk is inherent in all activity. The best one can do is seriously consider and 
evaluate the risks involved, producing a favorable balance against failure. 
Strategy is subject to the nature of the strategic environment, in which risk exists, 
and uncertainty is inherent in that environment as a result of chance, nonlinearity, and 
interaction with other states and actors. Risk can be assessed and often mitigated by 
questioning the thinking behind the strategy. Nonetheless, no matter how probing the 
questions, risk of failure will always remain. Failure can be either the failure to achieve 
one’s own objectives, thus providing a significant advantage to one’s adversaries, or 
creating unintended adverse effects. 
In peacetime, national interests and objectives lead to specific policies and 
commitments. Policy is a pattern or patterns of actions designed to attain specific 
objectives. Policy can represent a broad course of action or intent. Policy is the ways 
(courses of action, methods, or patterns) by which strategy pursues and achieves its 
objectives. Commitments are expressions of a nation’s intention to use its instruments of 
national power. Whereas policy might express general intent, a course of action, or 
restraints on action, commitments pledge nations to take specific actions at specific times 
and places. While conflict is always related to some national interest or objective, it is 
normally the outgrowth of a specific policy or commitment.  
In war, the national strategy is expressed in the National Defense Strategy and the 
National Military Strategy and focuses on employing the non-military instruments of 
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national power (informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, 
finance, and economic) alone or in combination179 in order to ensure achieving its 
political ends or objectives, the end state, as articulated by the political leadership. 
Informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and 
economic actions are linked through supporting strategies that contribute to attaining the 
objective of national strategy and achieving and maintaining the desired end state.  
 Military strategy, in turn, applies the military instrument of national power 
towards the accomplishment of the political objectives, in combination 
and conjunction with the other instruments or elements, of the overall 
national strategy. The departure point for military strategy, therefore, is 
the objectives of the national strategy. From there, military strategy must 
identify a military goal or objective that will lead to accomplishment of 
the political objective.  
 The military objective then provides the basis for the identification of 
specific ways, or courses of action, to accomplish that objective. The 
selection of one of these courses of action and its further development 
results in a strategic concept that embodies the key components of the 
chosen military strategy.  
 The military strategy is not developed in isolation from the other 
instruments of national power. The military objectives and strategy must 
also be compatible with the diplomatic, economic, and informational 
objectives and strategies. 
As stated in the opening sentence, the articulation of national interests, objectives, 
policies, and commitments linked to use of the instruments of national power is 
sometimes referred to as “grand strategy,” “grand national strategy,” “basic national 
security policy,” or, currently in the United States, “national security strategy.” Grand 
strategies or national security strategies are implemented by subordinate strategies — 
political or diplomatic strategies, economic strategies, national military strategies, and so 
forth — for the use of each of the instruments of national power.  
Strategy is essentially a matter of common sense. At its most basic, strategy is 
simply a matter of figuring out what is needed to achieve and maintain the desired end 
                                                 
179 Diplomatic, economic, military, and informational instruments make up the instruments of national 
power. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).In earlier joint 
doctrine publications, instruments of national power were referred to as elements of national power and the 
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state, determining the best way (i.e., course of action) to use the resources at one’s 
disposal to achieve it, then executing the plan.  
Unfortunately, in the practical world of politics and war, none of these things are 
easily done. Goals are complex, sometimes contradictory, and many-sided. They often 
change in the middle of a war. The resources at one’s disposal are not always obvious, 
can change during the course of a struggle, and usually need to be adapted to suit one’s 
needs. And the enemy is often annoyingly uncooperative, refusing to fit one’s 
preconceptions of him or to stand still while one erects the apparatus for his destruction 
According to the U.S. Army War College’s U.S. Army War College Guide to 
National Security Policy and Strategy, there are several ways to categorize strategies. 
One has a conceptual basis: strategy can be declaratory, actual, or ideal. Declaratory 
strategy is what a nation says its strategy is. Declaratory strategy may or may not be the 
nation’s true strategy, and the nation may or may not actually believe it. Actual strategy 
addresses the difference between the declared strategy and reality. It asks the question, 
what is its real strategy?” An ideal strategy is what a strategist would prefer to do if he 
had unlimited access to all the necessary resources (both quantitative and qualitative). It 
is a textbook strategy and may or may not correspond to reality.180 
A second method of categorization, according to the U.S. Army War College’s 
U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, is based on the 
pattern of execution: sequential, simultaneous, and cumulative. This paradigm attempts to 
make distinctions between strategies based on whether the strategist is attacking 
objectives progressively, simultaneously, or in essentially random order. Thus, a typical 
sequential campaign would involve actions to gain control of the air, followed by efforts 
to defeat the enemy’s fielded forces, and culminate in the attack on or occupation of 




                                                 
180 U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army War College Guide, 83. 
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on each of those target sets. A cumulative strategy produces results not by any single 
action or sequence of actions, but by the cumulative effect of numerous actions over 
time.181 
Attrition, exhaustion (or erosion per Russell Weigley, in his classic and seminal 
book The American Way of War),182 and annihilation are also standard historical strategic 
categories as strategic paradigms based on deterrence, compellence, and reassurance. 
Another way, as mentioned briefly above, to categorize strategy is organizational or 
hierarchical. This method discusses grand or national strategy at one level and theater, 
campaign, or operational strategy at another level. 
It was not until the end of the Second World War, however, that the term 
“national security” came into full usage in U.S. political discourse. Although Edward 
Mead Earle pointed out as early as 1943 that “national security strategy has of necessity 
required increasing consideration of nonmilitary factors, economic, psychological, moral, 
political, and technological. Strategy, therefore, is not merely a concept of wartime, but is 
an inherent element of statecraft at all times.”183 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has an approved joint definition of 
strategy: “The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national 
power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or 
multinational objectives...strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), 
national policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces 
and supplies (means)...”184 
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183 Earle, Gollden and Gilbert, Makers of Modern Strategy, viii. 
184 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, Joint Electronic Library, 
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The U.S. Army War College defines it, strategy, as a country’s broadest approach 
to the pursuit of its national objectives (ends) in the international system.185 Suitable, 
acceptable, and feasible grand strategies include or at least consider all instruments of 
national power. These are the ways of grand strategy. Contemporary U.S. national 
security doctrine recognizes four to seven categories — instruments or elements — of 
power available to a nation or strategist: political, economic, military, and informational 
(PEMI) or diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) and military, 
information, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic 
(MIDLIFE). The means are the physical and programmatic capabilities resident in the 
departments and agencies assigned responsibility under statute.186 
When discussing the strategy a country employs in pursuit of its interests, the 
community of interest and its subject matter experts usually use terms such as national 
strategy, national security strategy, or grand strategy. They generally use the latter term in 
their writings to denote a country’s broadest approach to the pursuit of its national 
objectives, or ends, in the international system. Ends are the objectives or goals sought. 
Means are the resources available to pursue the objectives. Ways or methods are how one 
organizes and applies the resources. Each of these components suggests a related 
question. What does the actor want to pursue (“ends”)? With what resources (“means”)? 
How to pursue and accomplish (“ways”)? The rational, or “why,” is defined by a nation’s 
goals and objectives; survival, vital, and important interests; and national values, 
principles, and ethics. 
The essential point is that a country, including the United States, adopts objectives 
based on its interests and values and how they are affected, threatened, or challenged in 
the international system. The means it possesses to pursue those objectives fall into four 
or seven (depending on how one conceptualizes them) broad categories of national 
power, which are called instruments of national power. 
                                                 
185 Robert H. Dorff, “A Primer in Strategy Development,” in U.S. Army War College Guide Strategy, ed. Joseph 
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Since 2001-2002, the U.S. has identified the instruments of power [as the military, 
informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic, or 
MIDLIFE, instruments of national power. Prior to the first Bush Administration’s 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the U.S. traditionally defined 
the instruments of national power as diplomatic, military, informational, and economic 
(DIME) or political/diplomatic, economic, military, and informational. How a country 
marshals and applies those instruments of national power constitute the “ways” of its 
grand strategy. 
The literature amply demonstrates that strategy is neither static nor stagnant. If 
strategy is a function of (1)  the desired effects and (2) an expected positive end state, 
then it ought to change or be different as the political ends change. This proposition leads 
directly to what Clausewitz, who in On War, called the supreme judgment about a war — 
its nature; The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman 
and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they 
are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to 
its nature … No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without 
first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to 
conduct it. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.187 
Conversely, one must also always remember B. H. Liddell Hart’s corollary: “Grand 
strategy must always remember that peace follows war.”188 
Policy, in this case basic national security policy, is, or should be, characterized as 
a rational process. The making of policy is a conscious effort by a distinct political body 
to use whatever power it possesses to accomplish some purpose; if only the mere 
continuation or increase of its own power. 
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Policy is a rational subcomponent of politics, the reasoned purposes and actions 
of individuals in the political struggle. War can be a practical means, sometimes the only 
means available, for the achievement of rational policy aims — that is, the aims of one 
party in the political dispute.  
Hence, to describe war as an “instrument of policy” is entirely correct. It is an act 
of force to compel one’s opponent to do one’s will. War is a part of politics. It does not 
replace other forms of political intercourse but merely supplements them. It is a violent 
expression of the tensions and disagreements between political groups when political 
conflict reaches a level that sparks organized violence. Thus war, like every other phase 
of politics, embodies both rational and irrational elements. Its course is the product not of 
one will, but of the collision of two or more wills. 
Liddell Hart went on to say, “Grand strategy should both calculate and develop 
the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting 
services. Also the moral resources — for to foster the people’s willing spirit is often as 
important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should 
regulate the distribution of power between the services, and between the services and 
industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy — 
which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic 
pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not the least of ethical pressure, to weaken the 
opponent’s will...Furthermore, while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand 
strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the 
various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of 
peace — for its security and prosperity. The sorry state of peace, for both sides, that has 
followed most wars can be traced to the fact that, unlike strategy, the realm of grand 
strategy is for the most part terra incognita — still awaiting exploration, and 
understanding.”189 
U.S. “grand” strategy involves the use of national power in peace and war to 
further a strategic vision of America’s role in the world that will best achieve the nation’s 
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three core interests: physical security, promotion of values, and economic prosperity. 
These core U.S. national interests have not changed significantly over the three-quarters 
of a century. They express and reflect the enduring values that are held by Americans: 
“The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental 
values intact and its institutions and people secure.”190 These are core interests that can 
never be compromised. 
The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) is based on American 
core (i.e., survival, vital, and important domestic and foreign political/diplomatic, 
economic, military, and informational) interests and values and its aim is to ensure the 
security of the nation while making the world a safer and better place through the 
advancement of U.S. interests. Since 2002, its goals are political and economic freedom, 
peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. The NSS includes 
strengthening alliances and working with others to defeat global terrorism and defuse 
regional conflicts; preventing U.S. enemies from threatening the United States, its allies, 
and friends with WMD; and transforming America’s national security institutions.  
 Protect the American people and American interests [worldwide]. It is an 
enduring American principle that this duty obligates the government to 
anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before 
[detect, deter, prevent and contain, and defeat] the threats can do grave 
damage. 
 Avoid seriously weakening the U.S. economy or undermining U.S. 
fundamental values and institutions  
 Defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks against the U.S. and its allies 
and partners 
 Defend against and defeat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
[chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and advanced high explosives; 
CBRN-E] and missile threats before they are unleashed; and improved 
protection to mitigate the consequences of WMD use. We [the U.S.] aim  
                                                 
190 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: 
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to convince our adversaries that they cannot achieve their goals with 
WMD, and thus deter and dissuade them from attempting to use or even 
acquire these weapons in the first place. 
 Expand economic liberty and prosperity [opportunities]...promote free and 
fair trade, open markets, a stable financial system, the integration of the 
global economy, and secure, clean energy development. 
 Build and sustain strong, flexible alliances 
 Advance human dignity in word and deed, speaking out for freedom and 
against violations of human rights and allocating appropriate resources to 
advance these ideals.191 
Basic national security policy (BNSP), from which the National Security Strategy 
(NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(NSHS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and other “strategies” are derived, provides 
strategic direction for senior U.S. decision-makers (i.e., cabinet secretaries, agency 
directors and administrators, ambassadors and chiefs of mission, combatant commanders, 
etc.) These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies 
and military plans (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies 
(means).192 
U.S. BNSP identifies, defines, articulates, and supports the worldwide interests, 
goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the 
United States. It includes descriptions of the nation’s foreign policy, worldwide 
commitments, and national defense capabilities necessary to deter, contain, and defeat 
state and non-state aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the 
United States.  
In addition, it describes the proposed short-term and long-term uses of the 
political, economic, military, and other instruments, or elements, of the national power of 
the United States that are maintained and employed to protect or promote the interests 
and achieve the nation’s goals, objectives, and end state. Lastly, it outlines and defends 
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the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security 
strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the 
capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the 
implementation of the BNSP and strategy. 
The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national and 
military strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on the design and conduct of 
operations using the operational art to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations 
and to organize and employ military forces. Operational art governs the mobilization, 
generation, deployment, and employment of resource and force packages, their 
commitment to or withdrawal from tactical situations, and the arrangement of tactical 
activities and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.193 
The tactical level focuses on planning and executing activities (i.e., battles), 
engagements, and activities to achieve objectives assigned to tactical units operating in 
the immediate proximity of the threat. Forces at this level generally employ various 
tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) to achieve their objectives Tactics are therefore the 
employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.194 
In sum, strategy, and the ways to develop, maintain, implement, and enhance 
strategy, is perspective, position, plan, and pattern. Strategy is the bridge between policy 
or high-order goals on the one hand and tactics or concrete actions on the other. In short, 
strategy is a term that refers to a complex web of thoughts, ideas, insights, experiences, 
goals, expertise, memories, perceptions, and expectations that provides general guidance 
for specific actions in pursuit of particular ends. Operational art and science, the “art of 
the campaign,” straddles the gap between ends and means.  
Strategy is at once the course one charts, the journey one imagines; and, at the 
same time, it is the course one steers, the trip one actually makes. Even when one is 
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embarking on a voyage of discovery, with no particular destination in mind, the voyage 
has a purpose, an outcome, an end to be kept in view. 
Strategy, then, has no existence apart from the ends sought. It is a general 
framework that provides guidance for actions to be taken, and, at the same time, is shaped 
by the actions taken. This means that the necessary precondition for formulating strategy 
is a clear and widespread understanding of the ends to be obtained. Without these ends in 
view, action is purely tactical and can quickly degenerate into nothing more than a 
flailing about. 
When there are no “ends in view” for the organization writ large, strategies still 
exist and they are still operational, even highly effective, but for an individual or unit, not 
for the organization as a whole. The risks of not having a set of organization-wide ends 
clearly in view include missed opportunities, fragmented and wasted effort, working at 
cross purposes, and internecine warfare. 
For the leadership of an organization to remain unclear or to vacillate regarding 
ends, strategy, tactics and means is to not know their own minds. The accompanying loss 
of morale is enormous. 
Ultimately, strategy is about means. It is about the attainment of ends, not their 
specification. The specification of ends is a matter of stating those future conditions and 
circumstances toward which effort is to be devoted until such time as those ends are 
obtained. 
Strategy is concerned with how one will achieve one’s aims, not with what those 
aims are or ought to be, or how they are established. If strategy has any meaning at all, it 
is only in relation to some aim or end in view. 
Strategy is one element in a four-part structure. First are the ends (end state) to be 
obtained. Second are the courses of action for obtaining them, the ways in which 
resources will be deployed. Third are tactics, the ways in which resources that have been  
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deployed are actually used or employed. Fourth, and last, are the resources themselves, 
the means at one’s disposal. Thus it is that strategy and tactics bridge the gap between 
ends and means. 
Establishing the aims or ends of an enterprise is a matter of policy and the root 
words there are both Greek: politeia and polites — the state and the people. Determining 
the ends of an enterprise is mainly a matter of governance not management and, 
conversely, achieving them is mostly a matter of management not governance. Those 
who govern are responsible for seeing to it that the ends of the enterprise are clear to the 
people who people that enterprise and that these ends are legitimate, ethical, and that they 
benefit the enterprise and its members. 
Strategy is the joint province of those who govern and those who manage. Tactics 
belong to those who manage. Means or resources are jointly controlled. Those who 
govern and manage are jointly responsible for the deployment of resources. Those who 
manage are responsible for the employment of those resources — but always in the 
context of the ends sought and the strategy for their achievement. 
Over time, the employment of resources yields actual results, and these, in light of 
intended results, shape the future deployment of resources. Thus it is that “realized” 
strategy emerges from the pattern of actions and decisions. And thus it is that strategy is 
an adaptive, evolving view of what is required to obtain the ends in view.195 
However, strategy, whether military, civilian, or business, is not planning. 
Strategy is non-linear and partakes of a different mindset. Planning makes strategy 
actionable. It relies on a high degree of certainty — a world that is concrete, or at least 
knowable, and can be addressed and defined in explicit terms. In essence, planning takes 
a gray world and makes it black and white through the analysis of the facts and 
assumptions about the unknown. Planning is essentially linear and deterministic, focusing 
heavily on first-order cause and effect. It assumes that the future results can be precisely 
known if enough is known about the facts and the conditions affecting the undertaking. 
                                                 
195 Fred Nickols, “Strategy: Definitions and Meaning,” Distance Consulting (2000) 
http://home.att.net/~nickols/strategy_definition.htm (07 September 2008). 
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The planning process, including programming and budgeting, is essential to reduce 
uncertainty at the tactical level by allowing detailed actions to be prescribed.  
The planning process works because the lower the level, the more limited the 
scope and complexity, and the shorter the timeline; hence, the number of unknowns is 
limited and can be compensated for in branches and sequels to create “certainty.” In 
reality, increases exponentially as one ascends from the tactical to the operational to the 
strategic level. 
Planning is not strategy, or policy for that matter. Strategists must understand the 
difference between strategy and planning in order to produce good strategy. The planner 
must understand the difference between planning and strategy in order to execute strategy 
successfully.  
Planning bridges the gap between strategy and execution. The purpose of 
planning is to create certainty so that people and organizations can act. The purpose of 
strategy formulation is to clarify, influence, manage, or resolve the earmarks — volatility, 
uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA)196 — of the strategic environment 
through the identification and creation of strategic effects in support of policy goals.  
Strategy lays down what is important and to be achieved, sets the parameters for 
the necessary actions, and prescribes what the state is willing to allocate in terms of 
resources. Thus, strategy, through its hierarchal nature, identifies the objectives to be 
achieved and defines the box in which detailed planning can be accomplished; strategy 
bounds planning. Within that box, planning adapts strategy to a concrete world with facts, 
figures, and interrelated and sequenced actions calculated to achieve the strategy’s 
objectives. 
Strategy is the direction and scope of an organization over the long-term which 
achieves an advantage for the organization through its configuration of resources within a  
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challenging environment, to meet the needs of markets and to fulfill stakeholder 
expectations. In other words, strategy is about where the organization wants to be in the 
long-term. 
In its broadest sense, strategy is about taking “strategic decisions” — decisions 
that answer the questions above. In practice, a thorough strategic management process 
has three main components, shown in the figure below: 
 
Figure 1.   The Strategic Management Process Triangle 
Strategy bridges the gap between policy and tactics. Together, strategy and tactics 
bridge the gap between ends and means. Strategy therefore refers to the means by which 
policy is affected, accounting for Clausewitz’s famous statement that war is the 
continuation of political relations via other means — the instruments or elements of 
national power. 
The underlying assumption of strategy from a national perspective is that states 
and other competitive entities have interests that they will pursue to the best of their 
abilities. Hence, there is the need for strategists and practitioners of the art and science of 
strategy to have a thorough understanding of the international environment (Chapter IV). 
Interests are desired end states such as survival, economic well-being, and 
enduring national values. The national elements of power are the resources used to 
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promote or advance national interests. Strategy is the pursuit, protection, or advancement 
of these interests through the application of the instruments of power. Strategy is 
fundamentally a choice; it reflects a preference for a future state or condition. In doing so, 
strategy confronts adversaries and some things simply remain beyond control or 
unforeseen. Consequently, there is the need for strategists and practitioners of the art and 
science of strategy to have a thorough understanding of the volatile, uncertain, complex, 
and ambiguous threat environment. Strategy is developed from a thorough analysis and 
knowledge of the strategic situation/environment (Chapter V). 
Strategy is all about how (way or concept) leadership will use the power (means 
or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and 
geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support state interests. Strategy 
provides direction for the coercive or persuasive use of this power to achieve specified 
objectives. This direction is, by nature, proactive. It seeks to control the environment as 
opposed to reacting to it. Strategy is not crisis management. It is the antithesis of crisis 
management. Crisis management occurs when there is no strategy or the strategy fails. 
Thus, the first premise of a theory of strategy is that strategy is proactive and anticipatory 
(Chapter XIII). 
A second premise of a theory of strategy is that the strategist must know what is 
to be accomplished — that is, he must know the end state that he is trying to achieve. A 
third premise of a theory of strategy is that the strategy must identify an appropriate 
balance among the objectives sought, the methods to pursue the objectives, and the 
resources available. In formulating a strategy the ends, ways, and means are part of an 
integral whole; and if one is discussing a strategy at the national (grand) level with a 
national level end, the ways and means would similarly refer to national level concepts 
and resources. That is ends, ways, and means must be consistent. Thus a basic national 
security policy and strategy end must be supported by concepts based on all the 
instruments of power and the associated resources (Chapter IX). 
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A fourth premise of strategy is that political purpose must dominate all strategy; 
thus, Clausewitz’ famous dictum, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other 
means.” Political purpose is stated in policy. Policy is the expression of the desired end 
state sought by the government. 
A fifth premise is that strategy is comprehensive. That is to say, while the 
strategist may be devising a strategy from a particular perspective, he must consider the 
whole of the strategic environment in his analysis to arrive at a proper strategy to serve 
his purpose at his level. He is concerned with external and internal factors at all levels. In 
formulating a strategy, the strategist must also be cognizant that each aspect — 
objectives, concepts, and resources — has effects on the environment around him. 
Consequently, the strategist must have a comprehensive knowledge of what else is 
happening and the strategist’s efforts must be fully integrated with the strategies or 
efforts of senior, co-equal, and subordinate elements. Strategists must think holistically, 
that is comprehensively; good (i.e., actionable) strategy is never developed in isolation. 
Chapter VII will introduce and discuss how U.S. BNSP and strategy must make 
use, individually and in combination, of its instruments of national power to detect; 
prepare for, protect against; deter, contain, and prevent; respond to, recover from if 
necessary; and decisively defeat these threats. It also introduces the calculus that although 
American power and influence is pervasive and multidimensional when all of its 
instruments of national power are deployed, the challenge of strategic integration, of 
bringing the instruments into coherent effectiveness in the pursuit of national interests, 
remains 
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VII. STRATEGY IN PRACTICE 
In the post-Cold War and post-September 11, 2001 threat environment, as 
described in Chapter V, defending the nation against its enemies remains the first and 
fundamental commitment of the federal government. The defense of the homeland is, and 
always has been, the core national interest and central to U.S. BNSP. 
In order to detect; prepare for, protect against; deter, contain, and prevent; 
respond to, recover from if necessary; and defeat this threat, U.S. BNSP and strategy 
must make use, individually and in combination, of its instruments of national power. 
Countering this amorphous, asymmetric and unconventional threat will require the 
nation’s BNSP to seamlessly link and integrate with Carl von Clausewitz’s famous 
“trinity of will,” composed of the people of a nation; that nation’s military commander 
and the army; and lastly, the government of the nation.197 
The literature review established that strategy, regardless of discipline, is simply a 
problem solving process. It is a common and logical way, methodology, to approach any 
problem — military, national security, personal, business, or any other category one 
might select. According to the preliminary and cursory literature review, strategy asks 
three basic questions:  
 What is to be done (goals, objectives, desired effects, expectations, end 
state)? 
 What capabilities are available or can reasonably be obtained that might 
help in meeting goals, objectives, desired effects, expectations, end state? 
 What is the best way to use what is available to do achieve the desired 
effects and meet the expectations? 
According to the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. defense establishment has an 
approved, albeit broad, national security, and defense-centric, definition of strategy: The 
art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a 
synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational 
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objectives.198 The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Electronic Library’s Joint Encyclopedia 
deepens and expands on this definition by adding that these strategies integrate national 
and military objectives (ends), national policies and military concepts (ways), and 
national resources and military forces and supplies (means).199 
The U.S. Army War College defines strategy in two ways:200 
 Conceptually – the relationship among ends, ways, and means. 
 Strategic Art — the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of 
ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting 
resources or capabilities) to promote and defend the national interests. 
By consensus, the literature review established the requirement that any strategy 
must be examined and tested for suitability, acceptability, and feasibility against the three 
components:201  
 Suitability tests whether the proposed strategy achieves the desired end 
state. If it does not, it is not a potential strategy.  
 Acceptability tests ways. Does the proposed course of action or concept 
produce results without excessive expenditure of resources and within 
accepted modes of conduct?  
 Feasibility tests means. Are the means at hand or reasonably available 
sufficient to execute the proposed concept?  
A strategy must meet or at least have a reasonable expectation of satisfying all 
three tests. The art becomes the analysis necessary to select the best or most efficient or 
least risky. However, strategy is made and executed by the institutions of particular  
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societies in ways that express cultural preferences and the acceptability of a strategy 
beyond morality and legality, a truly acceptable strategy must fit the norms of the 
military, government, and people. 
When great powers choose between (or among) alternative grand strategies, the 
most important question is which is likely to yield the most security. During World War 
II, U.S. policymakers realized that their nation’s enormous relative power gains created 
an unparalleled opportunity to mold the postwar international system, leading to an 
ambitious conception of America’s postwar strategic, economic, and ideological interests. 
When World War II ended, the United States enjoyed an almost unfettered range of grand 
strategic choices and conditions were much more conducive to U.S. expansion because of 
the political collapse of Europe, after World War II Western Europe, in effect, was zero 
polar. It was a power vacuum into which the United States could expand. And it did. 
The U.S. was the only great power to record absolute and relative gains in its 
wealth and power, emerging from World War II in a position of unprecedented economic 
ascendance. The United State emerged from the war predominant in military power, 
capability, and reach. Even as World War II was ongoing, U.S. policymakers understood 
that the war’s end would find the United States in an overwhelmingly powerful position 
in international politics; and even before World War II ended, U.S. policymakers had 
begun to redefine America’s security interests as global in scope, rather than merely 
regional.  
This was underscored in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s October 1944 
telegrams to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, 
which declared that “there is in the global war literally no question, either military or 
political, in which the United States is not interested.”202 During his 1945 mission to 
Moscow, presidential envoy Harry Hopkins reiterated to Stalin that America was a global 
power and, thus, legitimately was concerned with events in Soviet-occupied Poland (a 
country where, before World War II, the United States had no discernable strategic 
interests) because “the interests of the United States were world wide and not confined to 
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North and South America and the Pacific Ocean.”203 U.S. military planners held a similar 
view of America’s postwar role. As Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall stated, “It 
no longer appears practical to continue what we once conceived as hemispheric defense 
as satisfactory basis for our security. We are now concerned with the peace of the entire 
world.”204 
Since the early twentieth century, the U.S. has been far more secure than any 
great power in modern history. Consequently, the U.S.’s BNSP has been based on what 
one might call strategic internationalism: the belief that the U.S. must exert the full 
panalopy of its power — military, economic, and ideological — on the international 
system in order to shape its external environment. 
 From an objective standpoint, the American homeland essentially was 
unthreatened until the development and deployment of intercontinental 
weapons delivery systems (ca. mid-1950s). Precisely because it has never 
had to worry about rivals in its own regions, once the U.S. emerged as a 
great power and established its primacy in the Western Hemisphere, it has 
been free to concentrate its resources and ambitions on seeking extra 
regional primacy (or hegemony through selective engagement and 
presence). 
 The U.S. is the most powerful global actor the world has ever seen and its 
position is unprecedented, because the U.S. is the only great power in the 
history of the modern international state system to have attained 
hegemony in its own region and to have attained near- hegemonic primacy 
extra regionally. 
American grand strategy is predicated on the belief that if the U.S. abdicated its 
roles as regional stabilizer, Europe and East Asia would sink back into the pre-World 
War II days of multi-polar power politics, and the ensuring regional instability would 
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jeopardize important U.S. economic interests.205 As the 1997 Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) somewhat delicately put it, if the credibility of the U.S. commitment to 
maintaining regional stability is questioned, that “in turn could cause allies and friends to 
adopt more divergent defense policies and postures, thereby weakening the web of  
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alliances and coalitions on which we rely on to protect our interests abroad.”206 Over the 
past five years, the QDR’s projection has, because of the war in Iraq, to a certain degree 
manifested itself. 
The story of American grand strategy over the past six decades is one of benign 
expansion, and that strategy’s logic inexorably has driven the U.S. to attempt to establish 
its primacy in the world’s three most important regions outside North America itself: 
Western Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The current Bush administration’s 
decision to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein is another example of continuity 
in U.S. grand strategy since 1989. Iraq was not the first, but merely the latest, U.S. war of 
hegemony since the cold war’s end. Since the cold war waned in the late, in the 1980s, 
the United States has been involved in a series of such military interventions.  
There are different strategies in which the instruments of national power are 
employed alone or in combination. The formulation and employed of a specific strategy 
— erosion versus annihilation or offensive versus defensive — is a product of the 
nation’s or group’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges resident in its 
instruments of national power . 
All competitions, conflicts, and war involve power; real, perceived, and/or 
imagined. Political competition and conflict often escalates into war simply because the 
opponents disagree as to their relative power. The resort to naked force is the only way to 
determine the truth. 
Power is sometimes material in nature: the economic power of money or other 
resources, for example, or possession of the physical means for coercion (weapons and 
troops or police). Power is just as often psychological in nature: legal, religious, or 
scientific authority; intellectual or social prestige; a charismatic personality’s ability to 
excite or persuade; a reputation, accurate or illusory, for diplomatic or military strength.  
Power provides the means to attack, but it also provides the means to resist attack. 
Power in itself is therefore neither good nor evil. By its nature, however, power tends to 
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be distributed unevenly, to an extent that varies greatly from one society to another and 
over time. Power, real, perceived, and/or imagined, is personified in a nation’s 
instruments of national power. The instruments of national power will be discussed, in 
detail, in the next chapter. 
War is a continuation of politics by other means and is the employment of violent 
means to achieve them (Clausewitz).207 The political aims of an entity at war always 
appear somewhere along a continuum of objectives, which despite their variety can all be 
usefully labeled as either “limited” or “high-end.” The distinction is fundamental. A high-
end political objective amounts to the elimination of the opponent as a political entity, 
that is, elimination of the enemy political leadership, not necessarily of the organization, 
state, or society it leads. A limited political objective, on the other hand, is one which 
does not inherently require the elimination of the political entity who is currently one’s 
opponent.208  
There are essentially only two ways to use force to impose one’s will on an 
enemy. The first is to eliminate his capacity to use military force, leaving him helpless to 
resist one’s demands. The other is to inflict such high costs or political pain that he is 
willing to negotiate an end to hostilities on the terms desired.  
The first of these alternatives represents what has traditionally been called a 
strategy of annihilation, in which the  military objective is unlimited: One seeks to 
eliminate the enemy’s ability to defend himself, in other words, to disarm him, thus 
leaving him helpless to oppose the imposition of one’s will (however limited or however 
extreme ultimate intentions may be).  
The second alternative is a strategy of erosion, in which the military objective is 
limited: One seeks to raise the enemy’s costs so high that the enemy will find ending the 
war on the opponent’s terms more attractive than continuing to fight.  
The goal of a strategy of annihilation or incapacitation is to deprive the enemy of 
the capability of resistance, to make him militarily helpless. “Incapacitation” is perhaps a 
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better literal description of the strategic goal described here, but, as with so many 
potentially useful terms, that word tends to conjure up counterproductive images, in this 
case, of non-lethal weapons, limited applications of force, and “surgical strikes,” which 
are contrary to this meaning. 
Thus, one usually uses the term “annihilation.” Of course, the word “annihilation” 
is also problematical: It triggers strong emotions and is sometimes confused with a policy 
of extermination. The latter is a political, not military, goal. It cannot be achieved, 
however, without first annihilating the enemy’s means of resistance. What is being 
annihilated (literally, “made into nothing”) is the enemy’s physical means to oppose. 
Deprived of the means to fight, any residual will to resist is, one believes or hopes, 
irrelevant. Thus, this thesis uses the terms “disarm,” “annihilation,” “incapacitation,” and 
“high-end” or “unlimited” military objective more or less interchangeably.  
Normally, a strategy of annihilation is viable only when one possesses some very 
great superiority over the enemy, in terms of brute strength, military skill, leadership, 
technological capabilities, or morale. Sometimes one can achieve the necessary 
superiority through surprise, although this is hard to achieve and dangerous to count on. 
If one’s opponent has any strategic depth, he may recover from his surprise before one’s 
victory is assured. To seek to annihilate an enemy’s military capabilities without some 
such overwhelming superiority entails a willingness to pay a very high price for total 
military victory. (This is often called “attrition” warfare.). Such a price may well be 
justified, as in the American Civil War209 or the war against Hitler210. Oftentimes, 
however, the advantages to be gained through complete military victory are not sufficient 
to justify its cost.  
Some societies will accept such a defeat and adjust to the demands of the victor, 
as did Vichy France in 1940 and Germany in 1945. Others, however, will simply redefine 
                                                 
209 Richard E. Beringer, Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 
1991); David Herbert, Donald. Why the North Won the Civil War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); 
and Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War 
(Champange-Urbanna, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1991). 
210 Martin Gilbert, The Second World War: A Complete History (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2004); 
and John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Publishers, 2005). 
 127
their goals and seek different means to continue the struggle. The American South, for 
instance, in 1865 lost a war for territorial independence to the North’s strategy of 
annihilation, which left the South’s armies in ruins and its economy too wrecked to 
support continuation of the conventional war. White Southerners then turned to the less 
ambitious (i.e., politically limited) goal of maintaining their own preferred social order in 
the face of Northern efforts at “reconstruction.” They used the means of passive 
resistance to the national government and violent terrorism against local opponents. By 
1876, the national government had tacitly accepted Southern victory in this follow-on 
struggle, in return for national unity. This political compromise endured for nearly a 
century.  
In many cases, an annihilation strategy is pursued by an entity conscious of the 
temporary nature of its military superiority. Nazi Germany, for example, was well aware 
of the superior economic and manpower potential of Germany’s enemies in either a long 
war or a long arms race. The Germans’ mobilization strategy and the actual conduct of 
their campaigns therefore aimed at fighting a short war against unprepared foes. To be 
anything more than a gamble, such a strategy must be based on a reasonable probability 
that one’s military superiority, whatever its basis, will be decisive before an enemy’s 
superior mobilization potential can affect the dynamics of the war. It also requires that 
the effects of one’s victory be such as to preclude the enemy from reopening the conflict 
after such mobilization. That is, victory, even if limited, must remove the source of the 
enemy’s potential superiority.211  
The second approach, of which the American North’s second and victorious 
strategy is an example, for this thesis, shall be called a strategy of erosion. Its objective is 
to convince the enemy that a settlement of the outstanding political issues on one’s terms  
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will be easier and more attractive than continued conflict. To put it another way, one 
seeks to present the enemy with the probability of an outcome worse in his eyes than 
peace on one’s terms.212 
One accomplishes this through erosion, literally “wearing down” [quotation 
added] the enemy’s will to fight rather than destroying his ability to resist. Strategists, 
policy makers, and decision makers will choose this approach when they are either 
unable or unwilling to destroy the enemy’s war-making capability. Perhaps their goal 
requires such a modest concession from the enemy that they believe he will acquiesce 
after modest resistance. Perhaps one needs to keep the other entity’s military forces in 
existence as a buffer, or as a factor in the balance of power. Perhaps the public will not 
support the commitment of sufficient forces to wage a campaign of annihilation. In the 
latter case, however, one must ask why one thinks the public will tolerate instead the 
long, drawn-out struggle that strategies of erosion often imply. Strategists, policy makers, 
and decision makers might also ask themselves why they expect the enemy to fold before 
they will.  
In many cases, however, strategists, policy makers, and decision makers pursue a 
strategy of erosion simply because the enemy is too powerful: the outright destruction of 
his military power is beyond their capabilities — or that the costs outweigh the gains and 
risks are not worth the benefits. The Afghan guerrillas’ successful erosion strategy 
against the Soviets falls into this category as does the Taliban’s current campaign, and its 
accompanying rhetoric, against the U.S. and NATO. So does the American effort against 
Great Britain during the American Revolution. In the American Civil War, the selection 
and employment of a strategy of erosion by the Confederate States of America was 
unsuccessful.213 
Sometimes strategists, policy makers, and decision makers face enemies who 
simply cannot be dissuaded from the pursuit of policies they find intolerable by limited 
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political and military action (i.e., erosion). Strategists, policy makers, and decision 
makers sometimes find themselves in the awkward and uncomfortable situation where an 
annihilation strategy is also unavailable — because the enemy is too powerful, or 
domestic opinion will not support it, or their allies and neutrals would be too disturbed by 
their foe’s elimination.  
If strategists, policy makers, and decision makers can neither forcibly persuade 
nor destroy them, such enemies can only be contained through never-ending efforts. This 
may in fact be the case the U.S. and its partners are, and will be, facing in the current 
struggle and conflict with radical extremists who employ terrorist tools, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures in order to change the status quo in which the disenfranchised 
are empowered by gaining and exercising political power Whether one’s objectives in 
such struggles are essentially limited or high-end is a moot point: One’s eventual victory 
will result from the employment of all of the instruments of national power , alone or in 
combination; military operations are merely a holding action.  
The strategic attacker is the antagonist seeking to add to his relative power. It 
usually is the side that initiates a war, although defenders sometimes launch preemptive 
attacks. An attacker may be seeking to completely overthrow the balance of power or 
may simply want an upward adjustment in his relative position. This distinction affects 
the kinds of strategies both sides pursue and the intensity of the struggle.  
The strategic defender is the participant that wants to keep what he has or to 
maintain his relative position in a balance of power system. In many important respects, 
defense is inherently stronger than offense. The strength of the strategic defense derives 
from human psychology and the balance of power mechanism as well as the forces of 
friction and inertia. People are naturally willing to endure great sacrifices in defense of 
their homes and homelands but much less willing to endure such sacrifices in military 
adventures abroad.  
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 An aggressor’s action frequently causes anxiety and hostility in 
neighboring allied and neutral countries; they often interpret a challenge to 
the existing balance of power as a threat and are more naturally inclined to 
support the defender. Friction and inertia are normally on the side of the 
defender as well: it is inherently easier to hold onto something than to take 
it away from someone else. 
 These political and psychological strengths of the strategic defense are 
present in all conflicts and wars, even those in which territorial gains and 
losses (i.e., economic and financial, prestige and relative power, access to 
raw materials, etc.) are not major factors. The strength of the defense is 
often reinforced operationally since the attacker is normally moving away 
from his base of supply and the center of his political power, while the 
defender is falling back on his.  
 The relative superiority of the strategic defense is not an absolute. 
Obviously, a defender with few resources and poor leadership is not 
stronger than an attacker with vastly greater resources and good 
leadership. However, all other things being equal, the defender has the 
advantage.  
At the tactical and operational levels, the roles of attacker and defender may 
frequently change hands or even be shared more or less evenly. At the strategic level, 
however, the roles tend to be fixed throughout any given conflict. In the Second World 
War for example, the Western Allies held the advantages of the strategic defense even as 
their armies marched into Germany. They were perceived as being restorers of the 
balance of power rather than as threats to it.214 
However, in some situations, the roles of strategic attacker and defender can be 
reversed. When war is endemic in a society, when the origins of the conflict are poorly 
remembered, or when the war guilt has come to be equally shared, the advantages of the 
original defender tend to be lost. In such a case, the balance of power mechanism usually 
tends to support the current defender and to oppose whichever contender seems 
momentarily to have the initiative.  
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Strategies can also be either symmetrical or asymmetrical. That is, the contending 
powers may pursue mirror-image ends or rely on similar means, or they may pursue quite 
different kinds of goals or apply dissimilar means.215  
A symmetrical military strategy is one that attempts to match, or rather, to 
overmatch, the enemy strength for strength, to beat him on his own terms. Symmetrical 
strategies usually involve peer or near peer competitors and rivals.  
An asymmetrical strategy is one that attempts to apply one category of means 
against another category, to use some means to which the enemy cannot effectively 
respond in kind. Many conflicts and wars, including the one the U.S. and its partners are 
currently engaged in against radicals and extremists that employ terrorist tactics, 
techniques, and procedures, are fought between very different enemies and are thus 
profoundly asymmetrical in character.216  
 For example, a terrorist organization may wage war against a government 
or even against the international community as a whole.  
 The terrorist campaigns of the Irish Republican Army against the United 
Kingdom and the Palestine Liberation Organization against Israel are 
illustrations.  
Most states would like nothing better than for terrorists to act symmetrically and 
resort to open battle, which would make them vulnerable to the state’s superior 
conventional military forces. On the other hand, terrorists may also seek to provoke a 
symmetrical response: the purpose of many terrorist attacks is to provoke governments 
into actions that antagonize ordinary citizens such as restrictive security measures or even 
reprisals in kind. These acts undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the government 
                                                 
215 There is a long tradition of military theory involving asymmetrical strategies. It appears in Chinese 
military theory most prominently in Sun Tzu and in the works of Mao Zedong. A particularly clear 
discussion appears in Edward O'Dowd's and Arthur Waldron's, "Sun Tzu for Strategists," (Comparative 
Strategy 10 [1991]:25–36). British military thinker B. H. Liddell Hart propounded asymmetry in his theory 
of the "indirect approach" most powerfully in his books, The British Way in Warfare (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1932); The Ghost of Napoleon (London: Faber and Faber, 1933), and Strategy (New York: Praeger, 
1954). See also Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (trans. Samuel B. Griffith [New York: Oxford University Press, 
1971]) especially the introduction written by Griffith.  
216 David Brannan and Anders Strinberg, “The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security” 
(lecture,  Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Shepherdstown, WV, 2007). 
 132
and play into the hands of the terrorist strategy. Because of the fundamentally different 
natures of the adversaries, the political effects of these similar actions are dramatically 
different.  
Most real-world strategies are a mixture of symmetrical and asymmetrical 
elements, and it is often difficult to determine the overall balance between them. Thus 
any discussion of symmetry or asymmetry in war is a matter of degree as well as kind. 
The usefulness of the concept is that it helps to analyze the dynamics of a struggle. For 
example, the American strategy of deterrence and containment during the Cold War 
always involved strong elements of both symmetry and asymmetry.  
From a military standpoint, Eisenhower’s massive retaliation policy was 
fundamentally an asymmetrical strategy: the United States would reply to any type of 
Soviet aggression “by means and at places of our own choosing.”217This was generally 
interpreted to mean a U.S. nuclear response to a conventional Soviet provocation. From 
the national strategic standpoint however, Eisenhower’s strategy was broadly similar to 
the Soviet Union’s in that both relied primarily on deterrence rather than on the actual 
application of military force.  
The Kennedy administration’s subsequent flexible response strategy was 
militarily a symmetrical strategy of matching the Soviets strength for strength. However, 
it also took advantage of economic and political asymmetries.218  
There is no innate advantage or disadvantage to either a symmetrical or 
asymmetrical strategy. The choice depends on the situation and on the constraints of time 
and creativity. The interplay between symmetry and asymmetry in any struggle is unique 
and covers a wide range of possibilities. In India’s post-World War II struggle for 
independence, for example, British military power was overthrown by the most 
asymmetrical approach imaginable: Gandhi’s campaign of nonviolence.  
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A particular strategy must take into account the similarities and differences 
between the opponents and must, when necessary or advantageous, seek to create new 
ones. The effective strategist is not biased in favor of either symmetry or asymmetry but 
is keenly aware of both and of the interplay between them.  
Deterrence means dissuading an enemy from an action by means of some 
countervailing threat. There are essentially two methods of deterrence: denial and 
reprisal. To deter by denial means to prevent an enemy’s action by convincing him that 
his action will fail. Conceptually, this is a symmetrical approach (although the actual 
means of denial may be either symmetrical or asymmetrical). For example, a state may 
deter conventional invasion by maintaining sufficiently credible forces to defend its 
borders. It may deter the use of poison gas by training and equipping its forces and 
population to function effectively in a chemical warfare environment. Terrorists may be 
deterred from attacks on airports by tight security.  
The second approach, reprisal, is conceptually asymmetrical. A nation or group 
may concede to the enemy that he is capable of taking what he wants from, but one seeks 
to convince him that his prize will not be worth the price he will pay for it. For example, 
a state weak in conventional forces may seek to deter enemy occupation by credibly 
preparing to wage a long, painful guerrilla war of resistance. Conventional invasion 
might also be deterred through the threat of nuclear retaliation.  
There are overlaps between denial and reprisal. Tight airport security may deter 
terrorists by convincing them either that their efforts will fail (denial) or that they will be 
caught and punished (reprisal). A demonstrated capability to wage chemical warfare may 
deter a gas attack both by denying the enemy an advantage and by threatening to retaliate 
in kind.  
As these examples indicate, in practice denial and reprisal are often more 
effective when applied in tandem. The ability of one side to deny its enemy an advantage 
cannot always be absolutely convincing, especially if the other side is inclined to take 
risks. Deterrence by denial also implies a certain passivity. An enemy may be willing to 
test the defenses if he believes that failure carries no further penalty. On the other hand, 
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while deterrence by reprisal compensates for some of the weakness of denial, reprisal has 
its own weaknesses. Retaliation, even if carried out successfully, may come too late to 
avoid suffering significant damage.  
Not all strategies are the product of conscious thought; after all, viruses have 
strategies (often very successful ones that handily defeat one’s own conscious efforts). 
Warfare is driven by politics at every level, and rational calculation is only one of many 
factors in politics. As a practical matter, most of the elements of any given strategy are 
predetermined by choices made long before the present conflict. 219 
Strategies by intent are those developed primarily through the rational 
consideration of options and their likely implications. Strategies by default, on the other 
hand, are those determined primarily by ideologies or by unconscious assumptions and 
prejudices that prevent strategists from considering all of their options in what we would 
consider a fully rational manner — they are driven by what one is rather than by what 
one thinks. While conceptually distinct, the two are rarely mutually exclusive; most 
strategies involve elements of both intent and default. Therefore, the first question one 
must ask when confronted with a strategic problem is often not “What should we do?” 
but rather “What are we doing?”  
Dictatorships have difficulty waging coalition warfare. However sensible it might 
be to cooperate with similar entities to overthrow the balance of power, dictatorships by 
their very nature demand that decisions be made unilaterally. They attempt to treat 
potential allies as servants, subordinating others’ interests completely to their own. 
Theocratic states, which find their justification for existence in the alleged demands of 
God, have similar difficulties in compromising.  
Liberal democracies, which are cooperative, compromising, balance-of-power 
entities internally, are much more likely than dictatorships or theocracies to demonstrate 
these same characteristics in their external relationships — and to attempt to treat very 
different kinds of political entities as if they shared those values.  
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What are described are, of course, only tendencies. Insightful and strong-willed 
leaders occasionally overcome such tendencies. Strategic analysts therefore must seek to 
understand which elements of their own and the enemy’s strategies are fixed by nature 
and which are subject to conscious change. A policy which seeks merely to convince the 
enemy to change his behavior (which is the case in most erosion strategies) will fail if he 
is incapable of change. A strategic concept that requires one to behave in a manner 
contrary to one’s nature has little likelihood of success, unless one is prepared to change 
one’s own character in the process.  
Usually, when one talks about the conscious formulation of a particular strategy, 
one is talking about a specific method of using specific means to reach specific ends. This 
is a strategy “tailored” to deal with a particular problem where the means are finely 
adapted to fit one’s ends, and vice versa. Because such strategies are by nature unique, 
there is little to be gained from discussing them in general other than noting them as a 
category.  
There are large classes of problems, however, which do not lend themselves to 
such tailoring. These problems usually fall into one or both of two categories:  
 One lacks the time to tailor a unique response to a specific problem. This 
can be the case in rapidly unfolding strategic problems or in cases where 
one is for some other reason (including stupidity or simple stubbornness) 
unwilling or unable to adapt.  
 One lacks the specific knowledge one needs in order to craft a unique 
strategy in response to a specific situation, but one recognizes the problem 
(or think one does) as being of a certain, familiar kind.  
In either case, the strategist is left with little option but to go with an existing 
strategy (an existing set of means and ends), whether or not it is truly appropriate to the 
specific problem.  
If , in the process of formulating strategy, ones runs into certain types of problem 
often enough, strategists, policy makers, and decision makers, including commanders, 
develop reflexes, standard operating procedures (SOPs), branches, and sequels, or simply 
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strategic habits and patterns, that are generally appropriate to that class of problem. 
Experience tells them that they will work more often than not.  
Consequently, nations and some groups create and maintain bureaucracies to 
maintain and administer these “iterative” strategies. In general, the purpose of iterative 
strategies is not to maximize success in every particular case, but rather to maximize 
success on the average and over the long run. In many cases, however, iterative strategies 
are designed not so much to solve a class of problem as to reliably gain time to find an 
appropriate, more specific solution.  
Iterative strategies are not fixed: They can be changed and improved, usually on 
the basis of experience. Learning by experience in war, however, is highly dependent on 
the famous “OODA Loop,” the iterative cycle of Observing, Orienting, Deciding, and 
Acting.220 The OODA Loop (for Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) is a concept applied 
to the combat operations, often at strategic level in both the military and commercial 
operations. It was created by military strategist and U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd in 
the 1960s. 
The OODA loop was first developed to describe the process of air-to-air combat, 
but obviously applies to any interactive competition. Each party to a conflict first 
observes the situation. On the basis of the observation, he orients; that is, he makes an 
estimate of the situation. On the basis of the orientation, he makes a decision. Then he 
implements the decision and acts. Because the action has created a new situation, the 
process begins anew. The party that consistently completes the cycle faster gains an  
advantage that increases with each cycle. His enemy’s reactions become increasingly 
slower by comparison and therefore less effective until, finally, he is overcome by events 
(see Figure 2 below).221   
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Note how orientation shapes observation, shapes decision, shapes action, and in turn is shaped by the feedback and 
other phenomena coming into our sensing or observing window.
Also note how the entire “ loop” (not just orientation) is an ongoing many-sided implicit cross-referencing process 
of projection, empathy, correlation, and rejection.
From “ The Essence of Winning and Losing,” John R. Boyd, January 1996.
Note how orientation shapes observation, shapes decision, shapes action, and in turn is shaped by the feedback and 
other phenomena coming into our sensing or observing window.
Also note how the entire “ loop” (not just orientation) is an ongoing many-sided implicit cross-referencing process 
of projection, empathy, correlation, and rejection.
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Figure 2. The OODA “Loop”222 
 
Even though iterative strategies are more obvious at the tactical level, political 
entities do develop iterative strategies at the political/strategic level. These generally find 
expression, not within a single war, but over the course of many wars. Such a strategy’s 
immediate payoff in any particular case may be less than completely satisfying, but it can 
offer great advantages over the long-term. These strategies build a certain reputation, 
which may strongly influence the behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals. As a 
hypothetical example, an entity that habitually exterminates it enemies might find itself 
challenged infrequently. When war does occur, however, such an entity would encounter 
maximum resistance and hostility.  
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The United States pursues similar iterative strategies in its conduct of conflict 
resolution and war. Such strategies include decent treatment of prisoners, adherence to 
rigid military, informational, diplomatic/political, legal and law enforcement, 
intelligence, financial, and economic rules of engagement (ROEs), and strict observance 
of the international laws of warfare (jus ad bellum and jus in bello), respect for the 
independence of allies, relatively mild occupation policies, and the generous and 
systematic reconstruction of conquered states (as well as a persistent economic isolation 
of enemies the U.S. has failed, or not tried, to subdue).  
These policies often run counter to the emotions stirred by violence but are 
consistent with American moral precepts. They also reflect a recognition that wars end 
and that then one has to live with the survivors; human societies are far more tolerant of 
massive destruction and bloodshed in battle than they are of ill treatment afterwards.  
Further, as a practical matter, these policies make it more difficult for enemies to 
create and sustain firm popular resistance to American power and influence. They make it 
easier for other states to serve as American allies and help to minimize the impact of the 
“culminating point of victory” and other balance-of-power concerns. Combined with the 
American reputation for overwhelming firepower and a demonstrated willingness to use 
it in war, such policies have contributed greatly to America’s strategic success.  
Regardless of the strategy selected, it is critical that the strategists, policy makers, 
and decision makers responsible and accountable for developing and implementing the 
strategy fully understand the implications and ramifications of its execution; especially 
with respect to the opponent’s survival. 
Survival can therefore mean different things to different elements. It is 
strategists’, policy makers’, and decision makers’ task to isolate those elements — 
centers of gravity — of the enemy political system, if any, whose survival is intolerable 
to their end state. In implementing and executing the selected strategy, they must provide 
credible reassurances to the rest of the enemy’s population that the aims, goals and 
objectives, expectations, and desired end state do not threaten their survival.  
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If the aim is not the enemy’s complete destruction, he must be made to understand 
why submission to one’s demands will not be fatal. Even if one’s aim is truly the 
elimination of an enemy entity, it is not necessarily wise, let alone advantageous, to 
advertise that fact. A threat to its survival will provoke an entity to maximum resistance. 
A prior commitment to its eradication is wise only if that expressed goal is necessary in 
order to motivate one’s own people and allies.  
Not only do different entities define survival in different ways, they also tend to 
define their enemies’ survival in ways parallel to their own. This can lead to a profound 
misunderstanding of the strategic situation. The Confederate leadership in the American 
Civil War saw their goal, secession, as a purely defensive act that posed no threat to the 
survival of the northern Union. The Union leadership saw things differently.223  
As Lincoln indicated clearly in his Gettysburg Address, the sundering of the 
original Union called into question the validity of democratic institutions. National 
institutions that cannot maintain the integrity of the nation are by definition fatally 
flawed. Were the South’s secession accepted, there would be no logical basis on which to 
maintain the cohesion of the remaining states. Thus the Union would not survive 
secession, nor would the American dream of self-sustaining republican government “of 
the people, by the people, for the people.” Nor, for that matter, would the Lincoln 
administration itself survive defeat. The titanic Union war effort cannot be understood on 
any other basis.224 
Conversely, victory can be as hard to define as survival. At the strategic level, 
victory ultimately requires an end to the war and the reestablishment of peace. Logically 
speaking, victory in a strategic sense should mean the accomplishment of the specific 
political aims of the entity at war. In practice, however, the resort to war is often a 
mistake from which neither side truly benefits. In such cases, victory may mean merely 
ending the war on terms less unfavorable to oneself than to the enemy. In the aftermath of  
 
                                                 




the Second World War, the British Empire ceased to exist for all intents and purposes and 
transformed itself into the “Commonwealth.” France and Holland also lost their empires 
due to costs of the war. 
Therefore, because war is so dangerous and destructive, even to the victor, the 
only sensible goal of war is the establishment of a peace more favorable to an entity’s 
interests than could have been gained without recourse to warfare. Initial calculations 
may be proven erroneous by events, however. If the costs of continuing a military 
struggle come to exceed the value of the goal, meaningful victory is unattainable. As 
Clausewitz put it, since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its 
political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in 
magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the 
political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.225  
That this does not always happen is due in part to the fact that “senseless passion” 
is, in practice, seldom absent. Because one cannot put a precise or “dollar” value on most 
war aims, is it often difficult to perceive the point at which the cost of fighting exceeds 
the value of victory. Leaders may also flinch at the political cost of admitting their 
miscalculations. Further, entities at war may come to seek the thrill of victory for its own 
sake, for war’s excitement may become addictive to influential elements of society. As 
General Robert E. Lee put it, “It is well that war is so terrible, else we should grow too 
fond of it.”226 Union General William Tecumseh Sherman perhaps said it best ...”war is 
hell.”227 
In sum, strategy is the congregate application (the ways) of one or more of the 
instruments of national power (the means) to achieve success. In the Art of War, Sun Tzu 
says that “Victory is the main object of war.228 In On War, Clausewitz states that “the 
importance of the victory is chiefly determined by the vigor with which the immediate 
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pursuit is carried out. In other words, pursuit makes up the second act of the victory and 
in many cases is more important than the first. Strategy at this point draws near to tactics 
in order to receive the completed assignment from it; and its first exercise of authority is 
to demand that the victory should really be complete.”229 
Baron Antoine Jomini, a contemporary, and rival, of Clausewitz with service in 
the French and Russian armies during the Napoleonic wars, also gave modern U.S. theory 
and doctrine several terms. In his Art of War (translated by Charles Messenger and 
republished by Stackpole Books in 1996), Jomini was specific about how to plan a 
campaign.230 First, the national political-military leadership selected the theater of war. 
Next, the leadership identified and prioritized the decisive points in the theater. The 
selection of bases and zones of operation followed. Then one of these was designated the 
objective point. The line of operations was then the line from the base through the 
decisive points to the objective point.  
B. H. Liddell Hart, British veteran of the First World War and later an influential 
British military historian and theorist, advanced the idea that the military means is only 
one of the means of grand strategy and that strategy responsibility is to seek it [a military 
decision] under the most advantageous circumstances in order to produce the most 
profitable results. Although Jomini and Liddell Hart would be appalled at being 
compared with Clausewitz, this statement is similar to the Prussian’s comment, “Military 
activity is never directed against material force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously 
at the moral forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated.”231 In other words, 
military victory is the total and absolute defeat of the enemy and the enemy’s instruments 
of national power. 
The French general and theoretician Andre Beaufré provided another way to think 
about strategy. He was generally Clausewitzian in his acceptance both of the political and 
psychological natures of war and his characterization of war as a dialectic struggle 
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between opposing wills and was adamant that wars are not won by military means alone 
(destroying the enemy army) but only by the collapse of will. Most importantly, Beaufré 
recognized the criticality of non-military instruments, or elements of national power — 
political, economic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and informational — and 
that strategy was neither an exclusively wartime activity. 232 
To support his theory, Beaufre’ coined the term “total strategy” and defined it as 
the highest national level how the war would be fought and coordinated the application of 
all the elements of power. In order for a nation to execute its “total strategy,” Beaufre’ 
identified two general principles of strategy, which he borrowed from Clausewitz: 
freedom of action and economy of force.233 
For Beaufré, a nation’s “total strategy” could be executed in one of two modes: 
direct or indirect. According to Beaufre, all elements of power played in both modes, but 
the direct mode emphasized the military instrument. Indirect strategy, which he carefully 
distinguished from Liddell Hart’s indirect approach, used primarily the nonmilitary 
instruments to achieve political goals.234 
Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, U.S. Navy (ret.), who was influenced 
considerably by Jomini, sought to define the relationship between sea power and national 
greatness and secondly to establish some guiding principles of naval strategy and naval  
warfare. On the issue of sea power and national greatness, Mahan argued that a study of 
history revealed that the “mastery of the seas [sea control] had been a determinant of 
victory in war and of prosperity in peace.”235  
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To Mahan, sea power was the key to national greatness.236 In his most influential 
and celebrated work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783,237 he sought 
to demonstrate the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of 
nations.238 Mahan considered and defined sea power to include the overlapping concepts 
of command of the sea through naval superiority and that combination of maritime 
commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets that produces 
national “wealth and greatness.”239 
Although Mahan remains an important reference for maritime/naval strategists, 
the modern community of practitioners recognizes that sea power must be balanced with 
a strong economy, a stable and responsive government, a developed industrial base and a 
highly capable military force. Sea power is not enough in itself to achieve national 
greatness and is in fact wholly dependent upon a nation’s geography. If a nation’s 
geography is pertinent and appropriate, sea power should be considered as simply one of 
a number of measures that provides a means of protecting vital interests and enhancing 
autonomy and not a strategic planning panacea. 
Sir Julian Corbett provides a much more appropriate foundation for speculation 
about the future of sea power in the twenty-first century.240 Corbett, a lawyer and an 
historian, came to the study of naval strategy late in life. He is best remembered for his 
book Some Principles of Maritime Strategy which was published in 1911. 
In this work, Corbett developed a number of concepts relating to a general theory 
of war, the theory of naval war, and the conduct of naval war. Corbett theorized that 
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strategy needs to be consciously related to foreign policy and naval strategy to land 
strategy.241 Corbett saw that the reward for being strong at sea was the capacity it 
conferred to influence events ashore — for that was where events were actually decided. 
This led him to develop concepts that examined the role of sea power in the wider 
scheme of things.242  
Like Mahan, Corbett upheld the principle of command of the sea; sea control, and 
sea denial. He considered that the object of naval warfare must always be directly or 
indirectly either to secure command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing 
it.243 However, unlike Mahan, Corbett saw that the aim of command of the sea was to 
ensure the control of maritime communications and not the total destruction of an 
enemy’s fleet. To Corbett, command of the sea was a relative and not absolute concept. 
Rather he saw command as being asserted in theatres and used to prevent the enemy from 
disrupting one’s own communications.244 
Edward Luttwak is an American economist and historian, who has written 
extensively on strategic theory, focuses on attrition and maneuver as the forms of 
strategy. A post-Second World War theoretician, Luttwak is at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., senior associate, 
and has served as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National 
Security Council, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, and 
a number of allied governments as well as international corporations and financial 
institutions. He is also frequent lecturer at universities and military colleges in the U.S. 
and abroad and has testified before several congressional committees and presidential 
commissions. 
                                                 
241 Gough, “Maritime Strategy,” 58; Andrew Dorman, A., Mike L. Smith, and Matthew R.H. Uttley, 
The Changing Face of Maritime Power (London, U.K.: MacMillan Press, 1999), 5. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval 
Institute Press, 1988), 91-95. 
244 Gough, “Maritime Strategy”, 58; and Dorman, Smith, and Uttley The Changing Face, 5. 
 145
In Luttwak’s paradigm, articulated in his book, Strategy: The Logic of War and 
Peace 245 identifies five levels (technical, tactical, operational, theater strategic, and 
grand strategic) and two dimensions (vertical across levels and horizontal in levels) of 
operations and emphasizes two modes of operation (attrition and relational maneuver). 
Attrition is the application of superior firepower and material strength to 
eventually destroy the enemy’s entire force unless he surrenders or retreats. The enemy is 
nothing more than a target array to be serviced by industrial methods.246 
The opposite of attrition warfare is relational maneuver, “action related to the 
specifics of the objective.” The goal of relational maneuver, instead of physically 
destroying the enemy as in attrition, is to incapacitate his systems. Those systems might 
be the enemy’s command and control, his fielded forces, or even his doctrine, or perhaps 
the spatial deployment of his force, as in the penetration of a linear position.247 
Martin Van Creveld, in his book The Transformation of War, represents a 
segment of modern scholars that believe Clausewitz no longer explains why, how, or by 
whom wars are fought and that the world is seeing a decline of the nation-state, without a 
comparable decline in organized violence. Given this argument, the nature of the 
participants dictates the nature of the reasons they fight. Because the participants are not 
states, they will not be fighting for state-like reasons.  
To Van Creveld, war is no longer a rational political act conducted among states; 
if it ever was, and that future wars will be dominated by non-state actors. He points out 
that warfare waged by non-state actors dominated conflict in 1991 rather than the 
organized, political, interstate warfare between great powers that the international 
community seemed to expect (and Clausewitz seemed to predict). War is no longer 
fought by the entities one has always assumed fought wars. The combatants in modern 
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wars no longer fight for the reasons one has always believed. Finally, they do not fight in 
the manner one has always accepted as standard.248 
Van Creveld argued that Clausewitz’s model of war distinguishes between the 
affairs of the population, the army, and the government and criticizes this philosophy as 
too narrow and state-focused, thus inapplicable to the study of those conflicts involving 
one or more non-state actors. Instead, he proposed five key issues of war: by whom war 
is fought — whether by states or by non-state actors; what is war all about — the 
relationships between the actors, and between them and the non-combatants; how war is 
fought — issues of strategy and tactics; what war is fought for — whether to enhance 
national power, or as an end to itself; and why war is fought — the motivations of the 
individual soldier.249  
Like Luttwak and his nemesis Clausewitz, Van Creveld sees strategy as 
paradoxical. He believes pairs of paradoxes define strategy. If the object of war is to beat 
one’s opponent’s force with one’s own, then one must design maneuvers to pit strength 
against weakness. Because war is competitive, the enemy is doing the same thing, and 
one must conceal or protect our weakness from the opponent’s strength. Thus, the 
essence of strategy is “…the ability to feint, deceive, and mislead” because in the future, 
wars will be waged by groups of terrorists, guerrillas and bandits motivated by fanatical, 
ideologically-based loyalties; conventional battles will be replaced by skirmishes, 
bombings and massacres. Weapons will become less, rather than more, sophisticated.250  
Of note, Van Creveld is a contemporary of Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama, whose 
seminal work, The End of History and the Last Man, argued the neo-conservative 
                                                 




theory251 that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is 
largely at an end, with the world settling on liberal democracy and thus visualizing the 
eventual global triumph of political and economic liberalism. Having now distanced 
himself from the neo-conservative movement, he now argues that just as every other 
country does, the U.S. has a right to promote its own values in the world, but more along 
the lines of what he calls “realistic Wilsonianism,” [italics added] with military 
intervention only as a last resort and only in addition to other measures.252 
According to Fukuyama , a latent military force is more likely to have an effect 
than actual deployment. The U.S. spends more on its military than the rest of the world 
put together, but Iraq shows there are limits to its effectiveness. The U.S. should instead 
stimulate political and economic development and gain a better understanding of what 
happens in other countries.253 
The best instruments (or elements of national power), according to Fukuyama, are 
setting a good example, providing education, and, in many cases, money. The critical 
ingredient in sustainable national development and stabilization, be it political or 
economic, is that it never comes from outsiders, but always from people, the citizens, in 
the country itself in partnership with its government and national leadership.254 
According to Fukuyama, the one activity the U.S. proved to have consistently 
excelled at in the aftermath of the Second World War and throughout the Cold War was 
the formation of international political and economic institutions. He recommended a 
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return to support for these structures would combine American power with international 
legitimacy, but advises that such measures require a considerable patience.255 
Regardless of the course of action (i.e., ways) or the assets (i.e., means) 
employed, there are only two fundamental national strategic goals in any conflict: 
survival and victory. Any specific aims that the U.S. as a nation may pursue will reflect 
one or both of these two goals.  
Survival is the minimum goal of opponents and a prerequisite for victory. Victory 
is normally associated with the achievement of the political aims of the war, but it also 
requires an end to the war and the reestablishment of peace. The strategist must strive to 
understand what survival and victory mean in the specific situation at hand to each of the 
struggle’s participants.  
Survival is the continued existence of the political entity that is at war. However, 
survival can mean different things to different political entities. Survival often equates to 
the real or perceived continuance of a way of life or the well-being of the population.  
Threats to this type of survival are usually met with fierce resistance. The U.S. 
and its global partners appear to be encountering this phenomenon with respect to the 
current campaign against global extremists who are employing terrorist tactics, 
techniques, and procedures to gain and exercise political power in order to serve the 
greater good of their constituency.  
“The way forward” [quotations added] against the dominant threat facing the U.S. 
in the twenty-first century, first and foremost, is for the U.S. and its partners to create a 
more secure environment in which to combat extremism, radicalism, and terrorism while 
simultaneously guarding against, deterring, and containing state-based threats such as 
those posed by a resurgent and confident Russia and a growing and increasingly 
influential and capable China. Secondly, they must discredit and delegitimize those who 
use terrorism as means to advance their political ends. 
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Any effective U.S. policy framework must address the common ideological and 
political factors at the global and local levels. The U.S. and its partners must recognize 
that terrorism, particularly international terrorism, which is a small, artificially defined 
segment of political violence that represents the actions of very small groups, may be the 
dominant threat, but it remains but one of the threats the U.S. faces in the post-Cold War 
era of the twenty-first century. 
The U.S. and its partners must keep that in mind when looking for, and finding 
solutions to, root causes while simultaneously not being distracted from the plethora of 
threats generated by an increasingly globalized, interconnected, and integrated world.256 
Doing so will require the application of all of the nation’s instruments of national power 
— as military, informational (ideological), diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, 
intelligence, financial, and economic. 
Paraphrasing Brian M. Jenkins, armed force alone cannot win this war. The real 
battle is ideological. In the continuing campaign against today’s terrorists, insurgents, and 
guerillas; and for that matter, resurgent state competitors and rivals; political/diplomatic, 
ideological, financial, and economic warfare must be an essential part of America’s 
arsenal. It is not enough to outgun the terrorists and fellow travelers and those states that 
would wish to use them to their advantage and the disadvantage of the United States.257 
The U.S. and its partners must destroy the extremists’ appeal and halt their 
recruiting. It is not enough to kill or apprehend individual members. The ideology must  
be delegitimized and discredited. Most recently, this calculus was echoed by both 
Secretary of Defense Robert M Gates in a speech introducing the 2008 National Defense 
Strategy and a RAND study. 258 
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In another RAND study, the U.S. faces three key audiences in the struggle against 
terrorism: terrorists who attack the U.S., radical institutions that nurture terrorists, and 
sympathetic communities that harbor and support terrorists. Within each, the authors 
concluded that a confluence of anti-Americanism, radical Islam, and general support for 
political violence provides an environment in which terrorists can be nurtured or 
persuaded to conduct attacks against US targets. Strategic influence campaigns that 
delegitimize and discredit one or any combination of these audiences could help to 
disrupt this confluence. Doing so has the potential to reduce future support for al Qaeda 
and like-minded terrorists.259 Although, Anthony H. Cordesman stated that terrorism can 
never be totally eliminated as a tactic, but the ideology that drives organizations like al-
Qaeda can be discredited and its promoters isolated. 260 
Although the most pressing current threat involves especially radical extremists 
who employ terrorist tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures, recent events involving 
Russia, India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, Iran, and the Koreas illustrate that the 
global environment contains many threats to U.S. national security. In each of these 
events, there is a strong undercurrent involving the real or perceived survival of the 
nation-state and its people.  
As stated at the very beginning of this paper, national security refers to, and has 
referred to, the requirement of governments and civilian and military leaders to maintain 
the survival of the nation-state through the use of economic, military, and political power 
and the exercise of diplomacy – the instruments of national power. Methodologies to 
achieve and maintain the highest possible desired state of national security have been 
constantly and consistently developed and refined to establish, ensure, and maintain 
diplomatic, military, and economic security.  
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In some situations, the survival of a particular individual or group will take 
priority over the interests of the whole. In such a case, strategies that seek to compel 
submission by threatening the interests of the nation or of its people may have little direct 
impact. Finally, some political groups or ideological movements are willing to fight on, 
rationally or irrationally, until they are destroyed. Their hopes of survival lie in leaving 
behind a heroic legend to influence future generations or in making some other kind of 
lasting statement to humanity or God. For these groups, even the threat of annihilation 
may have little impact on their actions.  
Victory can be as hard to define as survival. Victory normally means the 
accomplishment of the specific political aims for which the group or nation went to war. 
In practice, however, victory may mean merely ending the war on terms less unfavorable 
to oneself than to the enemy. If the costs of continuing a military struggle come to exceed 
the value of the goal, meaningful victory is unattainable. Given the nature of war, 
however, such cost-benefit analysis is more easily described than accomplished.  
A major problem with victory as a goal is that victory, like defeat, is an emotion-
laden word. A compelling example is the recently released, and discussed previously, 
Medvedev Doctrine which articulates Russia’s historic concern about encirclement and 
envelopment and a real or perceived loss of freedom of action. Another is China’s 
increasing willingness to employ its burgeoning economy and excess investment capital 
to challenge the U.S. and the west, including Japan, for predominance in Asia and in the 
international market community. 
The accomplishment of limited military and political aims that do not satisfy the 
emotions or seem to justify the costs of the war may not feel like victory. Because one 
cannot precisely measure the value of most wars aims or accurately judge the cost of their 
attainment, it is often difficult to perceive the point at which the cost of fighting exceeds 
the value of victory. 
The main point in this discussion of survival and victory is that the problem of 
identifying what survival and victory mean to various participants in war can be 
extremely difficult. The analysis must involve a multitude of considerations that are 
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different in every conflict. A most important consideration therefore must be the national 
will — a political entity’s willingness to accept risk to achieve victory and its desired end 
state to ensure its survival and continued growth and prosperity. 
Each nation, state, or political entity has its own distinct character. This character 
is derived from a variety of sources: location, language, culture, religion, historical 
circumstances, and so forth. While national character is always evolving, changes 
generally occur only over the course of decades and centuries and may be imperceptible 
to the outside observer. As such, national character can be looked upon as a norm or 
constant. National character is akin to global climate patterns that change very slowly 
through history. 
Judging the national character of an adversary (or an ally) goes well beyond 
traditional orders of battle and related calculations regarding military and economic 
power. It requires consideration of national history, culture, religion, society, politics — 
everything that contributes to the makeup and functioning of a nation. The strategist must 
compile a complete dossier on a nation similar to that commonly prepared on enemy 
commanders. At the strategic level, success in war is facilitated by having a similar 
comprehensive psychological profile of each nation or political group involved in the 
conflict, including enemies, allies, potential enemies or allies, and even one’s own nation.  
It is of critical importance that sweeping dogmatic assertions do not govern the 
analysis of national characters. Such assertions often spring from ethno-centric attitudes 
and a failure to examine the true nature of a political presence. Rather, what is required is 
rational, objective, and informed thought about the makeup of a national character and its 
possible effects on a nation’s action or reaction to an event.  
When discussing strategy in the abstract, strategists, policy makers, decision 
makers, academics, and politicians often treat the ends, ways, and means permanent and 
fixed. In reality and practice, however, the community of strategic practitioners 
constantly adjusts, an in fact manipulates, both.  
Although ends have no natural upper limit, save the limits imposed by one’s 
material and psychological means, there is always a bottom limit to one’s aims, however, 
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defined by one’s conception of survival and freedom of action. The events of war, one’s 
own successes and failures, the lessons learned, new ideas, chance events, the entry of 
new contestants cause ends, ways, means and goals to shift. As resources increase, as one 
gains confidence in one’s abilities, as one find’s one’s enemy more vulnerable than 
originally imagined then the community of strategic practitioners tends to expand its 
goals.  
A pejorative term for this process is “mission-creep,” but it would be foolish for 
the strategist to ignore new opportunities simply because they were not covered in one’s 
original planning. On the other hand, when the community of strategic practitioners finds 
its resources or abilities inadequate, it reduces its ambitions, goals and objectives, ends, 
and end state to match. Fortunately, the resources (means) and courses of action (ways) to 
achieve one’s end state (ends) can be developed, given time, determination, and 
creativity. Means are adjustable to some degree at every level, and ends can affect the 
means available. 
Interestingly, although the public discussion of American interests changed 
dramatically with the September 11, 2001 attacks, the interests themselves have changed 
little, if at all. In particular, security of the homeland and the safety of the American 
population were always vital national interests even before the 2001 attacks.  
As the 1995 Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense put it: Since the founding 
of the Republic, the U.S. government has always sought to secure for its people a set of 
basic objectives: 
 The protection of their [Americans] lives and personal safety, both at 
home and abroad. 
 The maintenance of the nation’s sovereignty, political freedoms, and 
independence with its values, institutions, and territory intact. 
 Their [America] material well-being and prosperity.261 
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Similar phrasings can be found in most pre-9/11 American strategic documents; 
security of the homeland and the population hardly emerged as interests in 2001. As with 
American interests, few truly new threats to those interests have appeared in the last 
decade, and few have disappeared. Their relative severity has changed (certainly their 
perceived severity), but the list itself has not. 
As with American interests, few truly new threats to those interests have appeared 
in the last decade, and few have disappeared. Their relative severity has changed 
(certainly their perceived severity), but the list itself has not. Priorities, obviously, have 
changed and, in particular, “non-traditional” threats now receive much more prominent 
treatment than they did before 2001. But 2001 neither created new threats nor eliminated 
old ones.  
American power and influence is pervasive and multidimensional. All the 
instruments of national power are and must be deployed to combat a transforming world 
fraught with volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Yet the challenge of 
strategic integration, of bringing the instruments into coherent effectiveness in the pursuit 
of national interests, remains. U.S. BNSP and strategy must make use, individually and in 
combination, of its instruments of national power in order to “tame” the international 
environment’s transformative volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity and to 
frame and shape the international environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. This 
will be discussed the next chapter. 
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VIII. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: INTERESTS AND INTENT 
The fundamental purpose of the U.S.’s basic national security policy (BNSP) and 
its corresponding course(s) of action are to provide a comprehensive strategy that 
balances the ends, ways, and means of the instruments of national power to (1) achieve 
national security; and to (2) protect, preserve, and promote the American political, 
economic, and ideological way of life. U.S. BNSP is designed to shape the global 
environment and provide enduring security for the American people by exerting the full 
spectrum and reach of its instruments of national power — military, informational, 
diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic — on the 
international system at the international, state, group/organization, and individual levels 
in order to shape and control its external environment by detecting, deterring and 
preventing, and defeating current and emerging threats to the nation’s survival, vital, and 
important interests. 
The most fundamental task in devising a grand strategy is to determine a nation’s 
national interests. Once they are identified, they drive a nation’s foreign policy and 
military strategy; they determine the basic direction that it takes, the types and amounts 
of resources that it needs, and the manner in which the state must employ them to 
succeed. Because of the critical role that national interests play, they must be carefully 
justified, not merely assumed.262 When leaders are asking Americans to die, they have to 
be able to explain it in terms of the national interest.263 
Based on grand strategic decisions, U.S. political leadership provides (issues, 
communicates) national policy in the form of broad guidance (i.e., vision, intent) 
concerning America’s global role in pursuit of core national objectives. Interests are 
essential to establishing the objectives or ends that serve as the goals for policy and 
strategy. Interests are the foundation and starting point for policy prescriptions. They help 
answer questions concerning why a policy is important. National interests also help to 
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determine the types and amounts of the national power employed as the means to 
implement a designated policy or strategy.264 
Today, national security means more than the capacity to deter, fight, and win 
wars. In light of the characteristics of the international arena and contemporary conflicts, 
challenges to U.S. national security might take any number of non-traditional forms, from 
economics to unconventional operations and includes homeland defense, homeland 
security, national emergency preparedness, and incident management. Of course, the 
capacity to deter nuclear war and deter, contain, wage and decisively terminate 
conventional conflicts remains essential for the conduct of U.S. national security policy, 
even in the twenty-first century.  
In this new era, international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and effects 
(WMD-E) (including chemical and biological warfare), and information warfare have 
become increasingly important dimensions of national security. Consequently, national 
security policy must be carefully developed and implemented according to priorities 
distinguishing survival (i.e., vital) interests from others. 
Paraphrasing Sun Tzu, if almost everything is a matter of national security, then 
the concept of national security becomes virtually meaningless. If national security policy 
and strategy followed such a pattern, the United States would have to defend everything 
everywhere; as a result it would be unable to defend anything. Resources and personnel 
would be scattered across the globe and rarely be in a position to bring sufficient force to 
bear, even if survival were at stake. If everything is a priority, then nothing is a 
priority.265 
These answers were elusive at the start of the post-Cold War period and became 
even more complicated after September 11, 2001. This is because each generation of 
Americans seeks to interpret national values, national interests, and national security in 
terms of its own perspective and mindset. Although there is agreement about core 
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elements such as protecting of the U.S. homeland, interpretations differ about the 
meaning of national security, the nature of external threats, and the best course of conduct 
for security policy. This is to be expected that in a country with multiple power centers 
and shifting focal points; there will be different interpretations as well as outright 
differences.  
Whether Americans like it or not, they can neither withdraw from external 
responsibilities nor retreat to isolation. Regardless of the policies of any administration, 
the United States has links to most parts of the world: politically, economically, 
culturally, and psychologically. What the United States does or does not do has a 
significant impact on international politics. 
Short of clear threats to U.S. territory, Americans often disagree over priorities 
involving and/or relating to national interests. Even when there is agreement on priorities, 
there is disagreement on resource commitment and strategy. Yet a system of priorities 
provides a way to identify levels of threats and helps in the design of strategies. But all 
this must be guided by the meaning of national security and its conceptual dimensions. 
In a very generic sense, national interests are “that which is deemed by a 
particular state (actor) to be a…desirable goal.”266 The attainment of this goal is 
something that the identifying actor believes will have a positive impact on itself. 
Realization of the interest could enhance the political, economic, security, environmental, 
and/or moral well-being of a populace and the state (actor) or national enterprise to which 
the actor belongs.267 This holds true within the territory of the actor, as well as in any 
external relations that the actor may undertake outside of the administrative control of 
that actor.268 Interests, therefore, serve as the foundation and guiding direction for the 
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formulation of policy. For a nation state, there is more often than not a direct  
correlation between the nation’s interests and BNSP. 
Some political scientists, like Hans Morgenthau, believe that national interests are 
permanent features of the international system. Regardless of what government is in 
power, the interests of a nation state remain fixed components of the policymaking 
process. Other theorists have argued that interests are likely to be a diverse, pluralistic set 
of subjective preferences that change periodically, both in response to the domestic 
political process itself, and in response to shifts in the international environment. The 
national interest therefore is more likely to be what the policymakers say it is at any 
particular time.  
Using a portion of the preamble of the Constitution, all U.S. national security 
strategies have identified three core interests, all previously identified and discussed, that 
have remained timeless in some manner, shape, or form for the United States: “provide 
for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty 
to ourselves and our posterity.”269 These have been translated in those national security 
strategies into the modern day interests of: enhancing security at home and abroad 
(security), promoting prosperity (economic well-being), and promoting democracy and 
human rights (democratic values). 
For purposes of twenty-first century America, these three core interests have been 
defined as: 
 Security [italics added]: “Protection of the people (both home and abroad), 
territory, and institutions of the United States against potential foreign 
dangers.”270 This has always included defense of the American homeland. 
Domestically, it, pursuant to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP), would now include protection of critical infrastructure such as 
energy, banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water 
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systems, and cyber networks. America’s expansion into the world that 
began in the nineteenth century resulted in a broadening of the external 
portion of this core interest to now include components like protection 
against WMD proliferation, freedom of movement, access to key facilities, 
and assurance that U.S. national security institutions are transformed to 
meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.271 
 Economic Well-Being [italics added]: “Promotion of (American) 
international trade and investment, including protection of United States 
private economic interests in foreign countries.” The nineteenth century 
American entry onto the world stage also ensured that this core interest 
would evolve to now incorporate expanded global economic growth 
through free markets and trade, to include the advance of globalization.272 
 Democratic Values [italics added]: Until the twentieth century, this core 
interest was confined to ensuring that the domestic democratic process and 
associated values framed the traditional American tenets of “life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness.” The nation’s continued expansion into the 
world witnessed a change that in the twenty-first century can be said to 
include the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. 
All three of these, now twenty-first century core interests, have also evolved as a 
result of the American experience in the aftermath of the two world wars of the twentieth 
century into what can be considered a fourth core interest for the United States:273 
 Stable and Secure World Order: A favorable world order based on the 
“establishment of a peaceful international environment in which disputes 
between nations can be resolved without resort to war and in which 
collective security rather than unilateral action is employed to deter or 
cope with aggression.”274 Requirements for global stability in the twenty-
first century world would also include secure alliances and coalitions, the 
security of regions or countries in which the U.S. has a sizable economic 
stake, and the need to respond to humanitarian or other concerns, such as 
response to natural and manmade disasters, protecting the global 
environment, minimizing destabilizing refugee flows, and support for 
health problems like HIV/AIDS and food and water shortages. 
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As discussed previously in the chapter on International Relations Theory, there 
are multiple schools of thought on international relations and relationships and actor 
interactions and transactions. Consequently, it is not surprising that there are two 
dominant schools of thought on interests that are similarly aligned. 
The realist school of thought is founded on the premise that as a tool for the 
policymaker the national interest is intended to identify what is in the best interest of his 
state in its relations with other states.275 The term “best” is defined in terms of power and 
security. 
Realists view national security as the primary basis of a state’s national interest 
because of the threat of anarchy and constraints on sovereign states that are part of the 
international system. Anarchy in the international system would be manifested as 
disorder, disarray, confusion, or chaos. This could either be interpreted as a description of 
the general condition of the international system or as the absence of any authoritative 
institutions, rules, or norms that are more powerful than any sovereign state actor and, 
thus, have the ability to ensure security in the overall system.276 The result is a lack of 
security for the actors that are members of the system. For the national interest, the 
emphasis in realism is on doing what is primarily and almost solely to the advantage of 
that particular state actor. It is done with an express focus on power and security.  
In contrast, morality-based interests can be and are defined more broadly to 
encompass intangible values like human rights, freedom from economic deprivation, and 
freedom from disease.277 While military power could still be the national power element 
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of choice, morality-based interests would promote concepts such as “the values of 
national self-determination and economic egalitarianism.”278  
The last part of the twentieth century witnessed a surge in support for these kinds 
of morality-based interests through the execution of humanitarian intervention in places 
like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Humanitarian intervention is “armed 
interference in a sovereign state by [other states] with the…objective of ending or 
reducing suffering within the first state. That suffering may be the result of civil war, 
humanitarian crisis, or crimes by the first state including genocide.”279 Morality-based 
interests are not developed only to benefit the actor that crafts the interest. Rather, they 
are designed so other actors in the international system are also likely to benefit.280 
Given the complex world of the twenty-first century, neither one of these 
approaches is likely to be the sole rationale for why any given interest will be developed 
to guide policymaking. The bipartisan Commission on America’s National Interests 
assessed that the difference between realism and morality-based interests was more an 
alternative expression of valuation between the two has opposed to two dichotomous 
poles in contraposition to each other. The American people are oriented on the survival  
and well-being of the United States, while at the same time, owing much to historically 
embedded values, they are concerned about human rights and the welfare of individuals 
in other countries.281 
The issues associated with the twenty-first century world will require the crafter 
of national interests — the electorate, the elected government, and the media — to 
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simultaneously be both a pragmatic realist and an advocate of morality. Based on 
circumstances, sometimes one theoretical foundation will have greater influence than the 
other for the development of interests. With all of the many complex issues that will be 
present in the twenty-first century, this is likely to be true for American policymakers so 
long as the United States intends to maximize its influence on a global basis.282 
In the end, while some may believe as Lord Palmerston stated to the House of 
Commons in 1848 that “we have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. 
(Only) our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to 
follow,”283 the challenges and opportunities found in the twenty-first century will require 
the flexibility to craft interests that can work in this complex world, writ large. They may 
be rationalized in terms of either realism or a morality-based approach, or by a 
combination thereof in accordance with the particular circumstances of the issue. In turn, 
this rational determination is likely to drive how future policymakers decide to categorize 
and prioritize future interests. It will not be easy, but it must be done. 
U.S. national interests are expressions of U.S. values projected into the 
international and domestic arenas. The purpose of interests includes the creation and 
perpetuation of an international environment that is most favorable to the peaceful pursuit 
of U.S. values. It follows that these interests nurture and expand democracy and open 
systems. It follows logically that according to the March 2006 National Security of the 
United States of America, the best way to provide enduring security for the American 
people is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the 
needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.284 
Similarly, the United States wishes to prevent the expansion of closed systems by 
their use of force or indirect aggression. In the twenty-first century, the domestic arena 
has become an important consideration in pursuing national interests because of 
asymmetrical threats, the information age, and international terrorism — or at least actors 
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who employ terrorist tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to change in the 
status quo in which the disenfranchised are empowered by gaining and exercising 
political power — as well as catastrophic natural disasters such as Hurricanes Andrew 
and Katrina. 
Such concerns were heightened by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and 
increased with U.S. combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although the U.S. 
homeland has not experienced a successful attack since September 11, 2001, a number of 
threats have been detected, disrupted, and neutralized. 9/11 was not an anomaly: al-
Qaeda has struck American interests in the past, has vowed to attack the homeland again, 
and has attempted to do so several times since 9/11.285  
In sum, U.S. national security is the ability of national institutions, through the 
instruments of national power, to prevent adversaries from using force to harm America 
and Americans or their national interests and the confidence of Americans in this 
capability. In sum, homeland security is national security and national security is 
homeland security. 
Therefore, three statements serve as reference points. First, U.S. values as they 
apply to the external world are at the core of national interests. Second, pursuing national 
interests does not mean that U.S. national security strategy is limited to the homeland. 
This may require power projection into various parts of the world, especially when 
combating international terrorism. Third, the President, as Chief Executive, Commander 
in Chief, and Head of State, is the focal point in defining and articulating U.S. national 
interests.  
In specific terms, at the core of U.S. national interests is the survival of the 
homeland and political order. Therefore, national interests can be categorized in order of 
priorities as follows: 
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 First Order: Survival Interests. This requires protection of the homeland 
and areas and issues directly affecting this interest — Ensure physical 
[territorial and border] security, promotion of [political, economic, 
ideological, and cultural] values, and economic [domestic and 
international] prosperity; Dissuade, deter and contain, deny and disrupt, or 
defeat any potential peer competitor; Detect, deter and contain, discredit 
and delegitimize, deny and disrupt, and defeat all manners of adversaries; 
and Prepare for, protect against; deter, contain, and prevent; respond to, 
recover from all disruptive events regardless of their causality. This may 
require total military mobilization and resource commitment. In homeland 
defense, this also may require a coordinated effort of all agencies of 
government, especially in defense against terrorist attacks and information 
warfare.286 
 Second Order: Vital Interests. These are areas and issues that do not 
directly affect the survival of the United States or pose a threat to the 
homeland but in the long run have a high propensity for becoming First 
Order priorities. Critical interests are measured primarily by the degree to 
which they maintain, nurture, and expand open systems. Many also argue 
that moral imperatives are important in shaping national interests.287 
 Third Order: Important Interests. These are issues that do not critically 
affect First and Second Order interests yet cast some shadow over such 
interests. US efforts are focused on creating favorable conditions to 
preclude Third Order interests from developing into higher-order ones. All 
other interests are peripheral in that they have no immediate impact on any  
order of interests but must be watched in case events transform these 
interests. In the meantime, peripheral interests require few, if any, U.S. 
resources.288 
However, survival cannot be limited to the “final” defense of the homeland. In 
light of international terrorism and today’s weapons technology, weapons proliferation, 
and chemical/biological warfare, homeland survival means more than retreating to the 
borders and threatening anyone who might attack with total destruction. By then it is too 
late for national security policy to do much good, and in the new war, the attacker can be 
difficult to identify. If national interest is invoked only when the homeland is directly 
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threatened and survival is at stake, then the concept may be of little use, too late to 
overcome the peril. Hence, the need for any U.S. basic national security policy and 
strategy to embrace the concepts of presence and power projection; detect, deter and 
prevent, and defeat current and emerging threats to the nation’s survival, vital, and 
important interests overseas in theaters of operations distant from the U.S. homeland 
through forward presence and projection of power. 
U.S. national interests are formed and framed by U.S. national values. U.S. values 
are based on what is required for the philosophical, legal, and moral basis for the 
continuation of the U.S. system and “way of life.” These attributes are deeply engrained 
in the U.S. political system and domestic environment; they also apply to the way in 
which the public perceives justice in the international system and “just cause” in the 
conduct of war. In other words, values are principles that give the U.S. political system 
and social order their innate character; they provide substance to U.S. culture and create 
further principles upon which to base national interests. 
Modern U.S. values derive from the Judeo-Christian heritage, the Anglo-Saxon 
legacy (including the Reformation, the Renaissance, the philosophies of John Locke and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, among others, and the principles rooted in the American 
Revolution), the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution. From among these 
many historical reference points, there are at least six fundamental values that define the 
United States and its role in the international world.289 
 First, there is the right of self-determination, a dual concept in this context: 
it applies not only to the nation-state but also to people within that state. It 
is presumed that each nation-state has the right to determine its own policy 
and to govern in any way it chooses as long as it does not threaten 
neighbors or oppress its own people. At the same time, people within that 
nation-state also have the right of self-determination. From the US 
perspective, this means that through free and fair elections people in a 
nation-state have the right to determine how and by whom they will be 
ruled, with the option to replace rulers as they see fit. 
 Second, it follows that there is an inherent worth to any single individual 
in his/her relationship to others, to the political system, and to the social 
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order. Every person is intrinsically a moral, legal, and political entity to 
which the system must respond. Each individual has the right to achieve 
all that he or she can, without encumbrances other than protection of 
fellow citizens as well as homeland protection and survival. Individual 
worth must therefore be reflected in economic, political, and legal 
systems. 
 Third, rulers owe their power and accountability to the people, which is 
the essence of democratic political legitimacy. The people are the final 
authority: there is a continuing responsibility by elected and appointed 
officials to rule and function according to the moral and legal principles, 
and the right of the people to change leaders is absolute. In this respect, no 
consuming power can dominate government or establish its own rationale 
for rule. Furthermore, individual worth necessitates limited government 
with no absolute and permanent focal point of power. To ensure this, rule 
and governance must be open: decisions and policies must be undertaken 
in full public view, with input from a variety of formal and informal 
groups. The system of rule must be accessible to the people and their 
representatives. This is the essence of what are called “open systems.” 
 Fourth, policies and changes in the international environment must be 
based on the first three values outlined above. Thus peaceful change 
brought about by rational discourse among nation-states is a fundamental 
value. Resort to war can be acceptable only if it is clearly based on 
homeland protection and survival or other core values, and only if all other 
means have failed. In this respect, diplomacy and state-to-state 
relationships must be based on mutually acceptable rules of the game. 
 Fifth, any system professing such values and trying to function according 
to their principles must be protected and nurtured. Nation-states whose 
values are compatible with U.S. values are thought to be best served by an 
international order based on those same values.  
 Sixth, U.S. values are grounded in the Judeo-Christian heritage that 
predated the founding of the republic in the late eighteenth century. For 
many Americans, this instills a sense of humanity, a sensitivity to the 
plight and status of individuals, and a search for divine guidance. These 
precepts add a dimension to what is seen to be proper and just in the minds 
of many Americans and are considered by many to be beyond the legal 
definition of government.290 
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Although none of the literature suggests that these values are perfectly embodied 
in the U.S. system, there are many historical examples of value distortions and their 
misuse to disguise other purposes, these values are esteemed in their own right by most 
Americans and are embodied in the political-social system. Furthermore, the system of 
rule and the character of the political system have institutionalized these values, albeit 
imperfectly.  
The expectations of most Americans and their assessment of other states are, in no 
small measure, based on these values and they, in conjunction with U.S. survival, vital, 
and important national interests, form the basis for the goals and objectives, the end 
states, articulated in the current (March 2006) National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America: 
 Champion aspirations for human dignity; 
 Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks 
against us and our friends; 
 Work with others to defuse regional conflicts; 
 Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 
 Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free 
trade; 
 Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the 
infrastructure of democracy; 
 Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global 
power; 
 Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges 
and opportunities of the twenty-first century; and 
 Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.291 
Although the U.S. war against terrorism became the dominant theme in 2001, 
spelled out in the Bush Doctrine of President George W. Bush, such matters now are 
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magnified and complicated by U.S. combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; the on-
going “troubles” with Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea; the reemerging competition with 
Russia; and a variety of other issues linked to homeland security — energy, illegal 
immigration, the economy, natural disasters, etc. All of these issues go beyond the new 
kind of period of tension, conflict, and perhaps war.  
The U.S. national interest is to promote U.S. values and objectives. To promote 
these means to protect them by establishing and implementing effective national security 
policies. 
A core responsibility of the U.S. government is to protect the American people — 
in the words of the framers of the Constitution, to “provide for the common defense.” 
Today, the United States, its allies, and its partners face a spectrum of challenges, 
including violent transnational extremist networks, hostile states armed with weapons of 
mass destruction, rising regional powers, emerging space and cyber threats, natural and 
pandemic disasters, and a growing competition for resources.  
The U.S. national security establishment must respond to these challenges while 
anticipating and preparing for those of tomorrow. It must balance strategic risk across our 
responses, making the best use of the tools at hand within the U.S. government and 
among international partners. To succeed, the U.S. must harness and integrate all aspects 
of national power and work closely with a wide range of allies, friends, and partners — 
and occasionally adversaries and enemies. 
A United States at war against terrorism and the notion of a new concept of war 
have become intermixed with globalization, economic expansion, homeland security, and 
the attempt to pursue U.S. values peacefully. In this new environment, U.S. national 
security policy and priorities have become complicated, often ambiguous, and even 
inconsistent — not because of immediate threat of major conventional war but rather the 
unpredictable, uncertain, and confusing characteristics of the international arena. 




U.S. role around the world, the terrorist threat and the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
technology seem to have overshadowed much of the traditional perspectives also, at least 
for the foreseeable future.292 
U.S. national security is the ability of national institutions — military, 
informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and 
economic instruments of national power — to prevent adversaries from using force to 
harm Americans or their national interests and the confidence of Americans in this 
capability. There are two dimensions of this definition: physical and psychological. 
The first is an objective measure based on the strength and military capacity of the 
nation to challenge adversaries successfully, including going to war if necessary. This 
also includes a more prominent role for the geographic, demographic, natural resources, 
informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and 
economic instruments of national power and other non-military measures as well as the 
ability to use them as political-military levers in dealings with other states.  
The psychological dimension is subjective, reflecting the opinion and attitudes of 
Americans on the nation’s ability to remain secure relative to the external world. It is the 
national will. It affects the people’s willingness to support government efforts to achieve 
national security goals and objectives — ensuring physical (territorial and border) 
security, promoting of political, economic, ideological, and cultural values, and ensuring 
economic (domestic and international) prosperity. Underpinning this is that the majority 
of people have the knowledge and political will to support clear policies to achieve clear 
national security goals. 
For the United States, the purpose of its BNSP is to prevent conditions 
detrimental to the United States and maintain relations with other countries to enhance 
conditions favorable to U.S. national interests. The instruments of national power , and 
thus national security policy and strategy, are primarily military, informational, 
diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic diplomatic 
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and political, but include to one degree or another, geography, natural resources, and 
population demographics and the all-encompassing subtleties of the national will. 
America’s concept of national security today is infinitely more complex than at 
any time in its history. The same is true for the relationship between the foreign and 
domestic components of national security.  
Until recently, most Americans felt that U.S. values could not be imposed on 
other states unless survival was at stake. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001; 
the March 11, 2004 train bombings in Madrid, Spain; and the July 7, 2005 attacks in 
London, not to mention the real and perceived threats posed illegal immigrants, 
narcotraffickers, gangs, and organized crime, cyber and identity attackers, energy 
insecurities, economic and financial recession, and the media’s coverage of successfully 
interrupted, disrupted, and thwarted threats, national security is now seen by many to 
include the projection of U.S. values abroad. This adds to the confusion and highlights 
the interrelationship among foreign, domestic, and national security policies.293 
The difficulties of determining U.S. national interests and establishing national 
security priorities are compounded by the increasing linkages between a number of 
national security and domestic policies. The domestic economic impact of certain 
national security policies links U.S. domestic interests and policies to the international 
security arena. This is seen in economic sanctions, embargos on agriculture exports to 
adversaries or potential adversaries, diminished foreign oil sources, border security, and 
the export of technologically advanced industrial products. And in a dramatic way, 
September 11, 2001 obscured dramatically, and perhaps forever, the distinction between 
domestic (i.e., homeland defense, homeland security, and national emergency 
preparedness) and national security policy.294  
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Owing to the special characteristics of the U.S. democratic system and political 
culture, it is increasingly difficult to isolate national security issues from domestic policy. 
Besides the relationship and link between foreign and national security policies, domestic 
interests are important in establishing national security priorities and interests. Some 
scholars call these “intermestic” politics and policies.295 Nonetheless, national security 
policy by definition normally involves the use or the threat to use military force. 
Distinctions must be made between foreign and domestic policy and national security.  
The primary distinction rests in the likelihood of military force as well as in use of 
the military as the primary instrument for implementing national security policy. These 
observations are the basis for defining national security policy, expanding on the concept 
of national security: National security policy is primarily concerned with formulating and 
implementing national strategy involving the threat or use of force to create a favorable 
environment for U.S. national interests. An integral part of this is to prevent the effective 
use of military force and/or covert operations by adversaries or potential adversaries to 
obstruct or deny the ability of the United States to pursue and protect national 
interests.296 In light of the characteristics of the international arena and contemporary 
conflicts, challenges to U.S. national security might take any number of nontraditional 
forms, from economics to unconventional operations.  
Of course, the capacity to deter nuclear war and wage conventional conflicts 
remains essential for the conduct of U.S. national security policy, even in the twenty-first 
century. In this new era, international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and effects 
(WMD/E) (including chemical and biological warfare), and information warfare have 
become increasingly important dimensions of national security. 
First, the stark limitation of military power alone to resolve conflicts across the 
spectrum, from terrorism and insurgency to regional war, is obvious. Second, the erosion 
of a compelling American position of leadership and the failed illusion of democracy as a 
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global force for stability limits the United States’ ability to influence international 
relations. Third, slowing U.S. economic growth, precarious national fiscal health, and 
spiraling program costs continue to constrain force structure. Fourth, globalization is 
making commerce and information the coins of the realm, but areas that benefit least 
from them are rife with resource competition and potential extremist ranks. Fifth, U.S. 
conventional military supremacy spurred state and non-state actors toward asymmetric 
capabilities and stratagems, including show-stopper weapons and technologies, putting 
America on the horns of a vulnerability dilemma. Finally, the ambiguous nature of non-
state adversaries and the plethora of nonmilitary targets available to them diminish the 
relevance of conventional forces, no matter how lethal or precise.297 
The leadership intent of U.S. BNSP is to protect, preserve, and promote the 
American political, economic, and ideological way of life, shape the global environment, 
and provide enduring security for the American people against a broad and diverse 
spectrum of threats to U.S. national security and U.S. core interests. The spectrum 
includes foreign and domestic terrorism, state-based threats and non-terror-related 
threats, including weather, earthquakes, and man-made disasters. The dominant 
contemporary threat facing the U.S. is the transnational threat; specifically, but not 
limited to, the extremist Islamist threat. This transnational threat must be considered as 
permanent for at least the foreseeable future. In addition, the U.S. must guard against 
ascendant potential peer competitors such as Russia and China. 
U.S. BNSP must ensure physical (territorial and border) security and sovereignty, 
(political, economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and economic (domestic and 
international) prosperity of the United States. To do so, it must protect the American 
people and American interests (worldwide), anticipate and counter threats, use all of the 
available instruments of national power to detect, deter, prevent and contain, deny and 
disrupt, and defeat threats that could do grave damage to the U.S. and its interests, and 
avoid seriously weakening the U.S. economy or undermining the (American) 
fundamental values and institutions. 
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The BNSP must be able to: 
 Defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks against the U.S. and its allies 
and partners;  
 Defend against and defeat WMD/E and missile threats before they are 
acquired and employed;  
 Protection against and mitigate the effects and consequences of WMD/E if 
used;  
 Convince adversaries that they cannot achieve their goals with WMD/E 
and deter and dissuade them from attempting to use or even acquire these 
weapons in the first place;  
 Expand economic liberty and prosperity; promote free and fair trade, open 
markets, a stable financial system, the integration of the global economy, 
and secure, clean energy development;  
 Build and sustain strong, flexible alliances; and  
 Advance human dignity in word and deed by speaking out for freedom 
and against violations of human rights and allocating appropriate 
resources to advance these ideals. 
The intent of U.S. BNSP is to: 
 Protect the United States from direct attack; protect the sovereignty, 
territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure of the United 
States against threats and aggression;  
 Anticipate, detect, deter, prevent and contain, deny and disrupt, and defeat 
attacks on the United States, its friends, and allies;  
 Defeat aggression promptly and decisively by preventing conflict and 
surprise attack and prevailing against adversaries;  
 Maintain the strength and diversity of the U.S. economy and the nation’s 
fundamental values and institutions; expand economic liberty and 
prosperity by promoting free and fair trade, open markets, a stable 
financial system, and the integration of the global economy; and  
 Increase U.S. influence and access to markets and resources by building 
and sustaining strong, flexible alliances and promoting regional stability 
and spreading democracy.  
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It must concurrently prevent, deter and contain, deny and disrupt, combat and 
defeat terrorism, subversion, and terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce 
America’s vulnerability to terrorism and minimize the damage and recover from attacks 
that do occur; block or roll-back the proliferation of chemical, biological, nuclear, and 
radiological weapons (of mass destruction and effect) and take actions to counter their 
use as instruments of intimidation or war; and achieve and maintain the highest level of 
preparedness in order to protect against, prevent if possible, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist, catastrophes, man-made and natural hazards, and other disruptive events that 
affect the security of the United States. 
Simultaneously, U.S. BNSP must guard against and prevent outright defeat and 
capitulation — military, political and diplomatic, economic and financial, informational 
and ideological, intelligence, and law enforcement — and humiliation; failure, but not 
outright defeat, that results in a withdrawal, reduction of and/or loss of freedom of action, 
loss of prestige, reduction in and/or loss of politico-economic influence and leverage, 
reduction in and/or loss politico-military leverage and influence, etc.; continued, and 
potentially increased, attacks against the nation’s survival, vital, and important interests; 
citizens, facilities, and properties; and institutions, icons, and infrastructures; uncertainty 
in the ability to fully ensure the nation’s physical (territorial and border) security and 
sovereignty, promotion of (political, economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and 
economic (domestic and international) prosperity; inability to respond to, defend against, 
and recover from other domestic and international contingencies because of a lack of 
situational awareness (i.e., visibility) and the over commitment of resources and assets; 
national and international political embarrassment; negative impacts on the domestic 
economy and financial markets; civil unrest and disobedience and political, economic and 
financial, and ideological and cultural instability; loss of allies and partners; and the 
forced withdrawal from forward facilities. It must also guard and protect against the 
concomitant loss of ability to detect, deter and prevent, and defeat current and emerging 
threats to the nation’s survival, vital, and important interests overseas in theaters of 
operations distant from the U.S. homeland through forward presence and projection of  
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power; the loss of affordable access to vital raw materials, commodities, and services; 
and negative, derogatory, and prejudicial domestic and foreign media exposure and 
impact. 
U.S. BNSP must be able to achieve and maintain the core national interests — 
ensure the physical (territorial and border) security of the nation, the nation’s (political, 
economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and the nation’s economic (domestic and 
international) prosperity — and core desired end state — provide for the enduring 
security for the American people — by exerting the full spectrum and reach of its 
instruments or elements of national power in peace and in war. Accomplishing these 
actions requires the selection of a course of action that suitable, distinguishable, 
acceptable, feasible, and complete. 
America’s instruments or elements of national power are the taproot of its 
international influence and the ultimate guarantor of its security.298 Those who wish to 
challenge the U.S.’ position and actions in the international environment and with the 
global community must first acknowledge it power and reach. 
In addition, U.S. allies, partners, competitors, adversaries, and enemies must also 
acknowledge the four entrenched threads of American character: a belief in the ethical 
importance of American instruments or elements of national power as means and ends in 
themselves; a belief in the universal applicability of liberal values and institutions to 
mankind; a belief in the ethic of reciprocity as a normative means to achieve positive 
interactions among nations; and a belief in the value of maintaining strategic flexibility in 
an increasingly complex strategic environment. These ethical and value-based tenets are 
constants which historically influenced U.S. international behavior through the medium 
of four international relations theories: classical realism, classical liberalism, 
isolationism, and idealism. 
To paraphrase Sun Tzu, if almost everything is a matter of national security, then 
the concept of national security becomes virtually meaningless … If everything is a 
priority, then nothing is a priority. Adopting this strategic philosophy and mission 
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analysis paradigm dilutes the visibility of the core national interests and core national end 
state. It also retards the nation’s ability to exert the full spectrum and reach of its 
instruments or elements of national power to protect, preserve, and promote the American 
political, economic, and ideological way of life and shape the global environment and 
provide enduring security for the American people. In sum, it makes an already complex 
environment complicated.299 
Therefore, as strategy tends to be long term in its development, its execution, and 
its effects, early and accurate selection of an appropriate overarching goal is the critical 
keystone for creating and executing successful strategy. Thus, with adequate focus on the 
appropriate goal, much can be accomplished with little; but absent a specific, clear, 
attainable, and unifying goal, little may be accomplished despite great exertion. 
Therefore, it is critical and essential that the leadership must identify and pursue clearly 
defined and attainable goals, consistent with national values, whose achievement best 
furthers the national interest(s).  
The objective of national policy is to achieve unity of effort across the agencies of 
government. The process begins with formation of a shared conception of the conflict. 
The conceptualization needs to be revisited as the conflict evolves. Second, enduring 
principles and long-term policies are derived from the conception. Policies drive roles 
and missions of the various agencies and determine adequacy of means, the instruments, 
in terms of numbers but more importantly in terms of balance. Ultimately, strategic ends, 
objectives, necessarily follow from the meaning of winning. 
The resulting BNSP and strategy statement should provide, as a minimum, four 
things: 
 A conception of the conflict, including 
 threat, 
 underlying causes, 
 U.S. interests and objectives, and 
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 strategy; 
 A process for overseeing the conflict through implementation; 
 Identification of the departments and agencies, and their capabilities (i.e., 
means and resources or the instruments of national power) that have roles 
to play; and 
 Assignment of roles and missions to those agencies. 
Departments and agencies have substantial capabilities (i.e., means and resources 
or the instruments of national power) at their disposal and have developed standard ways 
of applying those means. However, absent consensus on clear ends, which are derived 











of the Conflict "Win the War"
Figure 3.  From Conception to Winning 
 
This selection is not as simple as one might think. Strategic activities always 
involve every instrument of element national power and each has different strengths, 
weaknesses, corresponding opportunities, and challenges that come to bear depending 
upon the objective being pursued. Finally, national security strategists operate across 
organizations and disciplines and subject each potential objective and the ways to achieve 
it, to rigorous analyses that assess the costs, risks, and likelihood of success. Only after 
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completing such analyses can the strategist recommend objective(s) to the policymakers 
which best further the national interest and employ, alone or in combination, the strengths 
and capabilities resident in and represented by the instruments of national power which 
will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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IX. THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER  
A nation’s basic national security policy and strategy cannot be operationalized 
without the creation and maintenance of its national instruments of power. The 
instruments of national power are the means, or resources, which a nation, through its 
government, possesses to operationalize its power through its BNSP and strategy. Power 
is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others and the ability to influence the 
behavior of others to get a desired outcome. Power derives from strength and will. 
Strength comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities – the 
instruments of national power. The national will infuses objectives with resolve and 
accomplishes the objectives through the employment of the instruments of national 
power. 
The instruments of national power “fall” into two basic categories: 
 The natural, or dispositional, instruments of national of are geography, 
resources, and population. They focus on, are derived from, and are 
concerned with the number of people in a nation and with their physical 
environment. 
 The social, or situational and/or contextual, (i.e., environmental) 
determinants (economic, political/diplomatic, military, psychological, 
informational, finance, and law enforcement, or in contemporary U.S. 
parlance; military, informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, financial, 
and economic — MIDLIFE) of power focus on, derive from, and concern 
the ways in which the people of a nation organize themselves and the 
manner in which they alter their environment.300 
These categories, as well as the differentiation of the instruments of national 
power into “hard and soft” powers, will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. The 
key judgments found in the recently completed National Intelligence Council’s Global 
Trends 2025: A Transformed World and the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Homeland Security Threat Assessment: Evaluating Threats 2008–2013, articulated in  
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Chapter V, make very clear the importance and value of each and all of the instruments 
of national power, the means (resources) through which the selected course of action 
secures the desired end state. 
Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft 
seeks through strategy to magnify and operationalize the mass, relevance, impact, and 
irresistibility of power. It guides the ways the state deploys and applies its power abroad. 
These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of these 
three arts are the paladins of statecraft.301  
Historically, power has been measured by such criteria as population size and 
territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. But 
national power is historically inextricably linked with military capacity, a natural 
relationship since war in the international arena is the ultimate discriminator and ratio of 
power. In the purest sense, the means in war302 is combat — physically attacking and 
defeating the enemy or defending against and repelling his attacks.  
As discussed in detail in Chapter VI, VII, and VIII, strategy is the calculation of 
objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more 
favorable outcomes than might otherwise exist by chance or at the hands of others. 
Strategy is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as “the art and science of developing and 
employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to 
achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”303 
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However, war304 is not limited to purely military means. In fact, military means 
are only one instrument, one element used to implement a national strategy. The relative 
importance placed on the military element of the national strategy varies greatly 
depending on the nature and the particular circumstances of the struggle. All of the 
instruments of power, military, information, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, 
intelligence, finance, and economic — must be brought to bear and exploited to the 
fullest in conflict and/or war.  
Nevertheless, one element of power alone cannot determine national power. Hans 
Morgenthau calls the mistaken attempt to define national power in terms of one element 
of that power the “Fallacy of the Single Factor.”305 Another aspect of this fallacy is the 
failure to distinguish between potential and actual, or actionable, power. Part of the 
problem stems from the fact that the term “power” has taken on the meaning of both the 
capacity to do something and the actual exercise of the capacity. A nation’s ability to 
convert potential power into operational power is based on many considerations, not the 
least of which is the political and psychological interrelationship of such factors as 
government effectiveness and national unity.306  
As stated in the previous chapter, strategy, broadly defined, is the process of 
interrelating ends and means. When one applies this process to a particular set of ends 
and means, the product, that is, the strategy is a specific way of using specified means to 
achieve distinct ends.  
As stated in the chapters on strategy, strategy is both a process and a product. Any 
discussion of ends and means in war must begin with two basic points. First, as observed, 
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war is an expression of politics. The ends or goals of any party waging war, even though 
those goals may be social, economic, religious, or ideological in nature, are by definition 
political goals. Second, wars are fought by political entities (political entities do not have 
to be recognized sovereign states) that have unique characteristics and often very 
dissimilar goals and resources. In order to understand any conflict, one must appreciate 
the ways in which the means and ends of the participants may vary.307 
In a conflict or a war, the national strategy focuses the instruments of national 
power308 on achieving its political ends or objectives as articulated by the political 
leadership. Military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, 
financial, and economic actions are linked through supporting strategies that contribute to 
attaining the objective of national strategy. 
Strategists must be able to analyze the overall strategic situation and appreciate 
the larger context in which military strategy is executed. In order to formulate and 
implement an effective military strategy, they must understand the ends and means of the 
larger national strategy as well as the strategies of the enemy, allies, and related neutral 
parties (see Figure 4 below). 
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Figure 4. Relationship of Political Objectives to National Strategy and Supporting 
Strategies309 
 
Presidents and their national security staffs, as do the leaders of other political 
entities, strive to achieve coherence, with varying levels of success through use of the 
“interagency process.” However, the interagency decision making process, across 
organizations and disciplines, and between jurisdictions, is uniquely American in 
character, size, and complexity. 
Given ever expanding responsibilities and the competition for resources, the 
instruments of national power, it is imperative that national security professionals master 
the National Security Council System in order to work effectively within it. The complex 
challenges to national security in the twenty-first century will require intelligent 
integration of resources and unity of effort and purpose within the government. It is also 
imperative that changes be made to make the system and the process more effective 
Grand strategy seeks the seamless integration of all aspects of national power to 
achieve a desired policy goal. The model is named the “Instrument-Element Model” 
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because it focuses on the essential elements which underlie the instruments of power by 
which competitors, rivals, and belligerents contend and interact with each other.310 Each 
actor is described and modeled by three elements: the people, the government and the 
military. Competitors, rivals, and belligerents, even allies, partners, associates, and 
neutrals, affect each other using the instruments of national power — military, 
information, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and 
economic.311  
A nation’s instruments of national power are more often than not grounded in the 
natural determinants (geography, resources, and population) of power. The development, 
maintenance, and application of a nation’s instruments of national power are wholly 
political in accordance with Clausewitz’s “remarkable” (and paradoxical) trinity of 
forces: irrational forces (violent emotion, i.e., “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity”); 
non-rational forces (i.e., forces not the product of human thought or intent, such as 
“friction” and “the play of chance and probability”); and rationality (war’s subordination 
to reason, “as an instrument of policy”).312 
Using the “social contract theory”313 tenets and underpinnings of the 
Enlightenment ca. 1648-1815), particularly Thomas Hobbes and to a lesser degree Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Clausewitz connects each of those forces “mainly” [quotations added] 
to one of three sets of human actors: the people, the army, and the government. 
The people are paired mainly with irrational forces — the emotions of primordial 
violence, hatred, and enmity (or, by implication, the lack thereof — clearly, it is quite 
possible to fight and even win wars about which one’s people do not give a damn, 
especially if that is the case on both sides.). The Hobbesian state of nature, that is, a 
condition without government. Perhaps one would imagine that people might fare best in 
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such a state, where each decides for herself how to act, and is judge, jury and executioner 
in her own case whenever disputes arise — and that at any rate, this state is the 
appropriate baseline against which to judge the justifiability of political arrangements.  
Hobbes terms this situation the condition of mere nature: 
…a state of perfectly private judgment, in which there is no agency with 
recognized authority to arbitrate disputes and effective power to enforce 
its decisions ... Dissolute condition of masterless men, without subjection 
to laws, and a coercive power to tie their hands from rapine, and revenge 
would make impossible all of the basic security upon which comfortable, 
sociable, civilized life depends ...there would be no place for industry, 
because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the 
earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by 
sea; no commodious building; no Instruments of moving and removing 
such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; 
no account of time; no arts; no letters; and which is worst of all, continual 
fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short ... If this is the state of nature, people have strong 
reasons to avoid it, which can be done only by submitting to some 
mutually recognized public authority, for “so long a man is in the 
condition of mere nature, (which is a condition of war,) as private appetite 
is the measure of good and evil.314 
The army (which refers, of course, to military forces in general) and its 
commander are paired mainly with the non-rational forces of friction, chance, and 
probability. Fighting organizations deal with those factors under the creative guidance of 
the commander (and creativity depends on something more than mere rationality, 
including, hopefully, the divine spark of talent or genius). 
According to Hobbes, taken together, these plausible descriptive and normative 
assumptions yield a state of nature potentially fraught with divisive struggle. The right of 
each to all things invites serious conflict, especially if there is competition for resources, 
as there will surely be over at least scarce goods such as the most desirable lands, 
spouses, etc. People will quite naturally fear that others may (citing the right of nature) 
invade them, and may rationally plan to strike first as an anticipatory defense. Moreover, 
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that minority of prideful or “vain-glorious” persons who take pleasure in exercising 
power over others will naturally elicit preemptive defensive responses from others. 
Conflict will be further fueled by disagreement in religious views, in moral judgments, 
and over matters as mundane as what goods one actually needs, and what respect one 
properly merits. Hobbes imagines a state of nature in which each person is free to decide 
for herself what she needs, what she’s owed, what’s respectful, right, pious, prudent, and 
also free to decide all of these questions for the behavior of everyone else as well, and to 
act on her judgments as she thinks best, enforcing her views where she can. In this 
situation where there is no common authority to resolve these many and serious disputes, 
we can easily imagine with Hobbes that the state of nature would become a “state of 
war”, even worse, a war of “all against all.”315 
The government is paired mainly with the rational force of calculation — policy 
is, ideally, driven by reason. This corresponds to the famous argument that “war is an 
instrument of policy.” Clausewitz knew perfectly well, however, that this ideal of rational 
policy is not always met: “That [policy] can err, subserve the ambitions, private interests, 
and vanity of those in power, is neither here nor there.... here we can only treat policy as 
representative of all interests of the community.”316 
The normative social contract, argued for by Rousseau in The Social Contract 
(1762), is meant to respond to this sorry state of affairs and to remedy the social and 
moral ills that have been produced by the development of society. According to Rousseau 
, since a return to the state of nature is neither feasible nor desirable, the purpose of 
politics is to restore freedom to us, thereby reconciling who we truly and essentially are 
with how we live together. Rousseau maintains, by submitting our individual, particular 
wills to the collective or general will, created through agreement with other free and 
equal persons. Like Hobbes and Locke before him, and in contrast to the ancient 
philosophers, Rousseau posits that all men are made by nature to be equals, therefore no 
one has a natural right to govern others, and therefore the only justified authority is the 
authority that is generated out of agreements or covenants. The most basic covenant, the 
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social pact, is the agreement to come together and form a people, a collectivity, which by 
definition is more than and different from a mere aggregation of individual interests and 
wills. This act, where individual persons become a people is “the real foundation of 
society.” Through the collective renunciation of the individual rights and freedom that 
one has in the state of nature, and the transfer of these rights to the collective body, a new 
‘person’, as it were, is formed. The sovereign is thus formed when free and equal persons 
come together and agree to create themselves anew as a single body, directed to the good 
of all considered together. So, just as individual wills are directed towards individual 
interests, the general will, once formed, is directed towards the common good, 
understood and agreed to collectively. Included in this version of the social contract is the 
idea of reciprocated duties: the sovereign is committed to the good of the individuals who 
constitute it, and each individual is likewise committed to the good of the whole.317 
Most importantly, national power is relative, not absolute. Simply put, a nation 
does not have abstract power in and of itself, but only power in relation to another actor 
or actors in the international arena. 
Power is sometimes material in nature: the economic power of money or other 
resources, for example, or possession of the physical means for coercion (weapons and 
armed personnel). Power is just as often psychological in nature: legal, religious, or 
scientific authority; intellectual or social prestige; a charismatic personality’s ability to 
excite or persuade; a reputation, accurate or illusory, for diplomatic or military strength.  
Power provides the means to attack and the means to resist attack318. Power in 
itself is neither good nor evil. By its nature, however, power tends to be distributed 
unevenly in ways that vary greatly from one society to another.  
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Closely allied to all this is the fact that national power is dynamic, not permanent. 
No particular power factor or relationship is immune to change. In this century, in 
particular, rapid changes in military technologies (i.e., “revolutions in military affairs or 
RMAs”) have accelerated this dynamism as have similar revolutions across the spectrum 
of human pursuits and endeavors — economic, finance, industry and manufacturing, 
transportation, communications, technology, politics, philosophy, the law, and religion. 
These revolutions cause dynamic shifts to occur in relative potential and relative 
actionable power. Power, as Hobbes long ago pointed out, is what people believe it is 
until it is exercised. Reputation for power, in other words, confers power on a nation-state 
regardless of whether that power is real or not. At the same time, there are examples 
throughout history of nations that continued to trade on past reputations, only to see them 
shattered by a single event.319  
Power is, therefore, situational and not dispositional. Power is, therefore, 
contextual and relevant in the existing circumstances for the particular situation. Some 
elements of national power or combinations of power cannot be applied to certain 
situations involving certain actors. Some elements of national power or combinations of 
power cannot be applied, with any certainly of success, effectiveness, or efficacy, to 
certain situations involving certain actors.  
This aspect of the contextual nature of national power introduces even more 
complications when the diversity of actors in the international arena is taken into account. 
In an increasingly multi-centric world, nation-states will increasingly deal with 
transnational and non-state actors in the exercise of national power. 
Some of these actors respond more willingly to one aspect of national power than 
to another. Multinational corporations for example, generally react to economic factors 
more rapidly than the United Nations or a national liberation movement. Conversely, 
negotiations and appeals to human morality may prove to be more powerful at the United 
Nations than in the corporate boardroom or in the field. The allegiance of an uneducated 
people in a newly independent country may help create a powerful national liberation 
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movement, yet be meaningless for a multinational corporation or the United Nations. 
National power, then, is contextual not only in its application to other states, but to other 
global actors, including extremists and terrorists, as well. 
National power is contextual in that it can be evaluated only in terms of all the 
power elements and only in relation to another player or players and the situation in 
which power is being exercised. A nation may appear powerful because it possesses 
many military assets, but the assets may be inadequate against those of a potential enemy 
or inappropriate to the nature of the conflict. The question should always be: power over 
whom, and with respect to what?320 Most scholars focus on power as a means, the 
strength or capacity that provides the “ability to influence the behavior of other actors in 
accordance with one’s own objectives.”321  
Contextually, the instruments of national power, no matter how defined, can be 
separated only artificially. In reality, they are linked — through various strategic, 
operational, and tactical course of action (COAs) or “ways” — syncretistically, 
synergistically, and symbiotically and employed alone, in tandem, and in various 
sequential and parallel combinations in order to achieve national objectives and goals 
commensurate with and favorable to national expectations and end states . Together, they 
constitute the resources, or means, for the attainment of national objectives and goals. 
Although these objectives and goals and expectations and end states may be judged as 
moral, immoral, or amoral, the instruments, or elements of, national power are simply 
means to national strategic ends and as such are morally neutral. 
 
                                                 
320 John Spanier and Robert L. Wendzel, Games Nations Play, 9th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
1996), 144-145; Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks for Understanding 
(New York: Macmillan, 1984), 102-103 and 309-311; and Gordon C. Schloming, Power and Principle in 
International Affairs (New York: Harcourt Bruce Jovanovich, 1991), 528. 
321 Spanier and Wendzel, Games Nations Play, 128; Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H Wolfe, 
Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1982), 64; Abramo F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968), 104; Walter S. 
Jones, The Logic of International Relations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), 245;Robert Dahl and Bruce 
Stinebrickner, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976), 29; Papp, 
Contemporary International Relations,102-103 and 308; and Michael P. Sullivan, Power in Contemporary 
Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 98. 
 190
The literature suggests that the order of strategic priorities drives the importance 
and primacy of an instrument or element of national power. The order of strategic 
priorities was dependent upon what arena was judged to be the contemporary center of 
gravity. 
Most post-modern strategists agree that national power can be distinguished 
between natural (predominantly dispositional) and social (predominantly situational, 
environmental, and contextual) determinants of power. In practice, it is impossible to 
make a clear distinction between the natural and social elements precursors to the 
instruments of national power. 
The natural determinants (geography, resources, and population) of power focus 
on, derived from, and are concerned with the number of people in a nation and with their 
physical environment. 
Social determinants (economic, political, military, psychological, and, more 
recently, informational) of power focus on, derived from, and concern the ways in which 
the people of a nation organize themselves and the manner in which they alter their 
environment. 
With respect to the instruments of national power that are determined by social, 
situational, contextual, and/or environmental factors, there are two general components of 
power: hard and soft. It is much more difficult to systematically or consciously develop, 
manage, control, or apply soft power than hard power. 
Power does not have to be used to be effective. It is often enough that the other 
actors acknowledge the presence of power, either implicitly or explicitly, since the 
potential exercise of acknowledged or presumed power can be as intimidating as its 
actual use; hence the concept and practice of deterrence. Historically, some international 
actors have sought power for power’s sake; however, most nation-states normally seek 
and use power to achieve or defend their survival, vital, and important interest, goals, 
objectives, and expectations.  
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 Hard power322 refers to the influence, leverage, and capability that is 
derived and generated from direct military and economic means. This is in 
contrast to soft power, which refers to power that originates with the more 
indirect means of diplomacy, culture, and history. Hard power describes 
an actor’s ability to induce another actor to perform or stop performing an 
action. This can be done using military power through threats or force. It 
can also be achieved using economic power relying on assistance, bribes, 
or economic sanctions.  
 Soft power323 is a term used to describe the ability of an actor to indirectly 
influence the behavior of other actors through cultural, informational, or 
ideological means. In contrast with the primary tools of hard power, the 
organic and inherent ability to threaten or reward, the sources of soft 
power are cultural and informational: values, principles, morals, and 
ethics; and diplomatic and foreign polices. Soft power uses an attraction to 
shared values and the perceived justness and duty of contributing to the 
achievement of those values. 
Regardless, whether it is hard or soft, an actor’s power is measured in terms of the 
elements of power that it actually possesses. The literature suggests that the instruments 
of national power — natural or social; military, informational, diplomatic, law 
enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic — represent the hard and soft powers 
that a nation-state possesses and can operationalize and effectively employ. 
The military, economic, and financial instruments of national power represent the 
hard power capabilities of the U.S. and the diplomatic/and informational instruments of 
national power represent the soft power capabilities of the U.S. The legal and law 
enforcement and intelligence instruments of national power can be characterized as either 
hard or soft and similarly employed. By and large, they bolster and complement the 
employment of the other instruments of national power. 
Prior to the issuance of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism in 
September 2006, the U.S. defined its instruments of national power in terms of 
                                                 
322 Kurt Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon, Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security (New 
York, NY: Basic Books, 2006) 
323 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Jackson, TN: Public 
Affairs, 2004). 
 192
diplomatic, information, military, and economics.324 However, in the aftermath of the 
attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration determined that the paradigm 
for combating terrorism must now involve the application of all elements of the nation’s 
national power and influence. In the future, not only would the U.S. employ military 
power, diplomacy, information, and economics — the key elements and instruments of 
national power that trace their beginnings to the mid-1940s — but it would augment and 
complement their effectiveness by employing, alone or in combination, financial, 
intelligence, and law enforcement activities and operations. As a result, current U.S. 
instruments of national power are defined as military, informational (ideological), 
diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic. This will be 
discussed in somewhat greater detail later in this chapter. 
This shift in policy definition and articulation was largely driven by marked 
realignment since the end of the Cold War of the instruments of national power which are 
available to the U.S. in pursuing its interests around the world. Because of resource 
constraints and new threats, some former mainstays of defense and foreign policy — such 
as strategic nuclear forces and foreign aid — are less central today. At the same time, the 
U.S. government is developing new techniques to deal with changing circumstances 
which rely more on coalition partners, high technology, the private sector, and additional 
roles for the Armed Forces.325 
From the beginning, perhaps as early as 1983, the current campaign against 
extremists and terrorists, as with any asymmetric conflict, has been both a battle of arms 
and a battle of ideas. In the short term, the “five meter target,” the conflict involves the 
application of all of the instruments of national power to detect, deter and contain, and 
defeat those state actors (i.e., nation-states) and non-state actors (i.e., persons and/or 
organizations) who wish to threaten or cause damage to the U.S. and its core national 
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security interests — physical security, promotion of values, and economic prosperity; its 
citizens, or its government. In the long term, “the 25-meter target,” successfully 
prosecuting the conflict, this campaign, will require winning the battle of ideas. 
Although previous wars and conflicts required the U.S. and its allies, partners, and 
associates to undeniably and unquestionably defeat and destroy their enemies’, 
predominantly, if not exclusively, state actors; centers of gravity — political (i.e., 
government); military (i.e., armed forces); economics (i.e., financial institutions and 
system, industries, and manufacturing and production — delivery capabilities and 
systems); and ideology (i.e., association with, faith in, and adherence to the politico-
economic entities); the U.S.’ ability to terminate these conflicts, including the Cold War, 
on terms favorable to the U.S. was largely the product of waging and winning the battle 
of ideas. It is no different in the current conflict. Violent extremism is simultaneously a 
threat to the nation’s way of life as a free and open society and to an increasingly 
integrated, globalized, and interdependent world.326 
Consequently, because the strategic environment is always defined by the 
character of politics and the interactions among political entities, there is no one 
dominant instrument, or element, of national power. The environment is complex and 
subject to the interplay of dynamic and often contradictory factors; all of which influence 
the strengths and weaknesses of each instrument, or element, of national power 
individually and in combination and direct and control the opportunities and challenges 
presented in the operational environment.  
Some elements of politics and policy are rational, that is, the product of conscious 
thought and intent. Other aspects are governed by forces, like emotion and chance that 
defy any purely rational explanation. To be effective, both the community of practitioners 
— strategists, policy makers, and decision makers — and the academics and politicians 
must master the meaning and the peculiarities of this environment. 
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The natural, or dispositional, determinants of power are geography, resources, and 
population. They focus on, are derived from, and are concerned with the number of 
people in a nation and with their physical environment. 327 
Geography is the first and foremost natural determinant of power. Geographical 
factors, whether they are location and climate or size and topography, influence a 
nation’s outlook and capacity. 
Location, in particular, is closely tied to the foreign policy of a state. Vulnerable 
nations, like Poland caught geographically between Russia and Germany, have even had 
to deal with the loss of national existence. Conversely, Great Britain, the U.S., and Japan 
have been protected by large bodies of water throughout their histories. Each, in turn, 
used the combination of a large navy and overseas trade to become a great power. With 
its oceanic moats, the U.S. was able to avoid entangling alliances and expand peacefully 
for almost a century, free of external interference. In addition, that expansion came about 
primarily without conquest, through the purchase of huge land tracts from European 
powers that found the location of the territories too remote to defend easily.  
The connection between foreign policy and location is, in fact, so fundamental 
that it gave rise in this century to geopolitics as a field of study. The study of international 
relations is impossible without a firm grasp of geography. The geographic factor in world 
history is the most fundamental because it is the most constant. Populations increase and 
decrease, natural resources are discovered and expended, political systems frequently 
change, empires and states rise and fall, technologies decline and advance, but the 
location of continents, islands, seas and oceans has not changed significantly throughout 
recorded history. 
Sir Halford John Mackinder (15 February 1861–06 March 1947) was a British 
geographer and politician. Mackinder was specialist in physical geography who, because 
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of his interest in evolution and how the context of historical events — social, cultural, 
political, economic, military, religious, etc. — impact human development later branched 
into economics and political theory, arguing that physical and human geography should 
be treated as a single discipline. According to Mackinder, “The actual balance of political 
power at any given time is… the product, on the one hand, of geographical conditions, 
both economic and strategic, and, on the other hand, of the relative number, virility, 
equipment and organization of the competing peoples.”328 
In 1902, Mackinder wrote his first major book, Britain and the British Seas. In 
writing this book, Mackinder may have been strongly influenced by Rear Admiral Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, U.S. Navy (ret.) (September 27, 1840 – December 1, 1914) and Sir John 
Knox Laughton KCB (April 23, 1830 - September 14, 1915).  
Mahan, president of the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island 
between 1886-1889 and 1892-1893, is best known for his famous and influential 
treatises, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, and The Influence of Sea 
Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812. Published 1890 and 1892 
respectively, these books argued that controlling sea-borne commerce (i.e., the sea lanes 
of communication or SLOCs) was critical to domination in war. If one combatant could 
deny the sea (i.e., sea control/sea denial) to the other, the economy of the second 
inevitably would collapse, leading to victory at sea and on land.  
According to Mahan, “the strategist is he who always keeps the objective of the 
war in sight and the objective of the war is never military and is always political.”329  
Once the enemy has been sufficiently weakened on sea and on land, the shift to the 
strategic offensive should not be delayed so that complete victory could be achieved a 
quickly and efficiently as possible.330  
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Mahan’s books were greatly acclaimed, and closely studied in Britain and 
Imperial Germany, influencing their forces build up before World War I. Mahan 
influenced the naval portion of the Spanish-American War, and the battles of Tsushima, 
Jutland, and the Atlantic and work influenced the doctrines of every major navy in the 
interwar (ca. 1919-1939) period; 
Sir John Knox Laughton, a friend of Mahan, was a British naval historian and 
arguably the first to argue for the importance of the subject as an independent field of 
study. In the 1870s he turned more and more to teaching and lecturing on history, 
delivering a now famous lecture to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in 1874 on 
the importance of actually analyzing historical events, rather than merely reporting events 
chronologically.  
This was a new idea at the time and would not have been seen then as stating the 
obvious, as perhaps it would today.331 During his time as a lecturer in naval history, 
Laughton was undoubtedly an influence on the more famous naval historian-strategists of 
his age — Mahan, Corbett332 and Richmond.333 Mahan, described as “one of Laughton’s 
disciples,” wrote of him saying that “He probably knows more naval history than any 
English speaking man living.”334 
Although primarily concerned, in Mackinder’s words, “to present a picture of the 
physical features and conditions” of Britain, the book’s chapters on “The Position of 
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Britain,” “Strategic Geography,” and “Imperial Britain” contain insights on global affairs 
that foreshadowed Mackinder’s subsequent geopolitical works.335 
In the book, Mackinder described Britain as being “of Europe, yet not in Europe,” 
and as lying “off the shores of the great continent.” British predominance in the world 
rested on its “command of the sea,” wrote Mackinder, because “the unity of the ocean is 
the simple physical fact underlying the dominant value of sea-power in the modern 
globe-wide world.” “A new balance of power is being evolved,” Mackinder opined, and 
it included “five great world states, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and America.” 
Mackinder suggested, however, that Britain’s position as the preeminent world power 
was endangered due to “permanent facts of physical geography” in the form of “the 
presence of vast Powers, broad-based on the resources of half continents” (i.e., Russia 
and the United States).336  
In 1904, Mackinder, then a director of the newly formed London School of 
Economics, presented a professional paper on The Geographical Pivot of History at the 
Royal Geographical Society, in which he formulated the Heartland Theory. This is often 
considered as a, if not the, founding moment of geopolitics, as a field of study, although 
Mackinder himself did not use the term. Although the Heartland Theory initially 
receiving little attention outside the profession of geography, this theory would influence 
the foreign policies of world powers ever since.337 
According to one his biographers, Mackinder’s avowed purposes in writing the 
“pivot” paper were to establish “a correlation between the larger geographical and the 
larger historical generalizations,” to provide “a formula which shall express certain 
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aspects… of geographical causation in universal history,” and to set “into perspective 
some of the competing forces in current international politics.”338 
Mackinder’s next major work, Democratic Ideals and Reality, was published in 
1919. It was a perspective on the 1904 work in the light of peace treaties and Woodrow 
Wilson’s idealism. This contains his most famous quote: “Who rules East Europe 
commands the Heartland; Who rules the heartland commands the World Island; Who 
rules the World Island commands the World.”339 This message was composed for world 
statesmen at the Treaty of Versailles; the emphasis on East Europe as the strategic route 
to the Heartland was interpreted as requiring a strip of buffer state to separate Germany 
and Russia. These were created by the peace negotiators but proved to be ineffective 
bulwarks in 1939.  
Geopolitics has many insights to offer; for example consider the connection 
between the British and American development of democracy and civil rights and the 
relatively secure strategic locations of both countries, as opposed to the authoritarian 
regimes of Germany and Russia, direct neighbors for much of history, lying exposed on 
the North European plain or the continuing Russian (Soviet between 1917-1993) drive for 
warm-water ports and the continuing value of maritime choke points relative to the sea 
lanes of communications. Of note, the eight international regions called the “U.S. 
Lifelines and Transit Regions” by the Department of Defense contain chokepoints that 
require attention are as follows:  
 The Gulf of Mexico-Caribbean Sea with the Panama Canal 
 The North Sea-Baltic Sea with several channels and straits 
 The Mediterranean-Black Sea with the Strait of Gibraltar and access to 
Middle Eastern areas 
 The Western Indian Ocean including the Suez Canal, Bab el Mandeb, the 
Strait of Hormuz, and around South Africa to the Mozambique Channel 
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 The Southeast Asian Seas with the Malacca and Lombok Straits among 
others,  
 The SLOCs passing the Spratly Islands,  
 The Northeast Asian Seas with SLOCs important for access to Japan, 
Korea, China, and Russia 
 The Southwest Pacific with important SLOC access to Australia, and the 
Arctic Ocean with the Bering Strait 
Location is also closely tied to climate, which in turn has a significant effect on 
national power. The poorest and weakest states in modern times have all been located 
outside the temperate climate zones in either the tropics or in the frigid zones. More 
successful nation-states have been located in the broad temperate zones between 30N/S 
and 60N/S in the northern and southern hemispheres respectively.  
According to the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), global climate change 
presents a serious national security threat which could impact Americans at home and 
abroad and the nation’s ability to employ its instruments, or elements of national power 
in pursuit of its interests and objectives, and heighten global tensions.340 The study, 
National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, explored ways projected climate 
change is a threat multiplier in already fragile regions, exacerbating conditions that lead 
to failed states — the breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism. The report includes 
several formal findings: 
 Projected climate change poses a serious threat to America’s national 
security. 
 Climate change acts as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the 
most volatile regions of the world. 
 Projected climate change will add to tensions even in stable regions of the 
world. 
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 Climate change, national security and energy dependence are a related set 
of global challenges. 
The report also made several specific recommendations: 
 The national security consequences of climate change should be fully 
integrated into national security and national defense strategies. 
 The U.S. should commit to a stronger national and international role to 
help stabilize climate changes at levels that will avoid significant 
disruption to global security and stability. 
 The U.S. should commit to global partnerships that help less developed 
nations build the capacity and resiliency to better manage climate 
impacts.341 
Size and topography are also geopolitical characteristics that can have advantages 
and disadvantages for a nation. 
The Soviet Union, with its eleven time zones, was able to use its vast size during 
the Second World War to repeat the historical Russian military method of trading space 
for time when invaded. At the same time, that immense size certainly played a role in the 
complex ethnic and political centrifugal forces that eventually pulled apart the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. 
In the American Civil War, the great rivers in the Eastern Theater ran northwest 
to southeast and constituted natural barriers, natural defensive lines, that benefited the 
Confederate States and frustrated, time and time again, the Lincoln Administration and its 
field commanders in their relentless campaigns to invade the “cradle of the 
Confederacy,” that 100 mile corridor between the Potomac River and the James River. 
Conversely, in the Western Theater, the great rivers ran north to south and were natural 
corridors for both commerce and invasion. Once conquered, the federal advance in the 
Confederacy’s most strategic territory, the Trans-Mississippi, was unvexed to the sea.342 
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In the future, technology may mitigate some of these factors in the same way that 
intercontinental missiles affected the importance of insular locations. But here, as in other 
areas, there are many geographical obstacles to the acquisition of power that are costly or 
impossible to overcome. However, the communities of practitioners — strategists, policy 
makers, and decision makers — and the academics and politicians must always 
remember that it is politics, not technology that determines the character and intensity of 
war. Modern technology, with its awesome killing power, may be applied with great 
restraint, depending on policy objectives and political constraints. At the same time, in a 
conflict propelled by powerful ethnic hatred and fear, half a million people can be slain in 
a few days with machetes — as happened in Rwanda in 1995. 
Population, or demographics, in the form of size, trends, and structure are an 
important aspect of national power.343 Demographic change is but one factor limiting a 
state’s ability to impose its will abroad or maintain itself at home. Over the past few 
generations, demographic change has not only radically altered human numbers but has  
profoundly affected their composition and global distribution. While the role of 
population in world affairs may seem self-evident, its relevance to state power and 
national security is often far from obvious. 
Regardless of their exact calibrations, virtually all current population projections 
anticipate comparatively slow population growth in today’s more developed regions 
(Europe, the Soviet Union, Japan, North America and Oceania) and comparatively rapid 
growth for the less developed regions (the rest of the world). With variations, these 
projections point to a continuation of trends evident since the end of World War II. If 
these trends continue for another generation or two, the implications for the international 
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Third World areas are those least likely to share Western values, and could produce “a 
fractious, contentious and inhumane international order” rather more dangerous than the 
Cold War.344 
In the 1980s and 1990s, portions of the national security community in the U.S. 
have embraced two other visions of how demographic factors might affect international 
security. The first can be loosely termed the “dynamic” paradigm of population and 
national security. This new, more “dynamic” paradigm emphasizes not population size as 
a component of national power calculations, but rather the interactions between 
population pressures and environmental degradation, mass migrations, resource 
depletion, forced refugee flows, ethnic conflict, hyper-nationalism, and urbanization in 
order to understand the roles that population factors play as both independent and 
dependent variables in the occurrence of armed conflict. Scholars like Homer-Dixon345 
and Gleick346 do not see demographic factors as just a determinant of national power 
potential, but instead have come to identify changes in population sizes and patterns as 
both catalysts and shapers of political instability and armed conflict.347 
Overall, the emergence of the new dynamic school of thought concerning 
demographics and national security is a positive development for three reasons. First, it 
provides American policymakers with a new set of indicators with which to pinpoint 
“zones of danger” where conflict may be looming. If such a zone were to coincide with a 
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region of vital interest for Washington, these measures could afford ample time for 
policymakers to formulate political intervention strategies that might head off impending 
conflict and allow the United States to avoid the need for a potentially costly military 
intervention. Second, the dynamic school serves the longer-term purpose of allowing the 
United States to better target its modest foreign aid resources, focusing them on regions 
where they might prevent some of the negative strategic consequences of intense 
population pressures. Third, it will help defense decision makers to make some educated 
predictions about the nature of future warfare in the developing world and to propose new 
operational concepts, tactics, and technologies the U.S. military may wish to consider as 
it tries to better prepare itself to meet the challenges posed by the next generation of 
armed conflicts.348 
Why has this dynamic view attracted more interest in the recent past? One can 
posit two logical reasons: the end of the Cold War’s bipolar U.S.-USSR competition, and 
increasing globalization. 
As the Cold War wound down, conflict became more regionalized and the 
previous narrow focus of most American security analysts upon the Central European 
conventional military balance and strategic nuclear arms control suddenly broadened to 
include other important regions of the world — regions where population pressures were 
thought to be driving some of the security problems that local elites worried about. 
Second, the increasing globalization of Western economic and security interests is 
making the spillover effects of demographic pressures, even in regions remote from 
Europe, North America, or Northeast Asia, hard to ignore.  
There are many in the U.S. national security policymaking community who argue 
that the continued stability of the current liberal international order is dependent upon the 
ability of the Western industrialized nations to prevent regions of anarchy from 
developing in which basic human rights cannot be even partially respected. Demographic 
factors such as differential fertility rates between ethnic groups and the existence of large 
refugee populations are, in turn, helping to drive the political problems that many of these 
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particular regions face. Although one should be careful not to overstate the importance of 
economic interdependence, it is clear that these linkages and feedback loops between 
demographic shifts in developing regions and America’s interests as the world’s sole 
superpower need to be better understood by intelligence analysts, diplomats, and national 
security planners.349 
A large population is a key prerequisite, but not an automatic guarantee of 
strength. For example; Canada is more powerful than the more populous, but less 
industrialized Mexico, and Japan, with a small population marked by widespread 
technical skills, has been able to exercise national power far in excess of China for all its 
masses. 
At the same time, trends in population growth and decline can have significant 
effects on national power. The Prussian unification of the German-speaking peoples in 
1870, for example, instantly created a great power with a population that grew by 27 
million between then and 1940, even as that of France reflected the shift in European 
power, increasing by only four million in the same period350.  
The historical increase in American power was partly due to the arrival of more 
than 100 million immigrants between 1824 and 1924; most of these unskilled laborers, 
ideally suited to working in America’s rapidly expanding mining and extracting and 
manufacturing and production industries, came from poverty-stricken eastern and 
southern Europe. During the same century, Canada and Australia, comparable in territory 
and developmental level but with populations less than a tenth of America’s, remained 
secondary powers.351  
Similar trends, traits, and characteristics represented centrifugal forces and more 
complex causes and effects. For example, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had a 
large and growing population during most of that same period, remained a secondary 
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power — in comparison to Germany, France, and Great Britain -because it was divided 
ethnically, weak politically, and at an extremely low level in terms of industrial 
development and manufacturing productivity. Imperial Russia, although vast and rich in 
resources, was a third-rate power in terms of actionable industrial development and 
manufacturing productivity. 
In the future, global trends also will affect the structure and balance of national 
populations, particularly those of the poorest countries. In 1830, the global population 
reached one billion for the first time; it required 100 years to double. It took only 45 more 
years (1975) for the population to double again to four billion. In the next 21 years the 
population increased almost two billion, reflecting a growth rate of about 90 million a 
year. For the next several decades, 90 percent of this growth will occur in the lesser-
developed countries, many already burdened by extreme overpopulation352 for which 
there is no remedy in the form of economic infrastructure, skills, and capital.353 
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Population structure and balance are also significant for developed nations. 
Important here is the percentage of the population in the most productive cohort, 
generally considered to be somewhere between the ages of 18 and 45, that can best meet 
the needs of the nation’s military and industry as well as create the following generation. 
Similarly, a comparison of the middle population group to the older will provide a picture 
of trends that can have significant consequences for a nation’s power.  
Any nation with an increasing cohort of retired people coupled with generous 
social welfare benefits will eventually have to face hard choices between “guns and 
butter” on the one hand and possible limits to its national power as well as to its 
investment and economic growth potential on the other. These choices already face the 
United States as the “baby boomer” generation approaches retirement age against the 
backdrop of a staggering explosion in social entitlements; hence the crisis in Social 
Security. 
The ability of a nation to grow and defend itself is controlled in large part by the 
availability of natural resources. Nations that do not possess sufficient mineral, energy, 
agricultural, and water resources within their boundaries must obtain them on the 
international market, where prices can be volatile and supplies unreliable. In times of 
war, all or part of the international market may be inaccessible and critical resources 
unavailable for import, hence, the historical importance of natural resources and access to 
and control of cost-efficient transportation systems and networks. 
The word resource refers to a naturally occurring concentration of minerals or 
fuels, whereas the word reserve refers to the portion of a resource that meets minimum 
criteria related to its extraction and processing. An accumulation of gold, for example, 
may be a resource but not a reserve if it cannot be mined and refined using existing 
technology. Resources can become reserves over time as technology improves and the 
economics of extraction and processing change.  
Therefore, the distinction is one of economics and engineering rather than 
geology. Resources are described as being measured, indicated, or inferred depending on 
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the degree of certainty with which they are known. A measured resource is one for which 
the size has been established by geologic mapping, test drilling, and sampling.  
An inferred resource is one for which there is a reasonable amount of geologic 
evidence, but that has not been verified by drilling or sampling. Reserves are similarly 
described as being proven, probable, or possible. 
Large amounts of natural resources are essential for a modern nation to wage war, 
to operate an industrial base, and to reward other international actors through trade and 
aid, either in modern industrial products or in the raw materials themselves. But these 
resources, whether they are arable land and water or coal and oil, are unevenly distributed 
around the world and are becoming increasingly scarce. Most importantly, very few, if 
any, nations, however, are self-sufficient.354 
As in the case of the geopolitical ownership of strategic places, the physical 
possession of natural resources is not necessarily a source of power unless a nation can 
also develop those resources and maintain political control over their disposition. 
Harkening back to the discussion on geography and its importance as a discriminator in 
determining national power, the worldwide distribution of energy resources such as coal, 
petroleum, and uranium ore is controlled by geology and is far from uniform. Some 
nations, therefore, have an abundance of resources whereas others have little or no 
domestic supply of strategically important materials. 
In their raw state, for example, minerals and energy sources are generally useless. 
Consequently, for example, the Mesabi iron deposits had no value to the Native 
American tribes near Lake Superior, and Arabian oil a century ago was a matter of 
indifference to the native tribes who roamed above it. Conversely, those nations with 
great industrial organizations and manufacturing infrastructures — for example, the 
Group of Eight (G-8) representing the seven largest, most productive, and most 
successful economies in the post-war world — Canada, France, Germany. Italy, Japan, 
the United Kingdom, and the U.S., and Russia — have traditionally been able to convert 
the potential power of natural resources into actual national power. 
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As stated previously, very few, if any, nations, however, are self-sufficient. For 
time immemorial, nations have traditionally made up for such difficulties in several ways. 
One time-honored, and oft-employed, method is to conquer the resources, a principal 
motivation for the Japanese expansion that led to the opening of the Pacific Theater of 
Operations in the Second World War and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that led to the First 
Gulf War.355  
A second method is to develop resources in another country by means of 
concessions, political manipulation, and even a judicious use of force — all used earlier 
to considerable effect by the U.S. in Latin America between the issuance of the Monroe 
Doctrine 1824 and the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama to ensure the security of and U.S. 
access to the vital Panama Canal. 
The third and most common method for obtaining natural resources is to purchase 
them. In recent years, however, the combination of rapid industrial growth and decline of 
resources has changed the global economy into a seller’s market, while providing 
considerable economic influence and leverage to nations in control of vital commodities. 
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) control of oil, for example, 
has, since 1973, provided its members — Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela, all 
twelve are “less developed countries” from the “developing world,” — with influence 
completely out of proportion to their economic and military power. 
The ability of a modern nation to defend itself or, should it be aggressive, to 
expand its territory depends on a reliable source of energy. Until the beginning of the 
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twentieth century, this meant coal. Although coal remains an important energy source 
that is used to generate most of the electricity used in the United States, it has been joined 
in strategic importance by petroleum and nuclear fuels.356 
The United States currently imports more than three billion barrels of oil per year 
from countries ranging from neighboring Canada and Mexico to Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, 
Iraq, and Angola.357 Although the United States contains significant petroleum reserves, 
they are not large enough to satisfy the long-term demand. It is, in most cases, also more 
expensive to produce oil from domestic reservoirs than to import it from countries that 
have abundant and easily recovered petroleum resources. The federal government 
maintains a Strategic Petroleum Reserve to help offset the potential effects of an oil 
embargo or other supply interruption. The continued growth of economies, and there 
industrial production and consumer components, such as the economies of the People’s 
Republic of China and India add additional pressures to the energy market by increasing 
demand within an environment of relatively static supply.  
Similar situations exist relative to mineral resources. The importance of critical 
and strategic metals to the security of modern nations was recognized by the United 
States during the First World War, when tungsten, tin, chromite (chromium ore), optical 
grade glass, and manila fiber for ropes were all in short supply. The War Department 
subsequently prepared a list of 28 materials that had been in short supply during the First 
World War, and since then Congress has funded stockpiles of strategic materials that are 
essential for national security.  
This concern carried through into the mid-1990s under a series of programs that 
were focused on developing and sustaining a credible and effective capability to harness 
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the mobilization potential of America in support of the armed forces, while meeting the 
needs of the national economy and other civil emergency preparedness requirements and 
providing for the maximum civilian contribution to military operations as well as for the 
continuation of essential civilian services. It shall also provide for effective utilization of 
military resources to assist civilian authorities in responding to peacetime and wartime 
emergencies.358 Currently, the program is represented by and operationalized through the 
Defense Production Act that was enacted on September 8, 1950, in response to the start 
of the Korean War as part of a broad civil defense and war mobilization effort in the 
context of the Cold War.  
The Act, now managed by the Department of Homeland Security / Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA) has been periodically reauthorized and 
amended, and remains in force with three major sections.  
 The first authorizes the President to require businesses to sign contracts or 
fulfill orders deemed necessary for national defense.  
 The second authorizes the President to establish mechanisms (such as 
regulations, orders or agencies) to allocate materials, services and facilities 
to promote national defense.  
 The third section authorizes the President to control the civilian economy 
so that scarce and/or critical materials necessary to the national defense 
effort are available for defense needs.  
The Act also authorizes the President to requisition property, force industry to 
expand production and the supply of basic resources, impose wage and price controls, 
settle labor disputes, control consumer and real estate credit, establish contractual 
priorities, and allocate raw materials to aid the national defense.359 
A third class of natural resources that is vital for national security includes 
agricultural land and water. As is the case for other resources, food or water that cannot 
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be produced within a nation must be imported. Therefore, countries with large amounts 
of arable land, favorable climates, and fresh water can be less dependent on outside 
supplies than nations that lack one or more of those resources. In cases where 
technological solutions do exist, for example desalinization of seawater to produce 
drinking water in arid coastal areas, they can be too expensive for all but the wealthiest of 
nations. A similar transformation may occur in the future with those nations that are 
major food producers as the so-called “Green Revolution” faces the prospect of more 
depleted lands and encroaching deserts.  
Finally, there is the chronically acute short supply of strategic, and often esoteric, 
minerals and raw materials so necessary for high technology and modern weapons. One 
consequence of this diminishment of and competition for raw materials has been the 
emergence of the sea bed, with its oil and manganese reserves, as a new venue of 
international geopolitical competition, in which those nations — specifically Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S.360 — with long coastlines and extensive 
territorial waters reaching beyond the 1982 United Nation’s Convention on the Law of 
the Sea’s 200 nautical mile (370 km) and naval forces capable of performing “blue water, 
open ocean” missions such as control and denial of the sea lanes of communication 
(SLOCs), presence and deterrence, and protection of shipping and freedom of navigation 
— have the advantage. 
The social, or situational and/or contextual, (i.e., environmental) determinants 
(economic, political/diplomatic, military, psychological, informational, finance, and law 
enforcement, or in contemporary U.S. parlance; military, informational, diplomatic, law 
enforcement, financial, and  economic — MIDLIFE) of power focus on, derive from, and 
concern the ways in which the people of a nation organize themselves and the manner in 
which they alter their environment.361 
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Ultimately, however, sustainable national power and influence is derived from 
and flows from the social determinants of power. Although extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to operationalize in nations and societies lacking the natural, or dispositional, 
determinants of power, nations and societies lacking the foundation and structure of 
strong social, situational, contextual, and/or environmental determinants have, with the 
exception of the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
cartel, historically failed to achieve prominence and influence. 
Important factors supporting the development, maintenance, and sustainment of 
the situational, contextual, and/or environmental instruments of national power include, 
but are not limited to the following: common language literacy and formal education; 
culturally plausible and defensible political representation, enfranchisement, 
“ownership,” and empowerment that translates into believable and actionable national 
pride and cohesion and a willingness to make sacrifices for the nation ; economic 
systems, to include employment, modernization and market expansion, and the ability to 
operationalize and harness through industry, manufacturing, transportation, and 
distribution, the natural, or dispositional, determinants of power — geography, resources, 
and population.; achievement and maintenance of the “quality” of life and associated 
goals, objectives, and expectations that include the ability of the individual to participate 
successfully in the national financial environment; and social mobility based on a ready 
acceptance of innovation. Other important attributes include, but are not limited to the 
following: a common national identity and history of shared successes and triumphs, 
failures and setbacks; and strengths and opportunities and weaknesses and challenges; a 
common religious identity and history; a common social psychology — morals, values, 
principles, and ethics; socio-cultural structure — individuals, families, clans, and tribes, 
and the national identity to include ethnicity and race; philosophical foundations and 
social cognition schemas; legal and law enforcement systems and crime and punishment 
paradigms; as well as long-standing societal and cultural frictions. 
The instruments of national power overlap, interconnect, and are complementary. 
For example, diplomats’ power to sway other governments is greatly dependent on those 
governments’ awareness of their own and their opponent’s economic and military power 
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and on their assessment of a nation’s, their nation and other nations, willingness to use 
that power. Economic and financial power is bolstered by military and diplomatic power, 
reinforced with the investigatory and prosecutorial authorities and tools available through 
the legal and law enforcement instrument of national power that can defend economic 
and financial interests. Military power is often dependent on the diplomats’ ability to gain 
basing rights, port access, diplomatic immunity and status of forces agreements, and over 
flight permission from other countries or to enlist them in alliances and coalitions. 
Military power is directly dependent on the financial and technological strength of the 
nation’s, and its opponent’s, economy.  
The ability to select and apply, alone or in combination, the instruments of 
national power in achieving an objective is predicated on, and underpinned by, accurate, 
relevant actionable intelligence. 
The U.S. must seek to achieve its goals as economically as possible and with the 
right combination of means — the military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law 
enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic. The way in which the U.S. combines 
these means in any given conflict will be greatly affected by the kind of BNSP the U.S. 
formulates, pursues, and by the strategic goals the nation seeks. Contextual descriptions 
of the military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, 
financial, and economic instruments of national power follow. 
According to Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United 
States, (Washington, D.C., The Joint Staff, 14 November 2000),362 the purpose of the 
Armed Forces (of the United States) is to fight and win the nation’s wars if deterrence 
fails. As the (executive agent for the) military instrument of national power, the Armed 
Forces (of the United States) must ensure their adherence to U.S. values, constitutional 
principles, and standards for the profession of arms. The United States wields, and has 
wielded, the military instrument of national power at home and abroad in support of its 
national security goals in a variety of military operations. 
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Military power is an essential instrument of national power, often reserved for 
those crises in which other forms of national power have been ineffective in protecting 
national interests. When the diplomatic, economic, financial, intelligence, and legal and 
law enforcement options prove ineffective in securing national interests, military power -
strong, flexible, and rapidly deployable – is essential to the successful achievement of the 
U.S. BNSP and its goals, objectives, and end state. 
The military instrument is the use of force or the threat to use force to achieve 
national objectives. Military power is the sum of a nation’s weapons and equipment, 
trained manpower, organizations, doctrines, industrial base, and sustainment capacity. 
The military instrument can be employed in a variety of ways that are short of combat 
such as training allies, establishing presence, or acting as a show-of-force. However, the 
main use of military power is in conflict. While the military instrument is often the main 
effort during war, the nature and objectives of the particular conflict must be examined to 
determine the appropriate relationship between the use of military force and the 
application of the other instruments of national power.363 
Since time immemorial, military strength has been historically the gauge for 
national power. Although the threat to the modern nation-state has changed dramatically, 
the military instrument, or element, of national power — specifically remains the 
dominant contemporary discriminator — especially with respect to the ability to project 
national power abroad through either the presence of military forces overseas or the 
ability to mobilize, generate, and employ military forces distant from a nation’s borders. 
The ability to project military power abroad has historically afforded nations to influence 
international events in their favor and terminate conflicts and disputes, military or 
otherwise, on terms favorable to their national interests and end states.364 
Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, defeat in war has normally signaled 
the eclipse and decline, if not the end of a nation’s power, while military victory has 
usually heralded the ascent of a new power. However, in the aftermath of the Second 
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World War and the advent of the Cold War, military defeat in war has led to the 
transformation of former military powers into highly visible and influential actors on the 
international stage. 
For example, Germany and Japan were utterly and completely defeated in 1945. 
Their militarily, economic and financial, political and diplomatic, and ideological centers 
of gravity were destroyed by the Allies’ pursuit of total war. However, both nations, with 
the help of the U.S. and other former adversaries, transformed themselves into regional 
economic and financial powers, equipped with modern industrial and manufacturing 
infrastructures backed by democratic free market political and economic systems, allied 
with and complementing their former enemies.365 
Military power is more than just the aggregation of personnel, equipment, and 
weaponry. It includes strategy, the operational art of the campaign linking strategy to 
tactics, leadership, morale, and discipline. All of these remain vital factors of military 
power and a nation’s ability to project national power abroad through either the presence 
of military forces overseas or the ability to mobilize, generate, and employ military forces 
distant from a nation’s borders and thus influence international events, in combination 
with one or more of the other instruments of national power , in their favor and terminate 
conflicts and disputes, military or otherwise, on terms favorable to their national interests 
and end states.366 
The military instrument, or element, of national power is highly sensitive to 
perturbations in military technology and the integration of emerging military technologies 
with military operations and tactics. Hence the quality of arms technology, tactical 
innovation, and application also has become a vital military factor for all nations in a 
period marked by rapid and important scientific breakthroughs. 
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Timely inventions ranging from the crossbow to the airplane have often been 
decisive when accompanied by appropriate changes in military organization and doctrine. 
These changes are called “revolutions in military affairs” by military historians and can 
have tremendous impact on how wars, campaigns, and battles are fought and won; how 
conflicts are terminated; and how new powers emerge to dominate the world stage. These 
“revolutions in military affairs,” or RMAs367, can be symmetric or asymmetric, 
conventional or unconventional, or a combination of both. Regardless of their 
characteristics, they usually result in a genuine qualitative and quantitative paradigm shift 
in military capability; strategy, operations, and tactics; and flexibility and adaptability.368 
Conversely, when “revolutions in military affairs,” especially “revolutions in 
military technologies,” fall into the hands of rogue states, failing states, or non-state 
actors such as terrorist groups, guerillas, insurgents, and criminals, they are transformed 
into actionable asymmetric, unconventional threats that threaten those more powerful and 
capable. This is because most nations build and maintain instruments of national power to 
counter the corresponding capabilities of their peer or near-peer competitors.  
Asymmetric and unconventional capabilities pose a major challenge for most 
nations because they are difficult to detect, forecast likelihood and consequences, and 
warn against; difficult to protect against and prevent; difficult to deter and contain; and 
difficult to respond to and recover from. In sum, asymmetric and unconventional tools, 
tactics and techniques, and procedures derived from “revolutions in military affairs,” 
especially “revolutions in military technologies,” in the hands of rogue states, failing 
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transformed into actionable asymmetric, unconventional threats frustrate, irritate, and 
annoy established nations and powers because they complicate and obfuscate their basic 
national security policies (BNSP).369  
This is because their BNSP are constructed to address the symmetric and 
conventional threats posed by their peer and near-peer competitors within the established 
international environment. Because rogue states, failing states, or non-state actors such as 
terrorist groups, guerillas, insurgents, and criminals do not adhere to or play by the rules 
of the established international community, their acquisition and employment of 
asymmetric, unconventional tools, tactics and techniques, and procedures are, and will 
continue to be, destabilizing.370 
The informational instrument (previously known as the psychological element or 
instrument and more recently as strategic communications)371 refers to the use of 
information and ideas to advance the interests and achieve the objectives of the nation. 
The objective in the use of the information instrument is to influence the perceptions and 
attitudes of allies, adversaries, and interested observers. Until recent times, information 
has almost been an ancillary instrument of national power, augmenting other efforts of 
the government. Now information itself is becoming critical for both economic growth 
and military success in operations. 
Informational power may seem, and may in fact be, the “fuzziest” of all the 
elements, but it is at least as important as the others, and political entities make huge 
efforts to increase it. It consists of national will and morale, national character, and 
degree of national integration. It is this most ephemeral of the social power determinants 
that has repeatedly caused nations with superior economic and military power to be 
defeated or have their policies frustrated by less capable actors. 
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Prior to the “revolution in information affairs,” it was the psychological 
instrument, or element, of national power. It involved all of the factors, including the 
awe, fear, or admiration that the U.S.’ physical power inspires, that its descendant 
currently encompasses. 
From the military perspective, according to Joint Publication 3-13, Information 
Operations (13 February 2006)372, information operations — the operational component 
of the informational instrument of national power — is the integrated employment of the 
core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological 
operations, military deception and operations security, in concert with specified 
supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial 
human and automated decision making while protecting our own information.373 
The informational instrument of national power also involves the world’s 
perception — among the American and foreign publics as well as among political and 
military leaders — whether the U.S., or one or more of its competitors or adversaries, are 
supporting or threatening the balance of power. In general, it includes the sympathy or 
antipathy inspired by a nation’s culture; ideas; values, morals, ethics, and principles; and 
national will and the immediate cause for which one is fighting … in sum, anything that 
affects the rational or emotional components of the human mind. 
In conjunction and combination with this instrument of power, the role of the U.S. 
national intelligence community is to gather valid and current information about potential 
adversaries and disseminate this information to the appropriate decision makers (i.e., 
information and knowledge management and information- and intelligence-sharing). It is 
the responsibility of the decision makers to act on this information. The United States 
also maintains an extensive security apparatus (i.e., personnel, physical and facility, and 
information security and assurance; computer, information technology, and automated 
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information systems security; communications security; and operations security) to 
protect critical information from being obtained by these same adversaries.374  
Finally, the use of “propaganda” vehicles like the Voice of America and Radio 
Free Europe allows the United States to spread the message of democracy to people who 
would otherwise be denied this information. In this arena, the informational instrument 
directly supports, complements, and enhances the diplomatic instrument of power. 
In sum, the information instrument, or element, of national power is understood to 
mean the U.S. government communicating its intent and views, i.e. communications, in 
order to achieve, maintain, and employ the strategic advantage through information 
superiority and dominance. Strategic influence and its elements have been known by 
many names: foreign information program, international information activities, political 
warfare, propaganda, psychological warfare, psychological operations, public 
information, public affairs, public diplomacy, international military information, 
information operations, influence operations, and perception management, to name just a 
few.  
Further, strategic influence has always had both overt and covert components. 
Today, key informational components of strategic influence include public affairs, 
political warfare, political advocacy, public diplomacy and psychological operations. 
This is because the communications revolution, which began over a century ago with the 
advent of global transmission of information, has taken on new momentum in recent 
decades with the development of fax machines, television satellites, and computer 
linkages.  
As the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated in the fall of 1989, 
a new fact of life in the international arena is that it is no longer possible for any nation-
state to deny its citizens knowledge of what is taking place elsewhere. Ideas, in other 
words, move more freely around the world than at any other time in the past.  
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This has had particularly fortunate results for the United States. Even as some 
other aspects of power have gone into relative decline, America’s influence as a source of 
ideas and as a shaper of culture has increased. This “soft power,” in Joseph Nye’s words, 
has been a major factor in formulating the U.S. national security strategic objective of 
“enlargement.”375 
Therefore, information has contributed to the concept of the world as a global 
village. This combination of enhanced communication and dissemination of information, 
however, is a two-edged sword that cuts across all the social determinants of power in 
national strategy. In the economic realm, for instance, global interdependence has been 
enhanced by information-communication improvements. 
Conversely, the near instantaneous downturns of major economies (the current 
crisis is an outstanding example) are always a possibility with the immediate transmission 
of adverse economic news concerning any nation-state or transnational economic actor. 
Politically, instantaneous and pervasive communication can enhance the ability of 
governmental elites to lead the people in a democracy or to act as a national consoler in 
times of tragedy, such as the Challenger explosion or the Oklahoma City bombing. At the 
same time, these developments can also aid the demagogues, the great simplifiers always 
waiting in the wings to stir fundamental discontents and the dark side of nationalism.  
In terms of psychological power, Winston Churchill demonstrated repeatedly that 
the pervasive distribution of targeted information can have momentous effects on 
intangibles such as national will. Conversely, however, this type of ubiquity has the 
pernicious potential of altering in a matter of years, basic values and cultural beliefs that 
take generations to create. Nowhere is the effect of developments in communications and 
access to information more far-reaching than on warfare. In the purely military realm, 
information dominance can create operational synergies by allowing those systems that 
provide battle space awareness, enhance command and control, and create precision force 
to be integrated into the so-called “system of systems.”376 
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One result of all this is to compress the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of 
war, previously considered as separate and distinct loci of command and functional 
responsibilities. The commander will be faced in the future with the much more complex 
job of recognizing those events occurring simultaneously at all three levels and 
integrating them into the calculation that results from the traditional consideration at the 
operational level of which tactical battles and engagements to join and which to avoid. 
Equally important, shorter time for decisions — occasioned by both the compressed 
continuum of war and electronically gathered information — means less time to discover 
ambiguities or to analyze those ambiguities that are already apparent.  
At the higher level of cyber war, the two-edged potential of communications and 
information is even more evident. In the future, nations will wage offensive information 
warfare on another state’s computer systems, targeting assets ranging from 
telecommunications and power to safety and banking. 
Such an onslaught could undermine the more advanced aspects of an adversary’s 
economy, interrupt its mobilization of military power, and by affecting the integrity of 
highly visible services to the population, create almost immediate pressure on 
government at all levels. As activities rely increasingly on information systems rather 
than manual processes and procedures, information infrastructures of the most developed 
nations, such as the United States, become progressively more vulnerable to state and 
non-state actors. Even as there are advances in information security technologies, hacker 
tools are becoming more sophisticated and easier to obtain and use. One analyst 
concludes in this regard that, for the United States, “the possibility of a digital Pearl 
Harbor cannot be dismissed out of hand.” 377  
Examples of the use of the informational instrument, or element, of national 
power are operations are focused on affecting the perceptions and behaviors of leaders, 
groups, or entire populations. Influence operations employ capabilities to affect 
behaviors, protect operations, communicate commander’s intent, and project accurate  
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information to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain. These effects should 
result in differing behavior or a change in the adversary’s decision cycle, which aligns 
with the commander’s objectives.  
The political-military and political-economic capabilities of influence operations 
are psychological operations (PSYOP), operations deception (OPDEC), operations 
security (OPSEC), counterintelligence (CI) operations, covert action (CA), propaganda 
and counterpropaganda operations, and public affairs (PA), public diplomacy, and 
strategic communications operations. Public affairs, public diplomacy, and strategic 
communications operations, while a component of influence operations, are predicated on 
their ability to project truthful information to a variety of audiences. These activities of 
influence operations allow the leadership to prepare and shape the operational 
environment by conveying selected information and indicators to target audiences, 
shaping the perceptions of policy and decision makers, securing critical friendly 
information, defending against sabotage, protecting against espionage, gathering 
intelligence, and communicating selected information about activities to the global 
audience.378 
In closing, strategic communication is defined as the informational instrument of 
national power in an era of globalization. It focuses U.S. government processes and 
efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve 
conditions favorable to advancing national interests and policies. It uses coordinated 
information, themes, plans, programs, and actions in collaboration with other elements of 
national power to achieve, maintain, and employ the strategic advantage through 
information superiority and dominance. 
The political instrument of national power is the execution of a nation’s foreign 
policy through diplomatic means. Diplomacy arises out of the “fundamental character of 
the nation-state system, with its basic assumption that nation-states are sovereign, but 
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divergent in their interests and unequal in their power.”379Diplomacy is dependent on the 
power of persuasion, convincing others to take actions that allow for the successful 
prosecution of a nation’s foreign policy. Rarely, if ever, is diplomacy successful without 
the strong support of the other instruments of national power as well.380 
Diplomacy can be defined as the influencing the international situation through 
bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements, negotiations, and engagement with the United 
States. The Department of State has the overall lead for U.S. diplomacy and foreign 
policy. The diplomatic element is conducted with foreign nations, the United Nations, 
and also non-governmental/international organizations.381 Diplomacy can also be defined 
as the art of employing communications and establishing relationships in the global 
environment. Ideas, prestige, and commitment are the currencies of the field.  
The diplomatic instrument uses a nation’s international position combined with 
diplomacy to achieve national objectives. Diplomatic tools may include negotiations, 
political recognition, treaties, and alliances. While the diplomatic instrument is normally 
emphasized before hostilities actually begin, it remains a key element of the national 
strategy in any conflict situation. In certain situations (especially military operations other 
than war), the diplomatic instrument continues to be the main effort, even after the 
commitment of military forces. 
Similarly, diplomacy is the art and practice of conducting negotiations between 
representatives of groups or states. It usually refers to international diplomacy, the 
conduct of international relations through the intercession of professional diplomats with 
regard to issues of foreign relations: international law; trade and commerce; war, 
deterrence, containment, conflict initiation and termination; economics and finance; and 
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society and culture. International agreements and treaties are usually negotiated by 
diplomats prior to endorsement by national politicians. 
Diplomacy is, therefore, the instrument or element of national power that builds 
political will and strengthens international cooperation. Diplomatic exchanges with other 
countries promote cooperation that serves and advances mutual interests and builds 
capacity that bolsters the capabilities of U.S. allies financially, operationally, and 
logistically.382  
The legal and law enforcement instrument, or element, of power relates to legal 
means within the operational environment, such as the PATRIOT Act and United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). The National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism specifically addresses UNSCR 1373, which imposes binding obligations on all 
states to suppress and prevent terrorist financing, improve their border controls, enhance 
information sharing and law enforcement cooperation, suppress the recruitment of 
terrorists, and deny them sanctuary. It, along with the military instrument, or element of 
national power, is perhaps the most dispositional of the situational, environmental, or 
contextual instruments of national power because the legal and law enforcement 
authorities and powers of nation are simultaneously the most fundamental in ensuring its 
internal sovereignty and in pursing and achieving its core interests — ensuring physical 
[territorial and border] security, promoting [political, economic, ideological, and cultural] 
values, and ensuring economic [domestic and international] prosperity — and the most 
malleable with respect to the changing threat. It is also perhaps, along with the 
informational instrument, or element, of national power, the most diverse.383 
The overarching mission of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Attorney-General, 
and the U.S. federal law enforcement community is to enforce the law and defend the 
interests of the United States according to the law; to ensure public safety against threats 
foreign and domestic; to provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; 
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to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and 
impartial administration of justice for all Americans.384 
Combating terrorism and other threats to national security is the highest priority 
mission of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Attorney-General, and the U.S. federal law 
enforcement community. Combating terrorism and other threats to national security is 
inherently inter-and multi-agency and includes the following functions. 
The mission of the U.S. federal law enforcement community — Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI); U.S. Marshals Service (USMS); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); U.S. Secret 
Service (USSS); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP); Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS); Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA); U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (US-CIS); U.S. Border Patrol (USBP); Federal Protective Service (FPS); the 
U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS); the criminal investigations’ and 
counterintelligence elements of the U.S. Departments of State and Defense; the military 
services (including the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); and the investigative services and 
police forces organic to the other federal departments and agencies — is to protect and 
defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and 
enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal 
justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners; and 
to perform these responsibilities in a manner that is responsive to the needs of the public 
and is faithful to the Constitution of the United States. 
The major functions of U.S. Department of Justice, the Attorney-General, and the 
U.S. federal law enforcement community are to: 
 Conduct professional investigations and authorized intelligence collection 
to identify and counter the threat posed by domestic and international 
terrorists and their supporters within the United States, and to pursue 
extraterritorial criminal investigations to bring the perpetrators of terrorist 
acts to justice,  
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 Design, develop, and implement counterterrorism initiatives which 
enhance the nation’s ability to minimize the terrorist threat,  
 Conduct counterintelligence activities and coordinate counterintelligence 
activities of other agencies in the intelligence community within the 
United States. (Executive Order 12333 (as amended) includes 
international terrorist activities in its definition of counterintelligence.),  
 Coordinate the efforts of U.S. government agencies and departments in 
protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure by identifying and 
investigating criminal and terrorist group intrusions through physical and 
cyber attacks,  
 Investigate violations of the laws of the United States and collect evidence 
in cases in which the United States is or may be a party in interest, except 
in cases in which such responsibility is by statute or otherwise specifically 
assigned to another investigative agency;  
 Locate and apprehend fugitives for violations of specified federal laws 
and, when so requested, state and local fugitives pursuant to federal 
statutory authority,  
 Conduct professional investigations to identify, disrupt, and dismantle 
existing and emerging criminal enterprises whose activities affect the 
United States, and  
 Address international criminal organizations and terrorist groups, which 
threaten the American people and their property, through expanded 
international liaison and through the conduct of extraterritorial 
investigations as mandated by laws and Executive Orders.385 
Additional missions and functions include, but are not exclusively limited to, 
providing for the security of federal court facilities and the safety of judges and other 
court personnel; apprehending criminals; exercising custody of federal prisoners and 
providing for their security and transportation to correctional facilities; executing federal 
court orders, seizing assets gained by illegal means and providing for the custody, 
management, and disposal of forfeited assets, assuring the safety of endangered 
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government witnesses and their families; collecting and disbursing funds;386 regulating 
the firearms and explosives industries;387 enforcing controlled substances laws and 
regulations of the United States;388 safeguarding the nation’s financial infrastructure and 
payment systems to preserve the integrity of the economy, protecting national leaders, 
visiting heads of state and government, designated sites and National Special Security 
Events (NSSEs)389 enforcing immigration and customs by targeting illegal immigrants 
and the people, money and materials that support terrorism and other criminal 
activities;390 managing, securing and controlling the nation’s border to prevent terrorists 
and terrorist weapons from entering the United States by extending the zone of security 
beyond the physical borders protecting American businesses from theft of their 
intellectual property and unfair trade practices; regulating and facilitating international 
trade; collecting import duties; enforcing trade laws related to admissibility; regulating 
trade practices to collect the appropriate revenue; and maintaining export controls; 
controlling the borders by apprehending individuals attempting to enter the United States 
illegally, stemming the flow of illegal drugs and other contraband; protecting agriculture 
and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases; processing all people, vehicles 
and cargo entering the United States;391 promoting confidence in the nation’s civil 
aviation system by detecting, deterring, and defeating hostile acts targeting U.S. air 
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carriers, airports, passengers, and crews;392 preventing terrorists and terrorists’ weapons, 
including weapons of mass destruction, from entering the United States;393 protecting the 
nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and 
commerce.394 
The intelligence instrument, or element, of national power integrates foreign, 
military, and domestic capabilities through policy, personnel, and technology actions to 
provide decision advantage to policy makers, diplomats, financiers and economists, 
strategic communicators, war fighters, homeland security officials, and law enforcement.  
In this environment, the key to achieving lasting strategic advantage is the ability to 
rapidly and accurately anticipate and adapt to complex challenges.395 Simply put 
intelligence guards against surprise. 
In addition to its traditional role supporting other instruments of American power, 
intelligence today has an ability to create conditions to prevent, preempt, and deter 
adversaries. Having an understanding of the intelligence capabilities of the adversary and 
his ability to develop the situation from his perspective, is also a critical element in 
understanding the operational environment. 
Given this, the intelligence instrument, or element, of national power is inherently 
inter- and multi-disciplinary. It is composed of a diverse community of interlocking and 
mutually supportive disciplines that include, but are not exclusively limited to indications 
and warning intelligence, current and operational intelligence, counterintelligence, 
counter-proliferation, science and technology, and of course, anti- and counterterrorism. 
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Intelligence is both information and an organized system for collecting and 
exploiting it — planning, direction, and targeting; collection; exploitation, processing, 
and analysis; production and dissemination; and evaluation and feedback. It is both an 
activity and a product of that activity. Perhaps most importantly, it is an evolving 
discipline focused on ensuring its ability to accurately forecast the future environment 
and anticipate future threats and missions for U.S. policy and decision makers through an 
intelligence enterprise strategy that aligns ends, ways, and means. Intelligence, overtly, 
covertly, or clandestinely, is therefore the primary enabler in a basic national security 
policy that is designed to detect, deter and contain, discredit and delegitimize, deny and 
disrupt, and defeat all manners of adversaries. 
Intelligence is something broader than information:  
 
 Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information 
important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and 
provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of 
these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and 
the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities; or  
 Intelligence is the process of gathering, processing, reporting, and 
disseminating finished, actionable intelligence to decision makers and 
other users with a need to know. Reduced to its simplest terms, 
intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around the U.S.; 
the prelude to decision and action by U.S. policymakers. 
Timely, accurate, and insightful information about the activities, capabilities, 
plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons, and their agents, is 
essential to the national security of the United States. All reasonable and lawful means 
must be used to ensure that the United States will receive the best intelligence 
possible.396 
The United States intelligence effort provides the President, the National Security 
Council, and the Homeland Security Council with the necessary information on which to 
base decisions concerning the development and conduct of foreign, defense, and 
economic policies, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign 
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security threats. All departments and agencies cooperate fully to fulfill this goal and397 
the national intelligence effort takes into account and considers the responsibilities and 
requirements of state, local, and tribal governments and, as appropriate, private sector 
entities, when undertaking the collection and dissemination of information and 
intelligence to protect the United States. 
Intelligence and operational coordination among the federal departments and 
agencies is essential to protect the United States from terrorist attacks and other 
disruptive natural, man-made, and/or technological incidents. It is critical that actionable 
intelligence relative to situational awareness and incident management be continuously 
communicated and socialized among federal agencies. 
The United States intelligence effort provides the President and the National 
Security (and Homeland Security Council) Council with the necessary information on 
which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and 
economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign 
security threats. Given that the current and anticipated strategic environment models 
closely resemble chaos theory: initial conditions are essential, trends are nonlinear, and 
challenges will emerge suddenly due to unpredictable systems behavior. In this 
environment, one prerequisite for decision advantage is global awareness: the ability to 
develop, digest, and manipulate vast and disparate data streams about the world as it is 
today. Another requirement is strategic foresight: the ability to probe existing conditions 
and use the responses to consider alternative hypotheses and scenarios, and determine 
linkages, all federal executive branch departments and agencies cooperate fully to fulfill 
this goal.398 
Intelligence employs quiet means to improve U.S. decision making while 
simultaneously frustrating that of the nation’s enemies. The U.S. Intelligence Community 
works behind the scenes to inform and facilitate the actions of diplomatic, military, law 
enforcement, and other customers. It seeks to ensure that U.S. decision and policy makers 
                                                 
397 Executive Order no. 12,333, United States Intelligence Activities. 
398 Ibid. 
 231
know as much as possible about a situation and that their initiatives have the best chance 
for success. At the same time, intelligence also helps to impair the reliability, speed, and 
efficacy of adversaries’ decision-making in to help our customers achieve decision 
advantage.  
Decision advantage results in the ability of the United States to bring any one or 
all of the instruments of national power to bear in ways that resolve challenges, defuse 
crises, or deflect emerging threats. According to Jennifer Sims, Director of Intelligence 
Studies, Georgetown University “...the key to intelligence-driven victories may not be the 
collection of objective ‘truth’ so much as the gaining of an information edge or 
competitive advantage over an adversary. Such an advantage can dissolve a decision-
maker’s quandary and allow him to act. This ability to lubricate choice is the real 
objective of intelligence.”399 
The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is a federation of executive branch 
agencies and organizations that work separately and together to conduct intelligence 
activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national 
security of the United States. 400 The intelligence community consists of: the Director of 
National Intelligence, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, 
Army Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Intelligence, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, 
Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps Intelligence, National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, and 
Navy Intelligence.401 
These agencies are included in the IC as specified in Title 50 of the U.S. Code. In 
addition to these organizations, there are other departments and agencies which have 
intelligence requirements and participate in information-sharing activities with the 
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statutory members of the IC. These organizations, known as “Non-Title 50” entities, 
include the Department of Transportation, the Department of Health and Human 
Services, the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The IC’s activities 
include, but are not limited to, the following:402 
 Collection of information needed by the President, the National Security 
Council and Homeland Security Council, the Secretaries of State and 
Defense, and other Executive Branch officials for the performance of their 
duties and responsibilities; and, as appropriate, the Congress of the United 
States; 
 Production and dissemination of intelligence; 
 Collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to 
protect against, intelligence activities directed against the U.S., 
international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other 
hostile activities directed against the U.S. by foreign powers, 
organizations, persons, and their agents; 
 Special activities; 
 Administrative and support activities within the U.S. and abroad necessary 
for the performance of authorized activities; and 
 Such other intelligence activities as the President may direct from time to 
time.  
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) serves as the head of the Intelligence 
Community (IC). The DNI also acts as the principal advisor to the President, the National 
Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to 
the national security; and oversees and directs the implementation of the National 
Intelligence Program. The President appoints the DNI with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. The Director is assisted by a Senate-confirmed Principal Deputy Director of 
National Intelligence (PDDNI), appointed by the President with the advice and consent of 
the Senate.403  
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By ensuring the timely and effective dissemination of intelligence to those who 
need it, ranging from the President, to heads of executive departments, to military forces, 
and to law enforcement communities, the intelligence instrument of power relates to 
continuous operations to develop the situation and generate the intelligence that allows 
the U.S. government to take actions against adversaries. 
Intelligence systems permit the U.S. government to understand adversary/enemy 
intent and capabilities; identify and quantify relative and acceptable risk; predict threat 
actions and vectors; describe and quantify effects, costs, and consequences; and detect an 
adversary’s/enemy’s movements, providing them the time necessary to take protective, 
preventive, and proactive response and recovery measures. Long before conflict occurs, 
intelligence must help provide a more thorough understanding of adversaries’ 
motivations, goals, and end state to determine effective deterrent courses of action. 
Achieving decision superiority (i.e., information dominance) in a dynamic 
environment requires the synchronization and integration of all sources of intelligence 
and information to include those from DoD and non-DoD agencies, law enforcement and 
multinational partners. Intelligence support must also be continuous across the entire 
spectrum of conflict, and span the range of all operations: pre-hostility, crisis, and major 
combat operations; to post-conflict stability operations.404 
Intelligence operations strategies that support conflict prevention, mitigate against 
surprise attack, and position intelligence to best answer war fighting needs are an 
essential element of this support. Intelligence campaign plans implement these strategies 
by defining the comprehensive intelligence needs for all phases of operations and 
campaigns, including intelligence all-source analysis and production as well as multi-
discipline collection, processing, and supporting information architecture. Such plans also 
provide for the widest possible dissemination and sharing of relevant information to 
ensure national and international unity of effort without compromising security. By  
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addressing all aspects of intelligence operations, these plans focus the intelligence 
capabilities of the intelligence community on providing the critical information that leads 
to decision superiority.405  
Given that the U.S.’ primary line of defense remains well forward of the 
homeland, U.S. assets, military and non-military, operating in key regions are essential to 
the defense of the United States and to the protection of allies and U.S. interests. U.S. 
theater security activities with multinational partners provide access to information and 
intelligence critical to anticipating and understanding new threats. This access supports  
the ability of the United States to project power against threats and support the 
establishment of an environment that reduces the conditions that foster extremist 
ideologies.406  
In addition, intelligence partnerships with other nations can take advantage of 
foreign expertise and areas of focus and provide access to previously denied areas. These 
relationships are essential mission components to protecting the United States, 
contributing to deterrence and conflict prevention, as well as preventing surprise attacks. 
The contemporary international environment is a dynamic world in which the 
pace, scope, and complexity of change are increasing. The continued march of 
globalization, the growing number of independent actors and advancing technology has 
increased global connectivity, interdependence, and complexity, creating greater 
uncertainties, systemic risk and a less predictable future. These changes have led to 
reduced warning times and compressed decision cycles.  
To these persistent threats, the intelligence community is adding a growing array 
of emerging missions that expands the list of national security (and hence, intelligence) 
concerns to include: infectious diseases, science and technology surprises, financial 
contagions, economic competition, environmental issues, energy interdependence and 
security, cyber attacks, threats to global commerce, and transnational crime. Foremost 
                                                 
405 Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A strategy for 
Today, A Vision for Tomorrow, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), 33 
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf (accessed September 21, 2008). 
406 Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 18.  
 235
among these challenges is the blurring of lines that once separated foreign and domestic 
intelligence, and the increased importance of homeland security.407 
Terrorism cannot occur without some infusion of and access to financial assets. 
The amounts involved do not necessarily have to be large. They will vary according to 
the strategies and methods adopted by the terrorists. Whereas some will have major 
projects (such as the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry, recruitment, or the provision 
of welfare to their supporters) that require significant long-term funding, others will have 
more modest financial needs. However, all terrorists need money to finance expenditure, 
if only for day to day living expenses.  
As such, there is an almost constant need for them to raise and move money. The 
means by which they do so encompasses a wide range of both legal and illegal activity. 
Terrorism can often be financed from legitimately obtained income. Charitable 
contributions, for example, can be major sources of funding, with non-governmental 
organizations having been the focus of much investigative work over recent years. 
Informal money transfer systems can also be vulnerable to use by terrorists and terrorist 
organizations. 
Terrorist attacks against the United States; U.S. citizens, nationals and persons; 
and/or U.S. interests worldwide constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. Given the 
pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial foundation of foreign terrorists, 
financial sanctions may be appropriate for those foreign persons that support or otherwise 
associate with these foreign terrorists. Therefore, there a need exists for further 
consultation and cooperation with, and sharing of information by, the United States and 
foreign governments and financial institutions as an additional tool to enable the United 
States to combat the financing of terrorism.408 
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Terrorists use a wide variety of methods to move money within and between 
organizations, including the financial sector, the physical movement of cash by couriers, 
and the movement of goods through the trade system. Charities and alternative remittance 
systems have also been used to disguise terrorist movement of funds. The adaptability 
and opportunism shown by terrorist organizations suggests that all the methods that exist 
to move money around the globe are to some extent at risk. 
Disrupting funding flows creates a hostile environment for terrorism, constraining 
overall capabilities of terrorists and helping frustrate their ability to execute attacks.  
Disrupting terrorist financing involves both systemic safeguards, which protect the 
financial system from criminal abuse, and targeted economic sanctions informed by 
counter-terrorism intelligence. 
There is a significant body of professional and scholarly literature that highlights 
the links between financial tools and wider counter-terrorist activity. The effectiveness of 
authorities at both detecting and investigating terrorist activity is significantly enhanced 
when counter-terrorist intelligence and financial information are used together to detect, 
deter and contain, disrupt, and defeat terrorism through the auspices and authorities of the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tax and Regulation; FinCEN, known as Financial Crimes and 
Enforcement Network; the Office of Foreign Asset Control, known as OFAC; the U.S. 
Mint; and the Office of Terrorist Financing. 
For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD) February 2008 Financial Action Task Force recommended four areas which 
could be the focus of efforts to further strengthen counter-terrorist financing efforts: (1) 
action to address jurisdictional issues including safe havens and failed states, (2) outreach 
to the private sector to ensure the availability of information to detect terrorist financing, 
(3) building a better understanding across public and private sectors and (4) enhanced 
financial intelligence to exploit the value of financial investigation as a tool in fighting 
terrorism.409 
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The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence (TFI) marshals the department’s intelligence and enforcement functions with 
the aim of safeguarding the financial system against illicit use and combating rogue 
nations, terrorist facilitators, weapons of mass destruction and effects (WMD/E) 
proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats. The 
mission, goals and objectives, and expectations of the office, in partnership with other 
U.S. financial enforcement and regulatory organizations and their foreign counterparts, is 
to gather and analyze information from the intelligence, law enforcement, and financial 
communities as to how terrorists and other criminals earn, move, and store money and 
take appropriate policy, regulatory, or enforcement action based on this analysis, 
including: freezing the assets of terrorists, drug kingpins, and their support networks; 
cutting off corrupt foreign jurisdictions and financial institutions from the U.S. financial 
system; developing and enforcing regulations to address the vulnerabilities of the U.S. to 
terrorist financing and money laundering; promoting the international adoption and 
implementation of counter-terrorist financing and anti-money laundering standards; 
tracing and repatriating assets looted by corrupt foreign officials in such countries as Iraq, 
Liberia, and Haiti; and promoting a meaningful exchange of information with the private 
financial sector to help it detect and address threats to the financial system.410 
The financial instrument of power is closely related to the economic instrument of 
power; there are, however, some important differences. The economic instrument of 
power concerns issues such as regional and bilateral trade, infrastructure development, 
and foreign investment. Examples of the use of the economic instrument of power might 
include enacting trade sanctions, enacting restrictions on technology transfers, and 
reducing security assistance programs. The financial instrument of power concerns issues 
such as the transfer of funds and banking.  
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) states that financial 
systems are used by terrorist organizations as a fiscal sanctuary in which to store and 
transfer the funds that support their survival and operations. Terrorist organizations use a 
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variety of financial systems, including formal banking, wire transfers, debit and other 
stored value cards, online value storage and value transfer systems, the informal “hawala” 
system, and cash couriers.411 According to the NSCT, the United States will continue to 
work with our allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism ...We will identify and block the 
sources of funding for terrorism, freeze the assets of terrorists and those who support  
them, deny terrorists access to the international financial system, protect legitimate 
charities from being abused by terrorists, and prevent the movement of terrorists’ assets 
through alternative financial networks.412 
According to Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United 
States, (Washington, D.C., The Joint Staff, 14 November 2000),413 the economic 
instrument of power is the leveraging of a nation’s wealth to influence the behavior of 
others. The more global the world’s economy becomes, the more important the use of 
economic power becomes–and the more effective. 
Unlike the ideological conflicts that dominated the world throughout the entire 
twentieth century, economic concerns now tend to dominate decisions and priorities. 
Application of economic power shapes, focuses, and tailors international activity through 
United States government spending and taxation -both discretionary and entitlement 
program activities (the Office of Management and Budget is the overall lead), policy on 
money supply and interest rates (the Federal Reserve Board is the lead federal agency), 
trade agreements, trade policy, and other negotiated trade arrangements in addition to 
U.S. government policy to promote international trade activity (through the auspices of 
the U.S. Department of Commerce and Department of State) and sometimes U.S. trade 
interests. Although boring and mundane compared to the other elements of national 
power, this element, especially the money supply and interest rate aspect, is critical for 
stability both domestically and overseas.414 
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The economic instrument uses the application of material resources to achieve 
national objectives. Nations employ economic means to protect their own industries and 
markets, to improve the quality of life of their people, to stabilize the economy and 
government of friends and allies, and to deter destabilizing and hostile actions by other  
nations. Specific economic means include regulation of trade practices, loans and loan 
guarantees, monetary and investment policies, foreign aid, subsidies, and technology 
transfers.  
As with the diplomatic instrument, the economic instrument generally has 
primacy over the military instrument during peace and is often used before military force 
during a crisis; changes in trade or monetary policy, economic sanctions, or some type of 
embargo are frequently the first steps taken in an effort to influence an adversary’s 
behavior. However, economic considerations continue to be at the forefront of any 
conflict, and the use of economic measures to support the friendly war effort and to 
undermine the enemy’s ability to resist continues throughout the course of a conflict or 
war. 415 
A nation can choose a variety of methods in applying economic power. Liberal or 
restrictive trade policies can open up or deny markets to the other nations of the world. 
The United States has long used foreign aid to entice other nations into taking actions 
favorable to U.S. interests and applied economic sanctions against enemies of the United 
States in attempts to influence the behavior of “unfriendly” nations. 
Other examples of the application of the financial and economic instruments of 
power include, but are not exclusively limited to, the use of, or the threat to use, 
economic means against a country in order to weaken its economy and thereby reduce its 
political and military power. Economic warfare also includes the use of economic means 
to compel an adversary to change its policies or behavior or to undermine its ability to 
conduct normal relations with other countries. Some common means of economic 
warfare are blockades, trade embargoes, boycotts, sanctions, trades, tax, and tariff 
discrimination, the freezing of capital assets, the suspension of aid, the prohibition of 
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investment and other capital flows, and expropriation, capturing critical economic 
resources, depriving the enemy forces of those resources so that they cannot fight the war 
properly, preemptive purchasing, and blacklisting of individuals, corporations, and state 
agents. 
Historically, the effectiveness of the economic instrument of national power has 
not been very good – particularly in cases of dealing with authoritarian and totalitarian 
dictatorships, failing and failed states, and/or rogue states. In these cases, the withdrawal 
of foreign aid or the application of economic sanctions often failed to impact the intended 
targets. A nation’s population might have been impacted, but the leadership was left 
largely untouched. It is rare that a government has actually changed its policy based on 
the application of economic power alone, but in combination with the other instruments 
of national power, economics can be a very effective tool. 
Naming a country on the terrorism list triggers a series of economic sanctions 
under different U.S. laws. These sanctions include: 
 Restrictions on export licenses (or a general ban) for dual-use items or 
critical technology (under the Export Administration Act of 1979)  
 Ban on sales or licenses for items on the U.S. Munitions Control List 
(under the Arms Export Control Act)  
 Ban on U.S. foreign assistance including Export-Import Bank credits and 
guarantees (under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961)  
 Authorization for the president to restrict or ban imports of goods and 
services from designated terrorist countries (under the International 
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985)  
 Prohibition of financial transactions by US persons with the governments 
of designated terrorist countries (under the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996)  
 Requirement that US representatives at international financial institutions 
vote against loans or other financial assistance to that country (under the 
International Financial Institutions Act of 1977)  
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 Ineligibility for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP, under the 
Trade Act of 1974)416 
Another central legislative initiative with respect to U.S. counterterrorism policy 
is the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. This Act provides for the 
designation of “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs) by the Secretary of State, a 
designation equivalent to the state sponsor designation. The Act also included provisions 
aimed at disrupting financial flows to FTOs: Section 303 makes it a crime for U.S. 
residents to knowingly provide material support or resources to a designated FTO. In 
addition, financial institutions are required to block funds in “which a foreign terrorist 
organization, or its agent, has an interest” and report the existence of these funds to the 
Treasury. The Treasury may require U.S. financial institutions to freeze assets of a 
designated FTO.417 
The “USA PATRIOT Act” passed by Congress at the end of October 2001 
strengthened the criminal laws against terrorism and expands the ability of U.S. law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies to track and detain suspected terrorists. The act 
also includes several measures to disrupt money laundering and other methods of terrorist 
financing.418 
The PATRIOT Act requires that foreign banks with corresponding accounts in 
U.S. banks designate a point person to receive subpoenas related to these accounts. 
Furthermore, U.S. banks are barred from doing business with banks that have no physical 
facility or operate outside the regulated banking system. The Treasury also has the 
authority to require banks to scrutinize deposits from residents of nations that do not 
cooperate with U.S. officials.419 
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The Act also includes a provision that allows the Treasury to impose sanctions on 
banks that refuse to provide information to law enforcement agencies. The threat of U.S. 
sanctions sends an important message about the level of U.S. commitment to foreign 
banks. Nevertheless, previous efforts to extend the force of U.S. sanctions to third 
countries have always been contentious. Coordination of efforts within the G-8 and the 
United Nations Security Council may eventually prove to be successful in securing 
international cooperation than the threat of secondary economic sanctions.420 
Economic capacity and development are key links to both the natural and social 
determinants of power. In terms of natural resources, as already illustrated, a nation may 
be well-endowed, but lacks the ability to convert/translate (i.e., operationalize) its 
abundance of natural resources into military capabilities, scientific and technological 
advancements and actionable engineering initiatives — especially in communications, 
information and knowledge management systems, and automated system command and 
control architectures, commercially viable and tradable economic and financial 
instruments, sustainable manufacturing and distribution industries and systems, 
operational high-technology exports, and other manifestations of power.421  
Although economic capacity and development are essential to establishing, 
operationalizing, and maintaining national power — specifically military power — an 
excess of military spending can erode the underlying basis for a nation’s power and its 
basic national security policy and capabilities if it occurs at the expense of a larger 
economy and reduces the national ability to invest in future economic growth.422 
For developing countries already, and chronically, short of economic investment 
capital, military spending represents a serious allocation of resources. However, even  
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developed, advanced countries, especially since the end of the Cold War, have had to 
make some choices between military and non-military investments and resulting 
capabilities.  
In the post-1945 environment, political stability and governmental legitimacy are 
increasingly linked to domestic economic performance. Excessive military spending, as 
the former Soviet Union discovered, can be dangerous and counterproductive, if not  
genuinely destructive, for large and small countries alike if the government cannot 
achieve and maintain the “quality” of life and associated goals, objectives, and 
expectations of its citizenry.423 
Strong domestic economies and self-sustaining financial systems also produce 
actionable non-military national power in the international arena. Through their military, 
informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, financial, and economic — MIDLIFE — 
instruments of national power, leading industrialized nations have available all the tools, 
tactics, and techniques for exercising power, including rewards or punishment by means 
of foreign trade, foreign aid, and investment and loans, as well as the mere consequences 
their domestic policies can have on the global economy.424 
This type of power can be weakened, however, if a nation suffers from high 
inflation, a large foreign debt, or chronic balance-of-payment deficits. In short, the 
strength of a nation’s economy has a direct effect on the variety, resiliency, and 
credibility of its international economic options. 
Consequently, economic considerations are closely interrelated to other elements 
of power. The importance of economics is amply demonstrated in today’s increasingly 
interdependent world that is characterized by increasing competition for finite natural 
resources, divergent growth rates and disparities in age and gender cohorts, speed and 
complexity of communications and transportation, and dependence on technology. 
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Interdependence, including globalization and integration, has caused major 
changes in the economic element of national power. Globally, national economies have 
become, and remain, more dependent on international trade and on financial markets that 
have become truly global, integrated, and interpenetrated, in scope and operations. 
From a security perspective, this type of economic interpenetration is reflected in 
the mutual vulnerability of national economies. Moreover, national economic policies are 
increasing influenced by a myriad of international non-governmental organizations such 
as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), while multinational corporations consistently, 
and quite effectively, manipulate the domestic politics of nation-states to further their 
transnational interests.425 
Taken together, the financial and economic instruments, when backed by the 
operational capabilities of the intelligence and legal and law enforcement instruments, 
can be effective and powerful combination in deterring and containing, disrupting, and 
defeating potential adversaries by denying them access to financial resources. 
Conversely, however, history has also taught that denying certain actors’ access to 
financial and related resources — Japan in the 1930s, can drive them towards initiating 
open hostilities.426 
In sum, the instruments of national power — military, informational, diplomatic, 
legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic — are closely tied to the 
national will and are an expression of the national will. The national will is the 
cumulative, yet intangible, instrument of national power. Cultivating national will simply 
means that the national leadership explains to the American people why they would like 
to use the instruments of national power , especially the military instrument and when 
they expect to return those forces to the people, their rightful owners. The national will as 
a vital component of national power and is simultaneously dispositional and situational. 
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It seems virtually self-evident that national will is, at best, hard to recognize in a 
quantitative sense, but it remains equally true that it is the decisive element of power in a 
free society. The people are the ultimate source of a national strength and power. 
The psychosocial element, the national will, is the cumulative instrument, or 
element, of national power. How powerfully, or how weakly, it manifests itself dictates to 
a significant degree how strongly the other elements of power can be employed within a 
national strategy to obtain national objectives.427 If misunderstood, it can lead the nation 
to the point at which the United States and its pursuit of national objectives are out of 
synch with the national will. This disconnect in a pluralistic democracy, in a free and 
open society, can lead ultimately to an inability to achieve objectives. The result is a loss 
of national prestige, credibility, and power.  
Specifically, without a national will to exercise power, a nation becomes 
powerless to provide a decisive basic national security policy and strategy. A country can 
have all the tools, the instruments of national power, but without the will to use them, it 
expresses no power. 
As stated earlier, all of the instruments of national power are linked. Therefore, 
how Americans as a nation accomplish core national objectives is interrelated, so much 
so that it is essential for national will to be equally considered if the nation is to be 
successful in achieving and sustaining its national policies and end state. The outcome 
will be a better national security strategy, effectively providing for and countering threats 
to national security. 
The value of the psychosocial or national will element of power is often neglected 
by national leaders in developing an appropriate national strategy to achieve national 
objectives. In order for the U.S.’ national will to be operationalized and employed as the 
basic national security policy and strategy and through its instruments of national power,  
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history has demonstrated that Americans must perceive a threat to their territorial 
integrity or a catastrophe before its national will will allow for achievement of national 
objectives. 
A traditional view of international politics holds that national will is ‘‘the degree 
of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its government in 
peace or war.’’428 Put another way, national will is the ‘‘popular dedication to the nation 
and support for its policies, even when that support requires sacrifice.’’429 These views of 
national will imply that it serves as an intangible, but extremely important factor without 
which the nation’s government cannot pursue its policies fully (if it can pursue them at 
all).430 Though not constant, this intangible factor can vary within the population, and it 
can vary overtime.  
Why is national will important? It is important because the true resolve of a nation 
is reflected in the willingness of its citizens to sacrifice or fight for what they believe in. 
A noted scholar, Hans Morgenthau, has said that national will “exerts a permanent and 
often decisive influence upon the weight a nation is able to put into the scales of 
international politics.”431  
According to Clausewitz, the aim in war is to achieve one’s will.432 The 
immediate requirement is to overcome one’s enemy’s ability to resist, which is a product 
of the physical means at his disposal and the strength of his will. One must either 
eliminate his physical ability to resist or, short of this, one must destroy his will to resist. 
In military terms, this means the defeat of the enemy’s fighting forces, but always in a 
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wrote that “When we speak of destroying the enemy’s forces, we must emphasize that 
nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical force: the moral element must also be 
considered.”433  
The national will, then, can influence our national objectives in many ways. Its 
importance is that it is the sensing reason, justifying and confirming our physical efforts. 
“The effects of physical and psychological factors form an organic whole which, unlike a 
metal alloy, is inseparable by chemical processes.”434 It appears that regardless of 
physical effort or capability, the moral factor produces causes and effects which truly 
dictate our possibilities. “The moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the 
finely-honed blade.”435  
National will, as an element of power, provides the framework for painting the 
American experience. While perception is a part of reality, a country’s will is something 
deeper and more enduring than image. It is more precious than military power, political 
power, or economic power. When military, political, or economic power fades, they can 
be recovered. When a national will fades, it is almost irretrievable.  
The world is changing rapidly. American notions of the geopolitical structures of 
this lifetime are being fundamentally altered. The national will must accept the changes 
and recognize legitimate opportunities for leadership, if the U.S. is to stay the course. The 
real character of a nation is its will to persevere. 
In the twenty-first century, as the elements of military power merge to essential 
equivalence, the nonmilitary actors of power become more important. The U.S. has the 
strength in the other elements of power. The U.S. must maintain its confidence to act in 
defense of its vital interests in what is now a highly fluid, dimensionally complex, multi-
polar, and dangerous, world by judiciously employing U.S. instruments, or elements, of 
national power, individually and in combination, in ways consistent with American 
national will to achieve, maintain, and operationalize the strategic advantage.  
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X. ACHIEVING THE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE 
The ultimate objective of basic U.S. national security policy and strategy is to 
frame and shape the situation in ways favorable and advantageous to the U.S. in order to 
protect and advance the nation’s core interests — ensuring the physical (territorial and 
border) security of the nation, the nation’s (political, economic, ideological, and cultural) 
values, and the nation’s economic (domestic and international) prosperity — and achieve 
and maintain the nation’s core end state — provide enduring security for the American 
people. To be effective, the policy and strategy must align, synchronize, and balance both 
the courses of action (i.e., ways) and the capabilities of the instruments of national power 
(i.e., means or resources) to detect, deter and prevent, deny and disrupt, contain, and 
decisively defeat current and emerging threats to the nation’s survival, vital, and 
important interests overseas in theaters of operations distant from the U.S. homeland 
while simultaneously maintaining the highest state of preparedness possible at home and 
abroad in order to protect against, prevent if possible, respond to, and recover from the 
effects and consequences of attacks and disruptive incidents that do occur. To accomplish 
its goals, basic U.S. national security policy must be capable of achieving and sustaining 
the strategic advantage. 
As stated previously in Chapter V, at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, the U.S. faces unprecedented challenges and opportunities. Secondly, 
globalization and the many “revolutions in technology” have done much to integrate the 
global community by dramatically shortening and expediting the ability of others to 
communicate, now nearly instantaneously, and process information to frame and shape, 
and sometimes corrupt, the operational environment.436 However, globalization has not 
reduced the amount of time required to mobilize, generate, and deploy resources distant 
from one’s own border. Consequently, the need for overseas presence, and the 
concomitant ability to project actionable power, remains as great as ever. 
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While the nature of warfare will continue to be characterized as the violent clash 
of wills between nations or armed groups in the pursuit of advantageous political ends, 
the conduct of joint warfare includes both violent and nonviolent means. The successful 
and favorable resolution and termination of conflict will require employing all of the 
instruments of national power. Given this, conflict and warfare will most likely arise out 
of seemingly distant innocent crises characterized by deteriorating situations involving 
natural or man-made catastrophes leading to potential humanitarian, societal, or state 
instability and an increased likelihood of conflict. Preparing for and responding to these 
crises will continue to require the U.S. maintain elements of its military, informational, 
diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic instruments 
of national power deployed and ready abroad in order to execute interagency mission 
operations associated with crisis resolution consistent with U.S. national interests and to 
frame and shape the situation in ways favorable and advantageous to the U.S. 
What does this mean for U.S. basic national security policy and the national 
security establishment — the personnel, facilities, resources, and supporting 
infrastructures responsible for it — at home and abroad? First and foremost, departments 
and agencies responsible for formulating, implementing and executing, maintaining, and 
enhancing basic national security policy and strategy must emphasize the concepts of 
unity of purpose and effort437 and continue to engage, especially those resources 
stationed abroad, with allied, partner, adversaries, and competitor countries, even as the 
terms of these engagements grow more complex. Indeed, the number of programs 
operated out of U.S. overseas facilities and establishment (i.e., Embassies, Stations and 
Legation, and Geographic Combatant Command headquarters) is expanding. 
According to Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, presence is defined as the state of 
being present, or of being within sight or call, or at hand; as opposed to absence.438 
YourDictionary defines presence as the fact or condition of being present; existence, 
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occurrence, or attendance at some place or in some thing.439 From the perspective of the 
purpose of this paper, the FreeDictionary provides the most relevant definition: the 
diplomatic, political, or military influence of a nation in a foreign country, especially as 
evidenced by the posting of its diplomats or its troops there.440  
Interestingly enough, The Joint Publications 1-02, Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms does not include a definition of presence. 
However, Joint Publication 1-0, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 
clearly states that an extended U.S. presence will be required, post-termination, to 
conduct stability operations to enable legitimate civil authority and attain the national 
strategic end state441 and that, as a nation, the United States wages war employing all 
instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives on terms favorable 
to the United States.442 It can therefore be inferred from this entry that a U.S. presence is 
necessary prior to and during operations because presence demonstrates U.S. 
commitment, facilitates access, enhances deterrence, and supports the transition from 
peace to war and a return to peace once hostilities have ended on terms favorable to the 
U.S. 
The U.S.’ ability to maintain and fully employ its military, informational, 
diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic resources 
overseas enhances U.S. security and that of its partners, bolsters prosperity, and promotes 
democracy. This ability is commonly called “presence.” 
In the context of U.S. basic national security policy and strategy, presence, 
especially forward military, informational (i.e., cultural), diplomatic, legal and law 
enforcement, intelligence (overt, covert, and clandestine), financial, and economic 
presence, unequivocally demonstrates U.S. resolve and sets the conditions for stability 
and undeniable commitment to a cause. U.S. presence, government and private sector, 
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creates a planning and future operational environment that is conducive to establishing 
and operationalizing information dominance, or knowledge superiority, (situational 
awareness of the common operating picture) and thus creating a strategic advantage. 
Presence is therefore the ability to project actionable U.S. power and influence, 
the means by which the U.S. frames and shapes the international environment in ways 
favorable to the nation’s interests and objectives. Presence is and has been a fundamental 
principle of U.S. basic national security policy and strategy since 1942, and perhaps as 
early as 1898. Ultimately, actionable influence and leverage is gained through the totality 
of the instruments of national power — military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law 
enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic – and underpinned by the strength of 
the nation’s geographic and demographic position and its resources and/or access to 
resources. 
Since the end of the Second World War, presence and power projection have been 
indispensable characteristics of the U.S. basic national security policy. Since the early 
1990s, however, they have become a fundamental strategic concept in support of the 
President’s National Security Strategy of the United States because the principal 
operational challenge facing the U.S. in this century so far is the requirement for early 
and continuous application of strategic responsiveness across the full spectrum of 
conflict, while simultaneously protecting against physical and asymmetric attacks 
targeting the continental U.S. (CONUS) and the global infrastructure that serves as its 
power-projection base.  
Given this, the basis of the nation’s post-Cold War strategic national security 
posture has been and remains based on selective, but actionable presence and power 
projection. Presence and power projection emphasize rapid mobilization, generation, and 
deployment of military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, 
intelligence, financial, and economic resources to augment and enhance those already 
abroad in order to frame and shape the situation in ways favorable and advantageous to 
the U.S. and to detect, deter and prevent, deny and disrupt, contain, and decisively defeat 
current and emerging threats to the nation’s survival, vital, and important interests 
overseas in theaters of operations distant from the U.S. homeland while simultaneously 
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maintaining the highest state of preparedness possible at home and abroad in order to 
protect against, prevent if possible, respond to, and recover from the effects and 
consequences of attacks and disruptive incidents that do occur. 
The presence of U.S. national security resources overseas represents the 
actionable capabilities available to the U.S.; projection represents the operationalized 
capabilities of these U.S. instruments of national power. 
The proactive nature of presence makes it conceptually well-suited to seize and 
exploit current opportunities and therefore influence the shape of the future international 
security environment with respect to protecting the American people and American 
interests. According to the most recent National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, these are: 
 Avoiding a serious weakening the U.S. economy or undermining 
fundamental values and institutions; 
 Defeating global terrorism and prevent attacks against the U.S. and its 
allies and partners;  
 Defending against and defeating weapons of mass destruction;  
 Expanding economic liberty and prosperity and opportunities;  
 Promoting free and fair trade, open markets, a stable financial system, the 
integration of the global economy, and secure, clean energy development; 
 Building and sustaining strong, flexible alliances; and  
 Advancing human dignity in word and deed, speaking out for freedom and 
against violations of human rights and allocating appropriate resources to 
advance these ideals.443  
Based on threat estimate provided by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 
and the senior officials of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the national security 
challenges the United States will likely face at home and abroad in the next 15 to 20 
years will require the departments and agencies (those holding permanent or occasional 
membership with the National and Homeland Security Councils or their derivative Policy 
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Coordinating Committees) to recognize that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of 
the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally 
political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success 
will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior — 
of friends, adversaries and, most importantly, the people in between.444 
Therefore, the opportunities to frame and shape the world environment are very 
possibly unique to this point in history. Given that the “tipping point” in the 
contemporary balance of power, the U.S.’ strengths, when combined with a posture of 
forward presence can operationalize U.S. influence which can shape the future concept 
and nature of conflict. If U.S. presence can exert the necessary influence it may be able to 
change how nations and non-state actors; the U.S., with the passage of time, has the 
opportunity to influence and change the behavior of the actors to produce a more stable 
international climate and decrease the possibility of protracted conflicts. 
To prepare for and respond to a full spectrum of crises, which in today’s intensely 
integrated and connected information-centric world develop much more quickly, 
precipitously, and aggressively, U.S. resources must be able to respond while in a posture 
of forward global engagement. The instruments of national power- military, 
informational — i.e., cultural, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence – 
overt, clandestine, and covert, financial, and economic – are key to power projection and 
is the ability to alert, mobilize, and deploy and operate anywhere in the world. 
Because of the ambiguity and speed of the threats, and the compressed 
intelligence and decision making cycles times, facing the U.S., its allies and partners, and 
its adversaries and enemies, there is an overarching and compelling need for transcendent 
speed of action. Presence and power projection enable the U.S. national security 
establishment to achieve and operationalize the strategic advantage and subsequently  
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execute proactive, rather than reactive, operations to events in the pursuit of securing and 
sustaining core U.S. interests and frame and shape the situation in ways favorable and 
advantageous to the U.S.  
Presence, in addition to being the “leading edge” of the U.S.’ deterrence and 
containment capability since the mid-1950s, also provides the U.S. national security 
establishment with the ability to achieve and operationalize the strategic advantage445 and 
implement parallel operations — interagency operations that conducted simultaneously 
across the levels of conflict resolution and warfare — that allow for a higher level of 
integration and distributed operations — operations that conducted from dispersed 
locations across time and space to achieve the effects desired; frame and shape the 
situation in ways favorable and advantageous to the U.S. and decisively defeat the 
opponent as quickly and efficiently as possible. 
Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. ability to establish and achieve, 
operationalize, and maintain the strategic advantage446 — which refers to the overall ability 
of a nation to control, or at least influence, the course of events — been based on the United 
States providing leadership to promote global peace and security. It was built on the 
following four foundations: 
 Strategic deterrence and defense, which consisted of a credible nuclear 
deterrent composed of offensive and defensive capabilities;  
 Forward presence, which consisted of military and non-military forces 
continually stationed or deployed worldwide;  
 Crisis response, which was the ability to respond quickly to more than one 
regional crisis; and  
 Reconstitution, which involved the ability to mobilize personnel, 
equipment, and the industrial base to regenerate and/or rebuild the strength 
and reach of the military and other instruments of national power and 
strength.  
                                                 
445 Bruce Berkowitz, Strategic Advantage, Challengers, Competitors, and Threats to America's Future 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 2. 
446 Berkowitz, Strategic Advantage, 2. 
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Presence, and therefore the ability to project actionable and operationalized 
power, is established and maintained by the U.S. country team. The country team is 
composed of the representative capabilities of the military, informational, diplomatic, 
legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic instruments of national 
power, and is headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the 
senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of 
the U.S. diplomatic mission.447 The “country team” is the critical intersection where 
plans, policies, programs, and personalities all come together. The “country team” is the 
in-country nexus for creating and maintaining strategic partnerships based on 
communication and common goals and objectives. 
The U.S. “country team” and its infrastructure overseas is the proverbial “tip of 
the spear” and the vanguard for establishing, achieving, advancing and enhancing, and 
sustaining and maintaining the objectives of U.S. basic national security policy and 
strategy by detecting, deterring and containing, denying and disrupting, and defeating the 
threats to U.S. core interests — ensuring physical (territorial and border) security, 
promoting of (political, economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and ensuring 
economic (domestic and international) prosperity — distant from the U.S. homeland and 
before the threat can manifest itself against the U.S. At home, most, if not all, of the same 
partners support the same objectives by preparing for, protecting against, preventing 
when and where possible, responding to, and recovering from all disruptive events that 
may befall the United States and affect its core interests. 
Presence makes it possible for the U.S. to: 
 Selectively project its national power, influence, and leverage abroad. 
 Promote regional stability by giving form and substance to U.S. bilateral 
and multilateral security commitments 
 Prevent the development of power vacuums and instability 
                                                 
447 Robert B. Oakley, “The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement,” Joint 
Forces Quarterly 47 (4th quarter 2007): 146, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i47/32.pdf 
(accessed September 25, 2008). 
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 Contribute to deterrence by demonstrating the U.S.’ determination and 
capability  
 Position the U.S. to frame and shape the situation in ways favorable and 
advantageous to the U.S. 
 Respond rapidly to crises and decisively resolve them 
 Enhance the effectiveness of operations across the spectrum of conflict 
Presence provides the U.S. with a foundation upon which to formulate and 
conduct security cooperation operations. The operations occur on a conflict spectrum that 
involves an imaginary tripwire. The purpose of presence is to limit American engagement 
to the near side of this tripwire, distant from the U.S. homeland and its critical 
infrastructures and key resources.448 
Establishing and maintaining selective, but comprehensive, U.S. presence at home 
and abroad creates an environment favorable to two overarching strategic concepts — 
forward presence and knowledge superiority — and three operational concepts — 
shaping, framing, and controlling the operational environment, attacking the operational 
environment, and sustaining the operational environment. By combining the strategic and 
operational concepts, U.S. BNSP is better able to detect, deter and contain, deny and 
disrupt, and decisively defeat the threats to U.S. core interests — ensuring physical 
(territorial and border) security, promoting of (political, economic, ideological, and 
cultural) values, and ensuring economic (domestic and international) prosperity — distant 
from the U.S. homeland and before the threat can manifest itself against the U.S.  
Consequently, national security policy and decision makers, the leaders of the 
national security establishment, must ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to 
unity of effort and purpose with their interagency and multinational partners. This is 
imperative with the advent of simultaneous, distributed, and parallel operations 
throughout a global operational environment and across the range of national security 
operations. They must also understand what specific conditions could result in mission 
                                                 
448 Christopher Griffin and Thomas Donnelly, “The Frontline Country Team: A Model for 
Engagement,” American Enterprise Institute (2008) 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080611_CountryTeamReport.pdf (accessed September 20, 2008). 
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termination, as well as those that yield failure. Ideally, these major operations and 
campaigns should contribute to the attainment of established strategic objectives and 
desired end states449 in the most direct and efficient manner possible by seizing the 
initiative450, operationalizing the strategic advantage, and taking the offensive.451. 
To optimize the United States’ overseas presence posture, the departments and 
agencies (those departments and agencies holding permanent or occasional membership 
with the National and Homeland Security Councils or their derivative Policy 
Coordinating Committees) responsible for formulating, implementing and executing, 
maintaining, and enhancing basic national security policy and strategy must continually 
assess this posture to ensure it effectively and efficiently contributes to achieving U.S. 
national security objectives in various regions of the world. This means defining the right 
mix of permanently stationed “country team” forces, rotationally deployed forces, 
temporarily deployed forces and infrastructure, in each region and globally, to conduct 
the full range of operations.452 
As stated in previously, the ability of the United States to achieve and maintain its 
national strategic objectives is dependent on the effectiveness of the U.S. government 
(USG) in employing all of the instruments of national power. They are the means or the 
resources the United States uses to apply its power, including its culture, human potential, 
industry, science and technology, academic institutions, geography, and national will. 
                                                 
449 End State is described as directing every operation toward a clearly defined and attainable 
objective that achieves intended strategic or operational outcomes. 
450 Initiative is described as seizing, retaining, and exploiting opportunities to impose friendly will by 
establishing the terms and conditions of the action, and by forcing the adversary (if present) to react to 
them. 
451 The purpose of an “offensive” action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative by prudently 
concentrating the effects of the instruments of national power alone or in combination power at the right 
place and time to achieve decisive results. 
452 White House, “History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997,” White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html (accessed September 26, 2008). 
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Power projection453 is defined as the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its 
elements of national power — political, economic, informational, or military — to 
rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations 
to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. 
Effective power projection capabilities are largely dependent upon presence. 
Since its independence, the United States has been a power projection nation; 
albeit predominantly a commercial and economic projector of power through the end of 
the Spanish-American War. Alone among the world’s major powers, the United States 
today has a substantial overseas military presence, with enough capability in numerous 
strategically important parts of the world to make an actionable difference in normal day-
to-day regional balances of power.454 
Effective and efficient global power projection is the key to the flexibility 
demanded of U.S. forces and ultimately provides national leaders with more options in 
responding to potential crises and conflicts. Being able to project power allows the 
United States to shape, deter, and respond even when it has no permanent presence or 
limited infrastructure in a region. If necessary, it allows the United States to forcibly enter 
a theater or to create and protect forward operating bases.455 
This ability is a crucial element of a state’s power in executing its national 
security policy and its corresponding strategy. Any state able to direct its military forces 
outside the limited bounds of its territory might be said to have some level of power 
projection capability, but the term itself is used most frequently in reference to militaries 
with a worldwide reach (or at least significantly broader than a state’s immediate area). 
                                                 
453Joint Chief’s of Staff, Joint Operation Planning; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed 
Forces; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 
Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007); and Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, Change 1(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 2008) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed August 15, 2008). 
454 Michael O'Hanlon, Unfinished Business U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2008) 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/06_military_ohanlon/06_military_ohanlon.pdf 
(accessed September 27, 2008). 
455William S. Cohen, “U.S Forces,” Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Defense, 1998) http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr98/chap2.html (accessed September 
27, 2008). 
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Even states with sizable “hard” power (i.e., military and or economic) assets may only be 
able to exert limited regional influence so long as they lack the means of effectively 
projecting their power on a global scale. Generally, only a select few states are able to 
overcome the logistical difficulties inherent in the mobilization, generation, deployment, 
and sustainment and command, control, and direction of modern joint and combined arms 
military forces. 
While traditional measures of power projection typically focus on “hard” power 
(i.e., military and or economic) assets, the developing theory of mobilizing, generating, 
deploying, and employing “soft power” (non-military and non-economic) notes that 
power projection does not necessarily have to involve the active use of military forces in 
armed hostilities and combat. Assets for power projection can often serve dual uses. The 
ability of a state to project its forces into an area may serve as an effective diplomatic 
lever, influencing the decision-making process and acting as a potential deterrent on other 
states’ behavior. 
The foundation of executable national power projection, the operationalized 
presence, is the presence of robust and credible “expeditionary” military, informational 
(i.e., cultural and psychological, public and private), diplomatic, legal and law 
enforcement, intelligence (overt, covert, and clandestine), financial, and economic 
resources — the “country team” — present where vital and important U.S. interests are 
most concentrated (i.e., selective extra hegemonic engagement).  
Alone and in combination, they provide a security framework that is 
complementary that can build and sustain stability and favorably shape regions of interest 
favorably and advantageously to the U.S. and facilitate detecting, deterring and 
containing, denying and disrupting, and decisively defeating all manner of threats to the 
U.S., it core interests, and desired national end state distant from the U.S. homeland and 
before the threat can manifest itself against the U.S. 
Framing and shaping the situation in ways favorable and advantageous to the U.S. 
is a critically important goal, objective, and/or end state of U.S. national security. U.S. 
power projection facilitates advancing, achieving, and maintaining it employing effects-
 261
based unified action to achieve objectives designed to shatter an adversary’s political and 
military cohesion, will, and capacity for resistance quickly, decisively, and at lowest cost 
in lives and other resources; secure the U.S. homeland, critical infrastructures, key 
resources, and key strategic nodes; reduce the effectiveness of adversary asymmetric 
approaches while maintaining a relentless, forward operational pressure to preempt 
adversary efforts, strengths, and opportunities by maintaining continuous operational 
pressure against the adversary; and control the operational tempo and momentum across 
the levels of the operation. 
The U.S. national security establishment accomplishes this by seeking, achieving, 
and maintaining full spectrum conflict dominance456 through unified action and the 
conduct of joint decisive operations, to synchronize all instruments of national and 
multinational power and apply appropriate capabilities to help supported or supporting 
agencies assess, contain, stabilize, manage, and resolve any situation to achieve the 
desired strategic and operational objectives and outcomes. By maintaining its instruments 
of national power in a global state of readiness (presence), the U.S. uses the global 
operational environment, the global battle space, to reach out (power projection) from the 
U.S. homeland and forward positions to the area of conflict or crisis to conduct 
operational level, joint decisive operations. 
While the nature of war will continue to be characterized as the violent clash of 
wills between nations or armed groups to pursue advantageous political ends, the conduct 
of conflict resolution and warfare will include both violent and non-violent means. Future 
operations will be planned and executed by a scalable interagency force capable of timely 
global projection, assured access, and immediate employment for desired strategic and 
operational level objectives in joint decisive operations; and sustainable even in an 
austere environment for extended periods or in an area-denial environment. 
The key feature threaded throughout this common interagency effort, is the 
overall capability for the interagency force, composed of resources drawn from the 
military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, 
                                                 
456 Donald Rumsfeld, “Foreword,” in National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 
Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008). 
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and economic instruments of national power to successfully and effectively conduct 
operations to achieve and maintain full spectrum dominance across the range of 
operations, inclusive of robust support for U.S. national security efforts as necessary and 
directed. As state previously in this chapter, full spectrum conflict dominance is the 
decisive defeat of any adversary or control of any situation across the full range of 
operations through joint decisive operations.457  
Joint decisive operations are the synergistic orchestration of joint and interagency 
force capabilities to achieve full spectrum dominance.458 It is the U.S. military’s 
component of unified action and the homeland security community’s concept of unified 
command or coordination. 
The term “unified action”459 is a broad generic term referring to the broad scope 
of activities (including the synchronization and/or integration of the activities of all 
governmental and non-governmental departments and agencies) taking place within the 
U.S. national security establishment. Unified action synchronizes and/or integrates multi-
agency and multi-national planning and operations, and their supporting operations, to 
achieve unity of effort and purpose through unity of command460 in the operational area. 
Unified action within the military instrument of national power supports the national 
strategic unity of effort through close coordination with the other instruments of national 
power. 
A new, but still contiguous with its predecessors, U.S. grand strategy has been 
emerging over the past decade, one that requires not only resources, but patience and 
commitment to the promotion of democracy and freedom abroad in face of a complex  
 
 
                                                 
457 Joint Staff, An Evolving Joint Perspective: U.S. Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st 
Century (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 2003) http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jwcr_screen.pdf (accessed 
September 12, 2008). 
458 Joint Staff, An Evolving Joint Perspective. 
459 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence; and Joint Operations, 8.  
460 The purpose of “unity of command” is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander 
for every objective. 
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threat environment. The acts of terror against the U.S. homeland exemplify the dangerous 
and uncertain strategic environment that will likely confront the United States in the 
future. 
Increasing political, economic, ethnic, and religious divisions, the diffusion of 
power among hostile state and non-state actors, population growth and a scarcity of 
natural resources, and the proliferation of dangerous technologies and weaponry are 
dramatically increasing the range of threats to the U.S. homeland and the nation’s global 
interests. These conditions are likely to endure and will both challenge and help shape the 
future joint force as it transforms. Evolving trends within the strategic and operational 
environments can be identified that both underscore the need for change and form the 
backdrop against which the Armed Forces of the United States will undergo 
transformation while conducting a broad range of military operations in the twenty-first 
century. 
Within this strategic environment, the United States will continue to have 
extensive and diverse global interests and commitments requiring sustainment of the 
instruments of national power to protect and advance them. Religious extremism and 
intolerance, failing and failed states, competition over natural resources and greater 
economic disparity among populations will all be growing problems and potential 
adversaries will have greater access to a global commercial, industrial, and informational 
base, providing them with niche capabilities intended to impede or defeat the capabilities 
or will of the U.S. This will accelerate and enhance the appeal of asymmetric approaches 
that avoid U.S. strengths and opportunities and instead attack U.S. weaknesses 
(vulnerabilities) and challenges. Therefore, the potential for major war, with overlapping 
regional conflicts or crises, will not abate. 
The U.S. operational environment, the “battle space,” will be global and extend 
from the U.S. homeland and will include external asymmetric threats that will require 
renewed vigilance and a focus on homeland security. Mobilizing, generating, and 
employing the instruments of national power, alone and in combination, will continue to 
rely heavily upon coordination and synchronization with interagency and multinational 
partners. Although the U.S. will retain the capacity to intervene preemptively and 
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unilaterally, the U.S. will usually operate within a coalition of like-minded powers and 
actors as the rapid urbanization and population concentration will continue to change the 
physical and political makeup of nations and as a blending and compression of the levels 
of warfare — strategic, operational, and tactical — will increasingly result in tactical 
actions with strategic consequences. 
National military capabilities and power continue to be, and will continue to be, 
key arbiters and requirements for great power status. However, the current threat 
environment, which includes a plethora of threats and threat vectors, demands that a 
nation, in order to be a serious and influential actor on the international stage, must 
possess not only sufficient military capability, it also must be able to project this 
capability beyond its borders in combination with its other, non-military, instruments of 
national power. 
The end (marked by the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
December 25, 1991) of the Cold War and the tragic events of September 11, 2001 in New 
York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania served as bookends for the current generation of 
strategists, policy and decision makers, leaders and commanders, scholars and academics, 
and politicians and for two radically different approaches to U.S. basic national security 
policy and strategy. During this decade, U.S. strategists, policy and decision makers, 
leaders and commanders, scholars and academics, and politicians grappled with 
transitioning from the focused strategy of deterring and containing communism to a 
broad, effective strategy able to confront a wide range of potential conflicts — the 
majority of which involve nations and non-state actors, especially radical extremists who 
employ terrorist tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to change the status 
quo in which the disenfranchised are empowered by gaining and exercising political 
power — anywhere in the world. 
Events after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have 
shown the need for transformed alliances and partnerships (i.e., NATO), to include a 
deployed U.S. presence and a robust U.S. ability to initiate and execute power projection 
operations, that are capable of a wide range of missions, including projecting stability 
around the periphery of the operational environment or treaty theater of operations, 
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intervening in civil conflicts, coordinating power-projection operations, and countering 
weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, deployed resources should be ready for 
expeditionary operations to shape behaviors and expectations in operational environment 
or theater of operations and for responding to challenges in and around operational 
environment or theater of operations. 
However, the contemporary “ full spectrum of conflict” dictates that all of the 
capabilities and strengths resident in and represented by the U.S.’ instruments of national 
power — geographic, natural resources, demographic, military, informational, 
diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic and the 
aggregate national will — be integrated in order to for the U.S. to detect, deter and 
contain, discredit and delegitimize, deny and disrupt, and defeat all manners of 
adversaries. U.S. adversaries are fortunately not always present in the U.S. Consequently, 
as President George W. Bush said on June 1, 2002, “We must take the battle to the 
enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”461 The U.S. 
must be able to, if necessary, fight and win a global war against a formidable enemy. The 
aggregated employment of the combined capabilities of all of the U.S.’ instruments of 
national power must be able to be mobilized, generated, and deployed forward into the 
theater of operations to be effective. 
Presence and power projection allow the U.S. to concentrate the effects of it 
military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, 
and economic instruments of national power in multiple dimensions from dispersed 
locations at critical points and times, while allocating minimum essential power to 
secondary efforts that are necessary to preserve freedom of action and maneuver. The 
purpose of “maneuver” is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the 
flexible application of power. 
                                                 
461 White House, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point,” White House, (June 
2002) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html (accessed August 15, 2008).  
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In the contemporary threat environment, presence and power projection 
capabilities facilitate achieving success by permitting the “maneuvering force”462 to take 
offensive action, seize and maintain the initiative, control the tempo of operations, and 
apply capabilities effectively within its operational environment in order to overwhelm an 
opponent at related critical points distant from the U.S. homeland. Controlling and 
dictating the tempo of operations463 can transform limited successes in the operational 
environment into a rapidly cascading decline in adversary will and capability.  
As stated previously, since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. ability to 
establish and achieve, operationalize, and maintain the strategic advantage has been 
based on the United States providing leadership to promote global peace and security. 
To achieve these two objectives, U.S. BNSP and strategy has, since the end of the 
Second World War, defined three components: (1) peacetime engagement, to include 
presence, which was the broad range of non-combat activities to promote democracy, 
relieve suffering, and enhance overall regional stability; (2) deterrence and conflict 
prevention, which ranged from conflict’s high end represented by nuclear deterrence to 
conflict’s low end represented by peace enforcement to restore stability, security, and 
international law; and (3) fight and win two major regional contingencies. Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued in May 2002 a revised Defense Planning Guidance464 
that placed greater emphasis on a new, but thoroughly traditional, strategic concept, 
                                                 
462 Joint maneuver is described as employing joint and multi-agency capabilities to gain and exploit 
positional advantage throughout the operational environment in order to generate the effects desired to 
facilitate achievement of strategic and operational objectives. 
463 Tempo is described as establishing and controlling the timing, cycle, sequence, reach, and intensity 
of an operation to best exploit friendly capabilities against adversaries and situations. 
464 The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) contains defense strategy and the guidance for key 
planning and programming priorities to execute that strategy. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) places 
responsibility and authority for program execution with the Services and other DoD components but 
maintains central direction. Serving this central purpose, the DPG presents the SECDEF's strategic plan for 
developing and employing future forces. Prepared by OSD and published by 1 October in the odd year, the 
DPG is a principal product of OSD planning. It reflects military advice and information recommended by 
the CJCS; service long-range plans and positions on policy and other matters advanced by Service 
Secretaries; and CINC appraisals of major issues and problems bearing on command missions. By 
promulgating the Defense Planning Guidance document, the Secretary of Defense increased his authority 
over the development of programs and budgets. However, the practice of publishing a new document 
annually denies DoD components needed planning stability (Office of Secretary of Defense, Defense 
Planning Guidance, 1992). 
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forward deterrence, that is, a commitment to proactively and preemptively detecting, 
denying and disrupting, containing and controlling, attacking, and decisively defeating 
potential threats overseas. 
This revised guidance led to the articulation of a deterrence policy based the 
concept of “layered defense,” which in itself is founded on the principles of presence and 
power projection. Specifically, this active, layered defense is understood to be global, 
seamlessly integrating U.S. capabilities (i.e., the MIDLIFE instruments of national 
power) in the foreign regions of the world, the global commons of space and cyberspace, 
in the geographic approaches to U.S. territory, and within the United States. In short, it is 
defense in depth predicated on viewing the strategic environment as an open system in 
which people, trade, and information move continuously and for which the entire U.S. 
government contributes to its defense through a variety of capabilities in a synchronized 
manner.  
For an active, layered defense to be effective, it “requires superior intelligence 
collection, fusion, and analysis (i.e., information dominance and superiority and the 
strategic advantage), calculated deterrence of enemies, a layered system of mutually 
supporting defensive measures that are neither ad hoc nor passive, and the capability to 
mass and focus sufficient war fighting assets to defeat any attack.”465Although the 
concept of an active, layered defense had a global context, the strategy must now be 
focused primarily on the U.S. homeland and the approaches to U.S. territory.466 
In closing and transitioning to the conclusion, therein lies the critical nexus of 
national security. The critical nexus is that the use of national power is the employment 
of all of the means that are available for employment in the pursuit of national objectives 
in peace and war to further a strategic vision of America’s role in the world that will best 
achieve the nation’s three core interests — physical security, promotion of values, and 
economic prosperity, and provide for the enduring security of the American people. 
                                                 
465 U.S. Department of Defense, Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept (Washington, DC: US 
Department of Defense, 2004) www.dtic.mil/jointvision/sd_joc_v1.doc (accessed August 15, 2008). 
466 U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington, DC: 
US Department of Defense, 2005), 1, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/d20050630homeland.pdf 
(accessed August 15, 2008).  
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Basic national security policy and strategy intrinsically and inherently includes 
national defense, homeland defense, homeland security, national preparedness, 
emergency management, and the collaborative capabilities of all of the instruments of 
national power. It is focused on a must be capable of detecting, deterring and preventing, 
disrupting and denying, containing, and decisively defeating current and emerging threats 
to the nation’s survival, vital, and important interests distant from the U.S. homeland 
while simultaneously maintaining the highest state of readiness in preparation to protect 
against, prevent if possible, respond to, and recover from any disruptive event that could 
effect the homeland and the core national survival interests.  
In order for the U.S. to consistently achieve, maintain, and operationalize the 
strategic advantage, the artificial walls must be eliminated, and the U.S. must formulate a 
multi-disciplinary national security policy and strategy that is intentional; iterative; 
offensively oriented through forward presence and power projection capabilities, but not 
necessarily preemptive, aggressive, and antagonistic; predicated on annihilation and 
eradication; and asymmetric. 
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XI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has demonstrated that national security is a collective term 
encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. A basic 
national security policy (BNSP) and its associated strategy uses the instruments of 
national power467 — all of the resources or means that are available for employment in 
the pursuit of national objectives — in peace and war to further a strategic vision of 
America’s role in the world that will best achieve the nation’s three core interests — 
physical security, promotion of values, and economic prosperity. A BNSP balances the 
ends, ways, and means to protect, preserve, and promote the American political, 
economic, and ideological way of life and shape the global environment and provide 
enduring security for the American people by exerting the full spectrum and reach of its 
instruments of national power. 
U.S. basic national security policy (BNSP) is a discipline pattern of government 
decisions and corresponding actions that is intended to counter perceived threats to the 
nation’s interests, especially the nation’s core survival, vital, and important interests. 
Because politics are an inherent component of policy, especially in a representative 
democracy with enumerated powers and prerogatives, politics, which is essentially a 
clash of current perceptions and future visions, cannot be separated from policy. 
Therefore, U.S. BNSP is the sum (∑) of history; prior decisions; actors; laws, 
rules, regulations, and authorities; and actions and reactions over time. The executive 
branch’s national security establishment, in partnership with the legislative branch, 
determines and defines the survival, vital, and important national interests; determines 
and defines the domestic and foreign threats to those interests; and develops and 
implements actions (i.e., courses of action or ways), using the resources (i.e., means or 
capabilities) resident in the instruments of national power to deter and contain, deny and 
disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat these threats. 
                                                 
467 Geographic, natural resource, and population/demographics; military, informational, diplomatic, 
legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic (MIDLIFE); and the national will. 
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National power is the capacity to influence the decisions and actions of other 
actors favorable to the U.S. National power is exerted through the instruments of 
elements of national power. Although national power has both domestic and foreign 
components and applications, the core purpose of the application of national power is to 
create and maintain conditions favorable to the nation’s core interests and end state. 
Stripped to its essence, the problem posed at the onset of this thesis is the practical 
application of the strategic framework of ends, ways, and means. Strategy is a coherent 
expression of a process, a course of action, that identifies the ends, ways, and means 
designed to achieve a certain goal.  
Mathematically, this relationship can be expressed as “Strategy = Ends + Ways + 
Means.”  
Ends, or end state, are the objectives or desired outcomes of a given strategy. In 
this thesis, the end state is ensuring the enduring security of the American people by 
achieving and maintaining the three core survival interests of the U.S.: physical 
(territorial and border) security, (political, economic, ideological, and cultural) values, 
and economic (domestic and international) prosperity. 
Ways are actions. They comprise the methods and processes executed to achieve 
the ends. More simply, ways, or courses of action, answer the question of how the end 
state will be achieved and maintained – proactive/reactive, offensive/defensive, 
unilateral/multilateral, realism-neorealism/liberalism-neoliberalism, global hegemony, 
extra regional hegemony, off-shore balancer, isolationist, etc.  
Means are the resources required to execute the way. Means are composed of and 
represented by the instruments of national power; geographic, natural resource, and 
population/demographics; military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, 
intelligence, finance, and economic (MIDLIFE); and the national will. The means or 
resources can also be described as centers of gravity — primary sources of moral or 
physical strength, power, and resistance and/or critical capabilities — primary abilities 
which merit a center of gravity to be identified as such in the context of a given scenario, 
situation, or mission. 
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There is a constant need to balance ends, ways, and means. Achieving this can be 
likened to a three-legged stool with the stool itself representing the strategy. A strategy is 
balanced and entails little risk if the selected way (course of action) is capable and has 
sufficient means (resources) to obtain the desired end (objective). 
However, if either the leg representing the ways (courses of action) or means 
(resources) is too short (due to inadequacies), or the leg representing the end state (the 
goals are unrealistic) is too long, the strategy is out of balance, and the risk is high. The 
likelihood of success is reduced. Therefore, the objective is to minimize, or ideally 
eliminate, the critical vulnerabilities — critical requirements or components thereof 
which are either deficient or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or attack 
(moral/physical harm) in a manner that achieves decisive results. Critical requirements 
are essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully 
operative. 
To bring the strategy back into balance, the legs must be adjusted; for example, 
desired ends can be scaled back to fit within the available means or resources, and the 
means or resources can be increased to more fully support the selected way(s). When the 
means or resources are inadequate, planners must consider alternative ways consistent 
with the desired end state and mission analysis. Because all of these “balancing” choices 
are strategic decisions, the balancing act is the heart of strategic art.  
Based on the literature, the principal nexus of the definitions of national security, 
homeland security, and national defense is defending and securing the homeland and 
ensuring the enduring sovereignty of the government and people of the United States. 
The secondary nexus is that only by exerting the full spectrum and reach of its 
instruments of national power can the United States achieve and maintain its core 
interests by framing and shaping the international environment in ways favorable to the 
nation’s desired end state. The third and final nexus is the ever-changing international 
environment. 
The research amply demonstrated that there has been continuity in change. The 
literature showed that although many of the variables — the threat, the global community 
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and international environment, domestic political demographics, and the domestic 
political balance of power — have certainly changed and evolved over not only over the 
past two decades, but over the whole period of the nation’s 232 years of independence. It 
is certain that these variables will continue to change and evolve and challenge the 
national security establishment’s community of strategists, policy makers, decision 
makers, academics, and politicians — all practitioners, of the art and science of strategy 
and international relations theory — in the future. 
However, the literature concurrently showed that the nation’s core interests — 
ensuring the physical (territorial and border) security of the nation, the nation’s (political, 
economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and the nation’s economic (domestic and 
international) prosperity — and the core end state — protect, preserve, and promote the 
American political, economic, and ideological way of life and shape the global 
environment and provide enduring security for the American people — have not 
changed. The literature also demonstrated that the resources (means) available – the 
instruments of national power – to the nation’s leadership in peace and in war, although 
they have most certainly evolved in terms of applicability and capability, have not 
changed. 
The element of the equation that has changed has been the course of action (ways) 
that U.S. exerts the full spectrum and reach of its instruments of national power to 
achieve and maintain its core interests by framing and shaping the international 
environment in ways favorable to the nation’s desired end state. 
The research and literature demonstrated that the U.S. has artificially, and 
unintentionally, compartmented the natural alignment and synchronization of the nation’s 
instruments of national power. This artificiality must be eliminated if the U.S. is to craft a 
BNSP capable of achieving and sustaining its unchanging and immutable core interests 
and end state. 
The U.S.’ national security is best served by a BNSP that is focused on the “25 
meter target.” The “25 meter target” emphasizes the longer term continuum of U.S. 
national security interests. Although the U.S. must remain capable of “putting out brush  
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fires” on its national security periphery, it must focus on building, achieving, and 
maintaining a BNSP capable of ensuring the achievement and maintenance of its three 
core interests and its core end state. 
First, U.S. BNSP must be strategy of intent. Strategies by intent are those 
developed primarily through the rational consideration of options (ways or courses of 
action) and their likely implications (risks versus gains and costs versus benefits). It 
cannot adopt a BNSP and strategy by default because strategies by default are determined 
primarily by ideologies or by unconscious assumptions and prejudices that prevent 
strategists from considering all options. 
Secondly, U.S. BNSP must be iterative (i.e., experiential, situational, 
environmental, and contextual). Iterative strategies are not fixed: They can be changed 
and improved, usually on the basis of experience. Learning by experience in war, 
however, is highly dependent on the famous “OODA Loop,” the iterative cycle of 
observing, orienting, deciding, and acting and are designed not so much to solve a class 
of problem as to reliably gain time to find an appropriate, more specific solution. An 
iterative strategy ensures freedom of action and maximizes U.S. success on the average 
and over the long run: the “25 meter target.” Because there is no one specific threat in 
today’s global environment, the U.S. should not adopt a tailored BNSP and strategy, 
which are built to address a solitary community of problems. 
Thirdly, U.S. BNSP must be an offensive — but not necessarily preemptive, 
aggressive, and antagonistic — strategy that employs its strengths to exploit 
enemy/adversary weaknesses and vulnerabilities, create parallel and sequential 
opportunities, and overcome challenges by establishing and maintaining the strategic 
advantage through information dominance and superiority and operational maneuver. An 
offensive BNSP and strategy creates a sense of uncertainty and ambiguity in the mindset 
of the enemy/adversary and facilitates the implementation of a strategy of annihilation. 
Fourth, U.S. BNSP must be one of annihilation (i.e., complete and utter 
incapacitation, unconditional surrender). U.S. BNSP and strategy must seek to eliminate 
the enemy’s/adversary’s ability to defend himself, in other words, to disarm him, thus 
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leaving him helpless to oppose the imposition of U.S. will (however limited or however 
extreme U.S. ultimate intentions may be). Any future U.S. BNSP and strategy must 
require that the effects of U.S. victory be such as to preclude the enemy from reopening 
the conflict after such mobilization. That is, victory, even if limited, must remove the 
source of the enemy’s potential superiority. 
Fifth, U.S. BNSP must be asymmetric because the U.S. has no genuine peer 
competitors at present and it is unlikely that a genuine peer competitor will arise in the 
foreseeable future. Most importantly, the U.S.’ current and projected enemies and 
adversaries are most certainly not peer or near peer competitors and rivals. An 
asymmetrical strategy is one that attempts to apply one category of means against another 
category, to use some means to which the enemy cannot effectively respond in kind. 
Therefore, in order for the U.S. to create and successfully operationally employ a 
BNSP and strategy, especially one that emphasizes asymmetry, intent, annihilation, and 
the superiority and necessity of the offense, including seizing and maintaining the 
strategic advantage and freedom of action, it must focus on a BNSP and strategy that 
focuses on its ability to deter and contain, deny and disrupt, and discredit and 
delegitimize enemy/adversary actions through the measured and commensurate 
application of swift, precisely targeted, and devastating retaliatory reprisals — through 
any one of, any combination of, or all of the instruments of national power — without 
warning. The retaliatory action must demonstrate that costs and risks of future action far 
outweigh the benefits and gains and that the objective of the U.S. is to eliminate the 
enemy’s/adversary’s ability to defend himself, in other words, to disarm him, thus 
leaving him helpless to oppose the imposition of U.S. will. 
Therefore, as articulated many times in this thesis, the central aim of U.S. BNSP 
and its operational COA must be to achieve and maintain the core national interests — 
ensure the physical (territorial and border) security of the nation, the nation’s (political, 
economic, ideological, and cultural) values, and the nation’s economic (domestic and 
international) prosperity — and core desired end state — provide for the enduring 
security for the American people — by exerting the full spectrum and reach of its 
instruments of national power in peace and in war. 
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To accomplish this task, U.S. BNSP must dispose of the artificial walls that 
currently separate its foundations and realign and resynchronize the capabilities resident 
in its instruments of national power. Doing so will enable the U.S. to achieve, maintain 
and sustain, and operationalize the strategic advantage. 
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